Albert Brown v. Estate of George Fletcher

• Decision Date: 18 May 1908
• Docket Number: No. 220,220
• Citation: 210 U.S. 82,52 L.Ed. 966,28 S.Ct. 702
• Parties: ALBERT W. BROWN, Plff. in Err., v. ESTATE OF GEORGE N. FLETCHER, Deceased
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

210 U.S. 82

28 S.Ct. 702

52 L.Ed. 966

ALBERT W. BROWN, Plff. in Err.,

v ESTATE OF GEORGE N. FLETCHER, Deceased.

No. 220.

Argued April 30, 1908.

Decided May 18, 1908.

On April 24, 1874, a bill of complaint in a suit for an accounting was filed in the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, sitting in equity, against George N. Fletcher, of Detroit, Michigan. The latter personally appeared and defended the suit. Without going into the details of the protracted litigation in Massachusetts, or showing how the plaintiff in error became at last the plaintiff in whose favor the Massachusetts court entered judgment, it is enough to say that on april 4, 1892, an agreement was made between the parties for submitting to arbitration all the claims and demands either party might have against the other; providing that the arbitration should be under rule of court, and that it should not operate as a discontinuance of the suit. It was further stipulated that the decease of either party should not terminate the submission, but that the arbitration should continue, and his successors and legal representatives should be bound by the final award therein. On October 18, 1893, the Hon. William L. Putnam was selected as arbitrator. On May 22, 1894, he filed a preliminary award. After this, and before a final award, Fletcher died, leaving a will, which was probated in the probate court of Wayne county, Michigan. Letters testamentary were issued to his executors, citizens of Michigan, who qualified as such, and took possession of the decedent's estate in Michi- gan. His principal estate, as well as his domicil, was in Michigan, but he owned two small tracts in Massachusetts. The probate court of Middlesex county, Massachusetts, by proceedings, regular in form, appointed Frank B. Cotton, a citizen of that state, administrator with the will annexed. The Massachusetts property was afterwards sold by that administrator for $350.

After the death of Fletcher the principal suit was revived, the administrator entered his appearance therein, and an order was made by the Massachusetts court that the executors and the children and residuary legatees of the decedent be notified to appear, and that in default thereof the arbitration proceed. They were notified by personal service of the order in the state of Michigan, but did not appear. The arbitration proceeded in their absence and a final award was made. It should also be stated that, on his death, Fletcher's counsel withdrew their appearance in the case. On April 14, 1903, the Massachusetts supreme judicial court confirmed the awards of the arbitrator, and adjudged that Albert W. Brown recover from Frank B. Cotton, administrator with the will annexed, the sum of $394,372.87 and $4,495.85 as interest and the costs of suits afterwards taxed as $5,385.40. It was further adjudged and decreed that the Michigan executors of the last will were bound by the final award of the arbitrator, and liable to pay to Albert W. Brown that aforesaid sums; that the legal representatives of George N. Fletcher were likewise bound by the award and liable for any deficiency. Thereafter the decree of the Massachusetts court was filed in the probate court of Wayne county, Michigan, as evidence of a claim against the estate. It was disallowed by that court, and, on appeal to the supreme court of Michigan, the disallowance was affirmed. 146 Mich. 401, 109 N. W. 686. Thereupon the case was brought here on error.

John Miner and Harrison Geer for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 84-87 intentionally omitted] Mr. Henry M. Campbell for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 87 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

The Federal question presented is whether the Michigan courts gave force and effect to the 1st section of article 4 of the Federal Constitution, which provides that 'full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.' That this is a Federal question is not open to doubt. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 666, 36 L. ed. 1123, 1227, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224, and cases cited.

The constitutional provision does not preclude the courts of a state in which the judgment of a sister state is presented from inquiry as to the jurisdiction of the court by which the judgment was rendered. See the elaborate opinion by Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court, in Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. ed. 897. That opinion has been followed in many cases, among which may be named Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439, 448, 34 L. ed. 1054, 1059, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 369; Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, 265, 35 L. ed. 464, 467, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 773; Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350, 44 L. ed. 500, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446. Even record recitals of jurisdictional facts do not preclude oral testimony as to the existence of those facts. Knowles v. Logansport Gaslight & Coke Co. 19 Wall 58, 61, 22 L. ed. 70, 72; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 730, 24 L. ed. 565, 571; Cooper v. Newell, 173 U. S. 555, 566, 43 L. ed. 808, 811, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506.

Every state has exclusive jurisdiction over the property within its borders. Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214, 44 L. ed. 741, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603. We make this extract from the opinion of Mr. Justice White in that case, p. 222:

'To quote the language of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch, 241, 277, 2 L. ed. 608, 619: 'It is repugnant to every idea of a proceeding in rem to act against a thing which is not in the power of the sovereign under whose authority the court proceeds; and no nation will admit that its property should be absolutely changed, while remaining in its own possession, by a sentence which is entirely ex parte.'

'As said also in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 722, 24 L. ed. 565, 568: 'Except as restrained and limited by the Constitution, the several states of the Union possess and exercise the authority of independent states; and two well-established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent state over persons and property are applicable to them. One of these principles is, that every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . . The other principle of public law referred to follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory. Story, Confl. L. chap. 2; Wheaton, International Law, pt. 2, chap. 2. The several states are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one state have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions. 'Any exertion of authority of this sort beyond this limit,' says Story, 'is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property in any other tribunals.' Story, Confl. L. § 539."

Fletcher, at the time of his decease, was the owner of property, some of it situated in Massachusetts and some in Michigan. Each state had jurisdiction over the property within its limits, and could, in its own courts, in conformity with its laws, provide for the disposition thereof. Massachusetts exercised its jurisdiction over the property within its limits and disposed of it by legal proceedings in its courts. The contention now is that the proceedings in the Massachusetts court can be made operative to control the disposition of the property in Michigan. In support of this contention, counsel for plaintiff in error state two propositions:

'The supreme judicial court in equity for Suffolk county, Massachusetts, having had jurisdiction in Fletcher's lifetime over the subject-matter and the parties to the suit and, on his death, the suit having been duly revived, the decree is conclusive evidence of debt in this proceeding.

'Fletcher's Michigan executors and the administrator with the will annexed of his estate in Massachusetts are in such privity that the decree is conclusive evidence of debt in this proceeding.'

Considering first the latter proposition, we are of opinion that there is no such relation between the executor and an administrator with the will annexed, appointed in another state, as will make a decree against the latter binding upon the former, or the estate in his possession. While a judgment against a party may be conclusive, not merely against him, but also against those in privity with him, there is no privity between two administrators appointed in different states. Vaughan v. Northup, 15 Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 639; Aspden v. Nixon, 4 How. 467, 11 L. ed. 1059; Stacy v. Thrasher, 6 How. 44, 12 L. ed. 337. In this latter case, on page 58, it was said:

'Where administrations are granted to...