Albert v. Milk Control Bd.

• Decision Date: 26 March 1936
• Docket Number: No. 26624.,26624.
• Citation: 200 N.E. 688,210 Ind. 283
• Parties: ALBERT et al. v. MILK CONTROL BOARD.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

210 Ind. 283

200 N.E. 688

ALBERT et al.

v.MILK CONTROL BOARD.

No. 26624.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 26, 1936.

Actions by the Milk Control Board of Indiana against Frank Albert and against Delbert Schafer, wherein defendants filed cross-complaints. The actions were consolidated. From the judgment, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.Appeal from Superior Court, St. Joseph County; Wm. A. Bertsch, speciaL judge.

Shively & Arnold, of South Bend, for appellants.

Philip Lutz, Jr., Atty. Gen., Caleb J. Lindsey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chas. G. Dailey, of St. Louis, Mo., Roland Obenchain, of South Bend, and Eggeman, Reed & Cleland, of Fort Wayne, for appellee.

HUGHES, Judge.

This is a consolidation proceeding brought originally by appellees as two separate identical actions, the first against appellant Frank Albert, and the second against appellant Delbert Schafer, both being actions for penalties and an injunction predicated upon the charge that the appellants were, and for some time past had been, engaged in the business of milk dealer, processer, distributor-producer, and distributing broker of milk without paying the license fee imposed, and without obtaining a license as required by chapter 281 of the Acts of 1935 of the General Assembly of the state of Indiana.

There were two paragraphs of complaint, the first to recover the penalties fixed in the act, and the second was for an injunction to restrain each of the appellants from continuous violation of the act. The cases were consolidated, and the appellants separately and severally demurred to the complaint. The demurrer was overruled, and the appellants then filed four paragraphs of answer and a cross-complaint. The cross-complaint asked that the court declare the rights and status of the cross-complainants relative to different provisions of said act. A demurrer was filed to each paragraph of answer, and the same was sustained. Motion by the appellee to strike out cross-complaint was overruled, and a demurrer to the cross-complaint was overruled. There was a judgment upon the pleadings without the introduction of any evidence. A motion for a new trial was filed by appellants, which was overruled. The errors assigned for reversal are as follows:

(1) The trial court erred in overruling appellants' separate and several demurrer.

(2) The trial court erred in sustaining the appellee's demurrer to each paragraph of appellants' several answer.

(3) The trial court erred in sustaining appellee's demurrer to the first paragraph of appellants' separate and several answer to the complaint.

(4) The trial court erred in sustaining appellee's demurrer to the appellants' separate and several second paragraph of answer to the complaint.

(5) The trial court erred in sustaining appellee's demurrer to appellants' separate and several third paragraph of answer to the complaint.

(6) The trial court erred in sustaining appellee's demurrer to appellants' separate and several fourth paragraph of answer to the complaint.

(7) The trial court erred in overruling appellants' motion for a new trial.

The Milk Control Act was enacted and approved March 12, 1935. Acts 1935, c. 281, p. 1365. The act consists of twenty-six sections and covers twenty pages. The title of the act is as follows: ‘An Act declaring an emergency concerning the production and distribution of milk, creating a milk control board and defining its powers and duties, and declaring an emergency.’ The appellants contend that the title of the act is insufficient and in contravention of article 4, section 19, of the Constitution of Indiana.

The above section has been thoroughly discussed and passed upon by this court and, as said in many cases, the purpose of the section is to prevent surprise or fraud in the Legislature by means of a provision or provisions in a bill of which the title gave no information and to apprise the people of the subject of legislation under consideration. Crabbs v. State (1923) 193 Ind. 248, 139 N.E. 180. And it is also intended to prevent a combination of nonrelated subjects in the same act. Sarlls v. State ex rel. Trimble (1929) 201 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270, 67 A.L.R. 718. Moreover, ‘it is not necessary that the title of an act furnish a complete index to its contents. It will be sufficient to meet constitutional requirements when, upon a liberal construction, it is sufficient to apprise the legislators and the public in general of the subject-matter of the legislation. Or, in other words, if it be so framed as to reasonably lead to an inquiry into the body of the bill, it is sufficient.’ Gmeiner v. State (1925) 197 Ind. 43, 149 N.E. 728, 729;State v. Arnold (1894) 140 Ind. 628, 38 N.E. 820. It has also been held by this court that, where the title relates to a subject which is broad enough to make it possible to comprehend different matters, which might or might not be included in the subject as means to a given end, courts will solve doubtful questions as to the relation of a particular matter to the subject in favor of the legislation. State ex rel. v. Board of Com'rs (1906) 166 Ind. 162, 76 N.E. 986.

With the foregoing rules of construction in mind, we think the title of the act is sufficient. It is sufficient to apprise the public and the legislators of the subject-matter; there is but one subject expressed in the title, and, so far as we are able to observe, all sections of the act are properly related thereto. It has been said that the word ‘subject’ in said section indicates the thing about which the legislation is had, and the word ‘matters' the incident or secondary things necessary to provide for its complete enforcement. Board of Com'rs v. Scanlan (1912) 178 Ind. 142, 98 N.E. 801. The Legislature of 1911 (Acts 1911, c. 119) passed an act entitled, ‘An Act concerning intoxicating liquor.’ It was held in the foregoing case that this title was sufficient to embrace all other matters for the enforcement of the act. Other illustrations are: ‘An Act concerning highways,’ Acts 1905, c. 167, Smith v. Board of Com'rs (1910) 173 Ind. 364, 90 N.E. 881; ‘An Act concerning drainage,’ Acts 1907, c. 252, Thorn v. Silver (1909) 174 Ind. 504, 89 N.E. 943,92 N.E. 161; ‘An Act regulating descents and the apportionment of estates,’ Stiers v. Mundy (1910) 174 Ind. 651, 92 N.E. 374.

It is next contended by appellants that the act in question is in violation of article 1, section 1, of the Indiana Constitution. This section is entitled ‘Natural Rights.’ If the act in question properly comes within the police power of the state, then it is not in violation of said article and section. We do not believe it can successfully be asserted that the regulation of the supply of milk for human consumption does not come within the police power of the state. Every state in the Union, so far as we are advised, has exercised this power in relation to milk. For many years prior to the enactment of the act in question, this state has exercised this power. See sections 35-1202, 35-1203, 35-1301, 35-1302, 35-1303, 35-1304, 35-1305, 35-1312, 35-1313, 35-1314, 35-1317, 35-1319, 35-1322, Burns' Indiana Statutes 1933, sections 8433, 8450, 8455, 8456, 8457, 8458, 8459, 8467, 8451, 8452, 8468, 2690, [210 Ind. 290]2693, Baldwin's Ind.St. 1934. The police power of the state may be exercised to require that milk for human consumption be wholesome and healthful. State v. Closser (1912) 179 Ind. 230, 99 N.E. 1057.Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police Court (1932) 214 Cal. 668, 8 P.(2d) 140, 80 A.L.R. 1217, and annotated notes. And it may also be exercised to secure a supply of milk sufficient to meet the needs of the people. As said in the case of Wallace v. Feehan (1934) 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438, 442: ‘It is generally recognized that the preservation of the food supply is a proper subject of legislative action, and laws enacted for that purpose will be upheld when they are reasonably appropriate and calculated to result in protection of the food supply against loss or destruction.’ In the case of Nebbia v. People of State of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 509, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469, in discussing the Milk Control Act of New York, the court said: ‘Appellant insists that it went beyond the limits fixed by the Constitution. Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the deteriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.’

So, whatever rights the individual has under article 1, § 1, the public has the right, through the Legislature, to regulate it for the benefit of the common interest of all, and, when this is done, there is no violation of said article and section. In the instant case no rights of the appellants were invaded under said section. The appellant, in his brief, says: ‘The business of producing, purchase, processing, sale and distribution of milk is not a business affected ‘with a public interest,’ and is not, therefore, subject to regulation as to the general policy of carrying on the business having no relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare it is unconstitutional and void.' If the milk supply of the state is not affected with a public interest and has no relation to public health and the general welfare of our people, then, of course, the act would be invalid. But it is of common knowledge that the milk supply is affected with a public interest and has a direct relation to public health and the general welfare of the people. It is judicially known that milk and its by-products is a food absolutely essential to thousands of our citizens in order to...