Alar v. Mercy Memorial Hosp.
| Decision Date | 06 February 1995 |
| Docket Number | GODSELL-STYT,D,139253,Docket Nos. 139088 |
| Parties | Christopher M. ALAR, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. MERCY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, and Gayl Godsell-Stytz, D.O., and Northern Professional Emergency Physicians, P.C., Defendants-Appellees. Christopher M. ALAR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GaylO., Defendant-Appellant, and Northern Professional Emergency Physicians, P.C., and Mercy Memorial Hospital, Defendants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Ready, Sullivan & Ready by Thomas D. Ready and Dwight R. Robinson, Monroe, for Christopher M. Alar.
Law Offices of Thomas J. Trenta, P.C. by Thomas J. Trenta and Richard T. Counsman, Bloomfield Hills, for Gayl Godsell-Stytz, D.O., and Northern Professional Emergency Physicians, P.C.
Kitch, Saurbier, Drutchas, Wagner & Kenney, P.C. by Susan Healy Zitterman, William A. Tanoury, and David R. Nauts, Detroit (Lisa Diehl Vandecaveye, Monroe, of counsel), for Mercy Memorial Hosp.
Before MARK J. CAVANAGH, P.J., and JANSEN and KOLENDA, * JJ.
In Docket No. 139088, defendant Mercy Memorial Hospital appeals as of right from a January 18, 1991, judgment in favor of plaintiff, a March 8, 1991, order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and a February 13, 1991, order assessing costs. Plaintiff Christopher Alar cross appeals as of right from the January 18, 1991, judgment in favor of defendant Northern Professional Emergency Physicians, P.C., and the February 13, 1991, order assessing costs. Plaintiff also cross appeals from the trial court's denial of his motions to amend the special verdict, for JNOV, and the grant of taxable costs to defendant Mercy Memorial Hospital. We vacate the judgment against Mercy Memorial Hospital and affirm the judgment in favor of Northern Professional Emergency Physicians.
In Docket No. 139253, defendant Gayl Godsell-Stytz, D.O., appeals as of right from the January 18, 1991, judgment against her and from the denial of her motion for JNOV. The appeals were consolidated. We reverse.
This case arises from plaintiff's alleged attempted suicide and subsequent admission to the emergency room and psychiatric unit at Mercy Memorial Hospital on June 8, 1988. Plaintiff, who had been appointed to the United States Air Force Academy in March 1988, was a senior high school student at Catholic Central High School at the time of the incident. Plaintiff had been involved in an exclusive relationship with Jill Bodine. During the spring of 1988, plaintiff talked to Jill about harming himself. Plaintiff claimed that he would mention suicide to get Jill's attention or divert it from any problem they may have been having at the moment. Jill testified, however, that she believed plaintiff had been unhappy for a few months and believed he was serious about harming himself.
On June 8, 1988, Jill informed plaintiff that she wanted to date other men in the fall because they were going away to separate universities. Plaintiff objected to this. After Jill left, plaintiff wrote a note suggesting that harm might befall him and he retrieved a gun from his parents' room to make sure that Jill would take him seriously.
Plaintiff then went to the school and gave Jill the note while she was in a student meeting. Jill found plaintiff in a car in the parking lot and plaintiff had the gun in his hand. Plaintiff told Jill that if he could not stay with her, his life was not worth living. Jill attempted to get the gun, but plaintiff was able to keep it away from her. Jill then went back into the school and the principal approached the car and asked plaintiff to help him load some boxes. While plaintiff was in the hallway of the school, the police arrived and plaintiff was taken to Mercy Memorial Hospital.
While in the emergency room, Dr. Godsell-Stytz saw plaintiff, treated him, and they spoke about the Air Force Academy. Dr. Godsell-Stytz was familiar with the Air Force Academy because her husband was a graduate. Eventually, plaintiff was taken to Pineview Center, the psychiatric unit at Mercy Memorial Hospital.
Plaintiff voluntarily admitted himself into Pineview under the care of Dr. Gary Koloff, a psychiatrist. Dr. Godsell-Stytz consulted with Dr. Koloff shortly after plaintiff was admitted. Dr. Godsell-Stytz told Dr. Koloff that she felt the Air Force Academy needed to be informed of plaintiff's situation, but she did not tell Dr. Koloff that she intended to call the academy herself. Further, when she spoke with plaintiff in the emergency room she did not ask for plaintiff's permission to notify the Air Force Academy and she did not tell plaintiff that she intended to notify the academy.
Dr. Godsell-Stytz called the Air Force Academy and notified Lieutenant Lt. Colonel John F. Swiney, Jr., the director of cadet selections at the academy, of plaintiff's admission to the hospital. Lt. Col. Swiney contacted the Department of Defense Medical Examination Review Board and advised them of plaintiff's situation. After a review of plaintiff's medical records, his admission to the Air Force Academy was revoked on June 27, 1988.
Plaintiff filed an action in the Monroe Circuit Court contending that Dr. Godsell-Stytz breached the physician-patient privilege, resulting in the loss of his appointment to the Air Force Academy, and that Dr. Godsell-Stytz' actions constituted intentional interference with a business relationship. Derivative claims of vicarious liability were brought against Northern Professional Emergency Physicians, a company providing emergency room physicians to hospitals by contract, and Mercy Memorial Hospital. Plaintiff also claimed that Dr. Godsell-Stytz' conduct breached a contract entered into between him and Mercy Memorial Hospital for which the hospital was liable independent of the vicarious liability claims.
Following a lengthy jury trial, the jury found that Dr. Godsell-Stytz was liable for breach of the physician-patient privilege and tortious interference with a business relationship, that Mercy Memorial Hospital was not vicariously liable for Dr. Godsell-Stytz' tortious conduct, but that the hospital breached its contract with plaintiff, and that Northern Professional Emergency Physicians was not vicariously liable because Dr. Godsell-Stytz was not its employee. The jury awarded plaintiff $95,000 in damages. Following postjudgment proceedings regarding motions for JNOV and costs and attorney fees, these appeals ensued.
Defendant Mercy Memorial Hospital raises nine issues in its brief; however, we find one issue to be dispositive and we vacate the judgment against Mercy Memorial. We agree with Mercy Memorial that the trial court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict and JNOV because plaintiff failed to prove the existence of a contract.
In reviewing a motion for a directed verdict, this Court views the testimony and legitimate inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Directed verdicts are appropriate only when no factual question exists upon which reasonable minds could differ. Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp, 429 Mich. 540, 549, 418 N.W.2d 650 (1988). Similarly, if the evidence is such that reasonable minds could differ, then judgment notwithstanding the verdict is also improper. Davis v. Wayne Co Sheriff, 201 Mich.App. 572, 579, 507 N.W.2d 751 (1993).
Plaintiff's claim against Mercy Memorial was premised on an alleged breach of contract. Upon his admission to Pineview, plaintiff was given a "Rights and Privileges" form that summarized his rights under the Mental Health Code. Plaintiff claims that this document is a contract entered into by himself and Mercy Memorial that Mercy Memorial breached when Dr. Godsell-Stytz called the Air Force Academy concerning plaintiff's admission to the hospital.
Mercy Memorial was required by M.C.L. § 333.20201; M.S.A. § 14.15(20201) to adopt a policy describing the rights and responsibilities of patients and to treat patients in accordance with that policy. Included in this policy is the patient's right to confidential treatment of personal and medical records. M.C.L. § 333.20201(2)(c); M.S.A. § 14.15(20201)(2)(c). Additionally, Mercy Memorial was required by statute to keep confidential information acquired in the course of providing plaintiff with mental health services. M.C.L. § 330.1748; M.S.A. § 14.800(748). Therefore, the requirement that such duties be imparted to plaintiff was a preexisting duty under the statute. Because Mercy Memorial had a preexisting statutory duty to afford plaintiff these rights of confidentiality when plaintiff sought the services of the hospital and became a patient, this duty could not provide adequate consideration for any alleged contractual relationship. Mercy Memorial's preexisting duty imposed by statute cannot be considered adequate consideration to create a contract. Powers v. Peoples Community Hosp. Authority, 183 Mich.App. 550, 554, 455 N.W.2d 371 (1990); Penner v. Seaway Hosp., 169 Mich.App. 502, 510-511, 427 N.W.2d 584 (1988).
Thus, the trial court erred in denying Mercy Memorial's motions for a directed verdict and JNOV. Other than the rights and privileges document, plaintiff presented no evidence regarding the question of consideration supporting an alleged contract. Failing to prove one of the essential elements of a contract, plaintiff could not sustain his claim of breach of contract. We therefore vacate the judgment against defendant Mercy Memorial Hospital.
In his cross appeal, plaintiff raises four issues. He first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict concerning whether Dr. Godsell-Stytz was an employee of Northern Professional Emergency Physicians. The jury specifically found that...
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