Alan, Sean and Koule, Inc. v. Sv/Corsta V
| Citation | 286 F.Supp.2d 1367 |
| Decision Date | 22 July 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CV402-174.,CV402-174. |
| Parties | ALAN, SEAN, AND KOULE, INC., d/b/a ASK, Inc. and ASK Corporation, a Florida corporation, Plaintiff, v. The S/V "CORSTA V," her boilers, engines, tackle, equipment, freight, appliances, appurtenances, plans, drawings, schematics, sails, tenders, etc., in rem, Defendant. Alan, Sean, And Koule, Inc., d/b/a ASK, Inc. and ASK Corporation, a Florida corporation, Plaintiff, v. Corsta, LLC., a Cayman Island Corporation, and the S/V "Corsta V," her boilers, engines, tackle, equipment, freight, appliances, appurtenances, plans, drawings, schematics, sails, tenders, etc., in rem, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
Edward L. Newberry, Jr., Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Bart, LLP, Savannah, GA, Michael W. McLeod, Seiden, Alder & Matthewman, PA, Boca Raton, FL, Christopher Rogers Fertig, Fertig & Gramling, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff.
Arnold C. Young, Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, PC, Marc Gordon Marling, Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, Savannah, GA, Robin Corwin Campbell, Adorno & Yoss, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Eric Allan Lee, Lee & Amtzis, PL, Deerfield Beach, FL, for Defendants.
Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 24 & 35). After careful consideration, the Court finds that Plaintiff's motions must be DENIED.
These actions involve a dispute over repairs made to the S/V Corsta V ("Vessel"). On March 1, 2001, the parties entered into a Ship Improvement Contract by which Corsta, LLC ("Corsta"), the owner of the Vessel, hired Plaintiff to perform certain repairs to the Vessel. The repairs were expected to take six to eight months to complete.1 The repairs began shortly after the contract was signed and included repairs to the Vessel's electrical wiring and hydraulics. Because the Vessel was missing as-built drawings of the electric and hydraulic systems, new ones had to be made as part of the repair process. In addition, the repairs included joinery work.
When the repairs first began in March 2001, Anthony Priest served as the Captain of the Vessel. As Captain, Mr. Priest supervised the work being done to the Vessel, inspected it, and dealt with any problems that arose. He also reviewed the invoices submitted by Plaintiff and compared the charges in the invoices with the work that had been done. If he agreed with the work done, he approved the invoices. If not, he voiced his complaint to Alan McKenna, who would address those complaints.2 During Mr. Priest's tenure as Captain of the Vessel, all invoices submitted by Plaintiff or TPL Corporation were paid in full. Mr. Priest left his post as Captain of the Vessel on May 3, 2001 and has no personal knowledge of Plaintiff's work after that date.
Mr. Priest was replaced as Captain by Peter M. Lambert, who began his employment in the first or second week of May 2001. (Lambert Aff. ¶ 8). Mr. Lambert performed the same job duties as Mr. Priest with respect to the supervision and inspection of Plaintiff's work. According to his affidavit, Mr. Lambert inspected all the invoices submitted by Plaintiff and had no disputes with Plaintiff's work. (Id. at ¶ 19). Mr. Lambert left his post as Captain of the Vessel around the second week of October 2001.
During Mr. Lambert's tenure as Captain of the Vessel, questions arose as to some of the invoices submitted by Plaintiff. Brian Holland, the Director of Finance at Equity Merchant Banking Corporation ("EMB"),3 began overseeing the invoices for payment submitted by Plaintiff and TPL in late summer 2001. At that time, Mr. Holland began to question some of the invoices submitted, and continued raising questions through September and October. (Holland Aff. ¶¶ 6, 8). On October 12, 2001, in response to Mr. Holland's inquiries, Plaintiff submitted two reports of work performed through October 12, 2001, and a number of invoices. Plaintiff also inquired as to when two invoices, which had been presented almost 30 days before, would be paid.
On October 18, 2001, Corsta sent a fax to Plaintiff seeking supporting documentation for a number of invoices and directed Plaintiff to contact Mr. Holland with any questions. On November 1, 2001, Corsta sent Plaintiff a fax, again asking for supporting documentation for certain invoices. On November 8, 2001, Mr. Holland sent Plaintiff a letter stating that Corsta still had not received the supporting documentation. The letter reflects that Corsta had, however, received a binder of photographs, for which Plaintiff charged Corsta $1,470.90. The letter further informed Plaintiff that it was no longer authorized to do work for Corsta and that Corsta would not pay the outstanding invoices, totaling $41,897.70, until its questions concerning Plaintiff's work had been resolved.4 Corsta's questions were never resolved to its satisfaction. As a result, Corsta filed an action against Plaintiff in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida on November 13, 2001. Corsta sought a return of Corsta's schematics and drawings, which were in Plaintiff's possession, and an accounting as to the allegedly outstanding invoices.
Plaintiff wished to file a counterclaim in the Florida state court action to enforce a maritime lien, which Plaintiff claims was created in its favor under the General Maritime Law of the United States by its performance of repairs on the Vessel. However, given the exclusivity of federal in rem maritime jurisdiction, Plaintiff could not assert its claim in the Florida state court action. Therefore, on January 7, 2002, Plaintiff instituted an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Corsta and the Vessel. Plaintiff's Complaint in the Florida federal action sought to foreclose Plaintiff's alleged maritime lien for services rendered by arresting the Vessel pursuant to the Federal Maritime Lien Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301(4)-(5). The Florida federal action included both an in rem claim against the Vessel and an in personam claim against Corsta. Specifically, Plaintiff's Complaint sought payment through condemnation and sale of the Vessel or from Corsta personally, of damages in excess of $41,897.70 plus interest, attorneys' fees, and collection costs.
After filing the Florida federal action, Plaintiff learned that the Vessel had left the geographic boundaries of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. As a result, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida did not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's in rem claim. When the Vessel was discovered in the geographic boundaries of the Southern District of Georgia, Plaintiff filed a second federal action against the Vessel in this Court on January 10, 2002. This action asserted only Plaintiff's in rem claim against the Vessel and was numbered CV402-007.
On July 16, 2002, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida transferred the case before it to this Court on forum non conveniens grounds. The transferred case was given the number CV402-174.
On October 30, 2002, Plaintiff filed motions for summary judgment in both CV402-007 and CV402-174. Corsta filed its responses to both motions on October 18, 2002. Plaintiff then filed its replies on November 7, 2002. On March 24, 2003, because of the similarity between the two cases, this Court ordered that they be consolidated. Since Plaintiff has asserted the same arguments for summary judgment in each case and because each case is based on the same set of operative facts, the Court will address both motions simultaneously.
Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The "purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus., Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (). Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmovant "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Tidmore Oil Co. v. BP Oil Co./Gulf Prods. Div., a Div. of BP Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (11th Cir.1991). The substantive law governing the action determines whether an element is essential. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); DeLong Equip., Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir.1989).
"[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine issue as to facts material to the nonmovant's case. Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1583 n. 16 (11th Cir. 1991); Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir.1991). A dispute of material fact "is `genuine' ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. However, if...
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