Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. S137238.,S137238.
• Citation: 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 534,40 Cal.4th 894,152 P.3d 1109
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Keith ALAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., Defendant and Respondent.

55 Cal.Rptr.3d 534

40 Cal.4th 894

152 P.3d 1109

Keith ALAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., Defendant and Respondent.

No. S137238.

Supreme Court of California.

March 15, 2007.

The Law Offices of John A. Schlaff and John A. Schlaff, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Michelman & Robinson, Carol Boyd, Encino, Larry Nathenson; Neumeyer & Boyd, Los Angeles, Katherine Tatikian, Encino; Sonnett & Associates, Anthony E. Sonnett, Jocelyn A. Julian; Yukevich & Sonnett and Stephanie A. Hingle for Defendant and Respondent.

Jay-Allen Eisen, Sacramento; Dennis A. Fischer, Santa Monica; Paul D. Fogel, San Francisco; Steven L. Mayer, San Francisco; Robert Olson, Los Angeles; Douglas R. Young, San Francisco; Lascher & Lascher and Wendy Cole Lascher,

Ventura, for California Academy of Appellate Lawyers as Amicus Curiae.

WERDEGAR, J.

We granted review to decide whether the Court of Appeal properly dismissed as untimely an appeal from an order denying class certification. In dismissing, the Court of Appeal concluded the notice of appeal was untimely because certain documents the superior court had mailed to the parties to inform them of its order satisfied rule 8.104(a)(1)¹ of the California Rules of Court² and, thus, commenced the 60-day period specified in the rule for filing a notice of appeal. We hold, to the contrary, that the documents in question did not satisfy the rule and that the notice was timely filed.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff and appellant Keith Alan filed this action against defendant and respondent American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Honda). Alan alleged that Honda, beginning in the mid-1980's, sold vehicles with timing belts that required costly, periodic replacement to prevent catastrophic engine, power steering and power brake failure, but prevented buyers from learning about the required maintenance through various misrepresentations and omissions. Alan purported to sue on behalf of all past and present owners of vehicles manufactured by Honda with timing belts, including certain Acura vehicles. He attempted to state claims under the unfair competition and false advertising laws (Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 17200 et seq., 17500 et seq.) as well as the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ.Code, § 1750 et seq.).

During pretrial discovery, the superior court concluded the proposed class was unmanageably large and invited the parties to limit the case to specific vehicle models and model years. The court's invitation led to a stipulated order that, while the case was pending, the statute of limitations would be tolled for all claims concerning vehicles other than Acura Integras manufactured from 1986 to 1993. Alan subsequently moved to certify a nationwide class consisting of "all individuals who now own, or have ever owned, any one or more of the Subject Vehicles" — a term defined in the operative complaint as all vehicles made by Honda with timing belts. The superior court denied the motion, reasoning that common issues did not predominate because each purported class member would need to offer individual proof of detrimental reliance on the alleged misrepresentations and omissions in order to obtain damages.

The ultimate question before us is whether Alan timely filed his notice of appeal from the superior court's order denying class certification. The matter is governed by rule 8.104(a), which provides as follows: "Unless a statute or rule 8.108³ provides otherwise, a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of: [¶] (1) 60 days after the superior court clerk mails the party filing the notice of appeal a document entitled `Notice of Entry' of judgment or a file-stamped copy of the judgment, showing the date either was mailed; [¶] (2) 60 days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document entitled `Notice of Entry' of judgment or a file-stamped copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or [¶] (3) 180 days after entry of judgment." The term "judgment," for purposes of rule 8.104(a), includes an appealable order. (Rule 8.104(f).)

Timeliness is at issue in this case because of the idiosyncratic manner in which the superior court informed the parties of its order denying class certification. On January 2, 2003, the superior court clerk mailed to the parties in a single envelope two documents, neither of which unambiguously satisfied rule 8.104(a)(1). The first document mailed by the clerk is entitled "STATEMENT OF DECISION RE: ALAN'S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION," and sets out the court's reasons for denying the motion. The statement of decision bears the superior court's file stamp and concludes with the sentence, "Alan's motion for Class Certification is Denied." The second document mailed by the clerk, a minute order, is entitled "RULING ON SUBMITTED MATER/MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION." The order states, "The Court, having heard argument in this Motion, and read and considered the papers, now issues its . . . `Statement of Decision Re: Alan's Motion for Class Certification' this date. [¶] Copies of this minute order and the Statement of Decision are sent via U.S. Mail on January 2, 2003 to counsel of record in envelopes addressed as follows." The names and addresses of counsel of record follow. In the margin at the bottom of the page is the notation, "Page 1 of 1 DEPT. 323." The minute order bears the typed or printed notation, "MINUTES ENTERED 01/02/03 COUNTY CLERK," but is not file-stamped. The parties disagree on whether these documents satisfied rule 8.104(a)(1). Honda contends they did. Alan maintains they did not.

On January 21, 2003, nineteen days after the superior court clerk mailed the documents just described, Honda filed and served on Alan a document entitled "NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER AND STATEMENT OF DECISION DENYING CLASS CERTIFICATION," attaching copies of the January 2 minute order and statement of decision. The parties agree that Honda's "Notice of Entry" satisfied rule 8.104(a)(2).

Alan filed his notice of appeal on March 6, 2003 — 63 days after the superior court mailed to the parties copies of its statement of decision and minute order, and 44 days after Honda mailed its own "Notice of Entry" of the court's ruling. Accordingly, if the documents mailed by the superior court clerk satisfied rule 8.104(a)(1), then Alan's notice of appeal was late. Alternatively, if those documents did not satisfy that rule, then rule 8.104(a)(2) governs and Alan's notice was timely.

Honda moved to dismiss Alan's appeal on the ground that rule 8.104(a)(1) governed and that his notice of appeal was therefore untimely. The Court of Appeal granted the motion and thus did not reach the merits of the appeal. In its opinion explaining the dismissal, the court addressed two issues. First, the court held the superior court's order denying the motion for class certification was immediately appealable under the so-called death knell doctrine because it had the effect of dismissing the action as to all members of the purported class other than the plaintiff. (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470, 174 Cal.Rptr. 515, 629 P.2d 23; Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 699, 63 Cal.Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d 732; Stephen v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 806, 811, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 130.) The court rejected Alan's arguments to the contrary. Second, the court concluded Alan's notice of appeal was indeed untimely. On this point, Alan argued that neither of the alternative documents required by rule 8.104(a)(1) — neither "a document entitled `Notice of Entry'" (ibid.) nor "a file-stamped copy of the judgment" — existed. Rejecting Alan's argument, the court reasoned that the minute order could be read together with the statement of decision to satisfy the rule. In the court's words, "[t]he January 2, 2003, order showed the date it was mailed, and included a file-stamped copy of a five-page statement of decision signed by the trial court." The court also rejected Alan's further argument that rule 8.104(a)(1), both in its plain language and as explained by the Advisory Committee, requires a single document that satisfies all of the rule's conditions without reference to other documents.

In his petition for review, Alan raised both of the points the Court of Appeal addressed in its opinion. In granting review, however, we limited "[t]he issue to be briefed and argued . . . to whether the Statement of Decision and Minute Order dated January 2, 2003 trigger the 60-day period within which to notice an appeal under California Rules of Court, rule [8.104](a)(1)." We thus do not review the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the order denying class certification was immediately appealable.

II. DISCUSSION

Rule 8.104(a)(1), which prescribes how a superior court clerk properly gives notice of a judgment or appealable order, has a limited function in. California appellate procedure. In most cases, the rule does not apply because the Code of Civil Procedure requires not the clerk but "the party submitting an order or judgment for entry" to mail notice of entry. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.5, subd. (a), italics added.) Parties give notice not under rule 8.104(a)(1), but under rule 8.104(a)(2), as did Honda in the case before us. The clerk is required to give notice only in designated family law matters (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.5, subd. (a); rule 5.134), in cases in which a prevailing party is not represented by counsel (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.5, subd. (b)), and upon specific order of the court (id., § 664.5, subd. (d)). The clerk was required to give notice in this case only because the court had so ordered in taking the motion for class certification under submission. In those family law proceedings in which the clerk must always give notice, rule 5.134 requires the clerk to use a Judicial Council form (FL-190) specifically drafted to ensure compliance with rule 8.104(a)(1). Obviously, problems are more...