Albert v. Postmates Inc.
| Decision Date | 05 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 18-cv-07592-JCS |
| Parties | JOSHUA ALBERT, Plaintiff, v. POSTMATES INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Plaintiff Joshua Albert brings several claims under California law based on the premise that Defendant Postmates Inc. misclassified Albert as an independent contractor rather than an employee in his role as a courier for Postmates. Postmates now moves to dismiss Albert's second amended complaint. The Court finds that matter suitable for resolution without oral argument and VACATES the hearing set for March 8, 2019, although the case management conference set to occur at the same time remains on calendar. For the reasons discussed below, Postmates' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Albert may file a third amended complaint no later than March 22, 2019 if he wishes to pursue claims based on Postmates' failure to reimburse expenses related to the use of his vehicle.1
This case began when Dora Lee, another Postmates courier, filed a putative class action in state court. Postmates removed to this Court under the Class Action Fairness Act and moved to compel arbitration of Lee's claims, and the Court granted that motion based on Lee's failure to optout of the arbitration clause of Postmates' Fleet Agreement within the time allowed to do so. See generally Order re Mot. to Compel Arbitration & Mot. for Leave to File Am. Compl. (dkt. 31).2 At the same time, the Court granted Lee's motion to file an amended complaint naming Joshua Albert and Kellyn Timmerman as additional plaintiffs. Id. at 18-22.
Postmates then moved to compel arbitration of Timmerman's claims and to dismiss Albert's claims. See dkt. 36. The Court granted the motion to compel Timmerman's claims and the motion to dismiss Albert's claims, but allowed Albert leave to amend most of his claims. See generally Order re Mot. to Compel Arbitration & Mot. to Dismiss ("Dec. 2018 Order," dkt. 47).3 The Court dismissed a claim under California Labor Code section 226.8 with prejudice because that statute does not provide a private right of action, and dismissed with leave to amend Albert's remaining claims—generally based on failure to pay sufficient wages and failure to reimburse business expenses—for failure to allege that Postmates owed such wages and reimbursements to Albert himself, rather than to "couriers" generally. Id. at 15-17. The Court did not reach Postmates' remaining arguments but encouraged Albert to consider those arguments in drafting a second amended complaint. Id. at 17. The Court also granted a request by Plaintiffs to dismiss rather than stay Lee and Timmerman's claims in order to allow them to appeal the Court's orders compelling arbitration, and severed Albert's claims to avoid confusion from his claims proceeding simultaneously with Lee and Timmerman's appeal. Id. at 1.
Albert's second amended complaint includes the following claims: (1) failure to reimburse business expenses in violation of section 2802 of the California Labor Code, see 2d Am. Compl. ("SAC," dkt. 49) ¶ 28; (2) failure to pay minimum wage in violation of sections 1197 and 1194 of the Labor Code, id. ¶ 29; (3) unlawful business practices under California's Unfair Competition Law (the "UCL"), id. ¶ 30; (4) a claim for penalties under California's Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") based on purported violations of a number of underlying sections of the LaborCode related to reimbursement of expenses, minimum wage, and willful misclassification, id. ¶¶ 27, 31-34; and (5) a claim for declaratory judgment establishing that Postmates has violated the Labor Code by misclassifying its couriers as independent contractors, in which Albert also seeks an injunction requiring Postmates to comply with the Labor Code, which Albert contends would constitute "public injunctive relief," id. ¶¶ 35-39.
Albert alleges that he worked as a delivery driver for Postmates in August of 2018, and that Postmates terminated him on August 30, 2018 "because his customer rating [purportedly] fell below a certain metric." Id. ¶¶ 14, 20. According to Albert, Postmates misclassified him and other drivers as independent contractors when, under California law, they would correctly be classified as employees. Id. ¶¶ 15-20. Albert alleges that, in the course of performing deliveries and running Postmates' smartphone application, he "incurred costs for the use of his vehicle, including for gas and car insurance, as well as phone and data expenses that he would not have incurred if he had not worked for Postmates," and for which Postmates did not reimburse him. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. Albert also alleges that Postmates only paid him $193.77 for twenty-six hours of work, averaging $7.45 per hour, despite California's $11 per hour minimum wage. Id. ¶ 24.
The only basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over Albert's claims is the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), which permitted Postmates to remove the case from state court when Lee sought to represent a class pursuing a total recovery exceeding than five million dollars. See SAC ¶ 6; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).4 The Court's previous order recognized that there does not appear to be precedent directly addressing whether CAFA jurisdiction extends to a case like this one, where the only remaining plaintiff no longer seeks to represent a class and was not a party at the time the case was removed. Dec. 2018 Order at 17-18. Despite the Court's request that theparties should be prepared to address this issue if Albert chose to proceed in this forum, id. at 17, neither party's briefs on the present motion address subject matter jurisdiction.
As noted in this Court's previous order, the Ninth Circuit has held that the denial of class certification does not destroy jurisdiction for a case removed under CAFA. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2010) (). Although Albert was not a party when the case was removed, he still sought to represent a class that would have satisfied CAFA jurisdictional requirements when he joined the case. See generally 1st Am. Compl. (dkt. 35). And while Albert has chosen to proceed individually rather than, as in Shell Oil, filing an unsuccessful motion for class certification, the Court finds no support in precedent or policy for conditioning jurisdiction on the distinction between whether a plaintiff pursues a meritless motion or chooses to forego filing a motion. See In re Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 606 F.3d 379, 380 (7th Cir. 2010) (). The Court therefore has subject matter jurisdiction over Albert's claims.
A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. "The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint." N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). Generally, a plaintiff's burden at the pleading stage is relatively light. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a "pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court analyzes the complaint and takes "all allegations of material fact as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).Dismissal may be based on a lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of facts that would support a valid theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A complaint "'must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "[C]ourts 'are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in original). Rather, the claim must be "'plausible on its face,'" meaning that the plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Section 2802 of the California Labor Code requires an employer to "indemnify his or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties." Cal. Lab. Code § 2802. Whether an expenditure is "necessary" within the meaning of this statute "depends on the reasonableness of the employee's choices." Gattuso v. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial