Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi

• Decision Date: 06 January 1994
• Docket Number: INC,No. 80376,RENT-A-CA,80376
• Citation: 632 So.2d 1352
• Parties: 19 Fla. L. Weekly S20 ALAMO, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, v. Michael MANCUSI, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1352

632 So.2d 1352

19 Fla. L. Weekly S20

ALAMO RENT-A-CAR, INC., Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, v. Michael MANCUSI, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.

No. 80376.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 6, 1994.

Rehearing Denied March 15, 1994.

G. Bart Billbrough of Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder & Carson, Miami, for petitioner/cross-respondent.

John Beranek of Aurell, Radey, Hinkle & Thomas, Tallahassee, and Walter G. Campbell of Krupnick, Campbell, Malone and Roselli, Ft. Lauderdale, for respondent/cross-petitioner.

OVERTON, Justice.

We have for review Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 599 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), based on direct conflict with Gatto v. Publix Supermarket, Inc., 387 So.2d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed, we approve in part and quash in part the district court's decision in this malicious prosecution case, and we remand this cause for a new trial.

The record reflects that Michael Mancusi sued Alamo-Rent-A-Car (Alamo) for malicious prosecution based on Mancusi's arrest for failure to return a rental car to Alamo in violation of section 817.52(3), Florida Statutes (1985). At trial, a jury awarded Mancusi $300,000 in compensatory damages and $2,700,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal summarized the facts of this case as follows:

The facts leading up to Mancusi's arrest on the criminal charges were in dispute; however, it appears that Mancusi rented a vehicle from Alamo believing that his contract entitled him to use the vehicle for one month, while the contract showed that the rental period was for one week only. Eventually Alamo was able to contact Mancusi, who stated his belief that he had rented the vehicle for one month, and asked Alamo to retrieve the vehicle from his business location because it would not start. Alamo had the vehicle towed to its lot, and collected payment for only a portion of the time that Mancusi had used the vehicle. Although the vehicle had been returned, the Fort Lauderdale Police Department continued its investigation into the incident, and approximately two (2) weeks after the vehicle was returned to Alamo, Mancusi was taken to the Fort Lauderdale police department, questioned, and arrested.

The transcript of Mancusi's criminal case, proffered by Alamo during the malicious prosecution trial, reveals that after approximately one-half day of testimony in Mancusi's criminal trial, the state announced a nolle prosequi following lengthy discussions between the state, Alamo, and Mancusi. During these discussions it was determined that the state would announce a nolle prosequi, and Mancusi would pay $364.00 to Alamo and execute a release in favor of the City of Fort Lauderdale, the State Attorney's Office, the State of Florida, and the City of Dania. Alamo also proffered the testimony of Mancusi's criminal attorney, which tended to indicate that the nolle prosequi was announced after a bargain had been struck between the state and Mancusi.

The trial court did not allow Alamo to admit testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the nolle prosequi because the trial court ruled that the nolle prosequi Mancusi received after jeopardy had attached in his criminal case constituted a bona fide termination of the criminal litigation in Mancusi's favor, as a matter of law.

Mancusi, 599 So.2d at 1011-12. The criminal trial transcript and other testimony regarding the nol pros was proffered into the record by Alamo after the trial judge determined that this evidence was inadmissible given his ruling that, because jeopardy had attached, the nol pros was bona fide as a matter of law. Alamo asserted that the proffered evidence would show that the nol pros was bargained for and therefore not bona fide. The trial judge, however, stated that, because jeopardy had attached, the nol pros constituted a bona fide termination and, consequently, that evidence regarding the nol pros was irrelevant and inadmissible.

The trial court also ruled that section 768.73(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), the statute limiting punitive damages to no more than three times the amount of a compensatory damage award, was inapplicable in this case.

On appeal, the district court reversed the trial court's decision in part and remanded this cause for a new trial. The district court first determined that the trial court erred in holding that the nol pros of the underlying criminal case constituted a bona fide termination under the circumstances of this case. The district court stated that a "bargained-for" nol pros after jeopardy had attached is not indicative of the accused's innocence and is not sufficient, as a matter of law, to establish a bona fide termination. Consequently, the district court ruled, the jury should have been allowed to review the evidence surrounding the nol pros to determine whether the nol pros was, in fact, a bona fide termination. In so ruling, the district court noted that the burden rests on the defendant "to establish that the decision to nolle prosequi was based solely on restitution." Mancusi, 599 So.2d at 1012 (quoting Liu v. Mandina, 396 So.2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)) (emphasis added). The district court also stated that the jury should have been allowed to review the evidence regarding the nol pros and should have been allowed to hear the proffered testimony regarding the negotiations and conditions from which the nol pros resulted.

Finally, the district court addressed the issue of punitive damages. Under section 768.73(1)(a), punitive damages must be limited to no more than three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded in any civil action based on, among other things, "misconduct in commercial transactions." The district court, in affirming the trial court's ruling on this issue, found that the statute did not apply to cases involving an intentional tort. The district court then concluded that the instant case was based on the intentional tort of malicious prosecution rather than on the negligence action of "misconduct in a commercial transaction" and, as such, that the statutory limitation on punitive damages was not applicable.

Bona Fide Termination

In order to prevail in a malicious prosecution action, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding against the present plaintiff was commenced or continued; (2) the present defendant was the legal cause of the original proceeding against the present plaintiff as the defendant in the original proceeding; (3) the termination of the original proceeding constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) there was an absence of probable cause for the original proceeding; (5) there was malice on the part of the present defendant; and (6) the plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the original proceeding. Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 502 So.2d 1217 (Fla.1986); Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So.2d 49 (Fla.1974). The failure of a plaintiff to establish any one of these six elements is fatal to a claim of malicious prosecution.

Alamo's principal argument concerns the third element, a bona fide termination. Alamo first asserts that the district court erroneously placed the burden on Alamo rather than Mancusi to prove a bona fide termination of the underlying criminal case on which this action is based. Second, Alamo contends that Mancusi must do more than simply show that the underlying criminal case was dismissed; Mancusi must also prove that the termination was one of "good faith," i.e., that the underlying action was dismissed because Mancusi was innocent. Third, Alamo asserts that the district court erroneously stated that a nol pros is always proof of a bona fide termination unless it is shown that the dismissal was secured "solely for restitution." As to this last assertion, Alamo states that, although a nol pros that is secured on the promise of restitution does not constitute a bona fide termination, neither does a nol pros that is secured through bargaining, negotiation, or a promise of payment, such as the one at issue here. Because Mancusi's nol pros was allegedly premised upon a bargained-for promise of payment to Alamo, Alamo argues that Mancusi has failed to establish the bona fide termination element and concludes that judgment must be entered in its favor.

Mancusi, on the other hand, maintains that the district court did not reverse the burden of proof or suggest that Alamo had the burden of showing the absence of a bona fide termination. Mancusi insists that the district court merely held that, once he proved that the underlying criminal case was dismissed by the State, the burden then shifted to Alamo to prove that the nol pros was based "solely on restitution." Further, he states that negotiating or discussing a nol pros with the State does not negate the "bona fide" nature of the dismissal for purposes of malicious prosecution. Based on the evidence presented at trial, Mancusi claims that the termination was bona fide as a matter of law and asks that we uphold the judgment entered by the trial court.

The district court, relying on Freedman v. Crabro Motors, Inc., 199 So.2d 745 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), stated that a bona fide termination is one that indicates the innocence of the accused and is one that has not been obtained by the accused on a bargained-for promise of payment or restitution. Clearly, as with all of the elements of a malicious prosecution claim, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish that the underlying cause of action was terminated and that such termination was "bona fide." Once a plaintiff submits evidence of a bona fide termination, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut that the termination was bona fide. For example, when a plaintiff establishes that an underlying criminal case was nol prossed and presents evidence that the nol pros was not the result of a negotiated plea or...