Albertorio-Santiago v. Reliable Financial Services

• Decision Date: 04 May 2009
• Docket Number: Civil No. 07-1785 (GAG).
• Citation: 612 F.Supp.2d 159
• Parties: Carlos ALBERTORIO-SANTIAGO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RELIABLE FINANCIAL SERVICES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

612 F.Supp.2d 159

Carlos ALBERTORIO-SANTIAGO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RELIABLE FINANCIAL SERVICES, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 07-1785 (GAG).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

May 4, 2009.

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Anibal Medina-Rios, Anibal Medina-Rios, Bayamon, PR, Pablo Landrau-Pirazzi, Pablo Landrau, Rio Piedras, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Seth Erbe, Carlos E. Perez-Pastrana, Raphael Pena-Ramon, Ismael Rodriguez-Izquierdo, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GUSTAVO A. GELPI, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, Carlos Albertorio Santiago ("Santiago") and his son, Carlos Joel Albertorio Feliciano ("Feliciano") (hereinafter collectively "plaintiffs"), brought this action against Reliable Financial Services, Inc. ("Reliable"), Ricardo Acevedo-Correa ("Correa"), Osvaldo Acevedo-Pérez ("Pérez"), Michelle Chevalier Torres ("Chevalier"), and the Hon. Roberto Sánchez Ramos for alleged constitutional rights violations committed in the course of the repossession of plaintiffs' vehicle. Plaintiffs filed this civil suit pursuant to Section 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as state law claims of negligence under Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141-5142, seeking economic, emotional, and punitive damages.¹ Plaintiffs also request a declaratory judgment providing that the self-help repossession provision in the Puerto Rico Commercial Transactions Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 19, § 2203,² is unconstitutional. Defendant Reliable moved for summary judgment as to all causes of action (Docket No. 87), plaintiffs responded in opposition (Docket No. 94), and Reliable replied (Docket No. 101). Defendant Correa moved to join both Reliable's motion for summary judgment and reply (Docket Nos. 90 & 102), which requests were granted by the court (Docket Nos. 91 & 103). After a thorough review of the applicable law, the court DENIES Reliable's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 87).

I. Standard of Review

Summary Judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "An issue is genuine if `it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party' at trial, and material if it `possess[es] the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law'." Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir.2006) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party must then "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the court finds that some genuine factual issue remains, the resolution of which could affect the outcome of the case, then the court must deny summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (here, the plaintiff) and give that party the benefit of any and all reasonable inferences. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Moreover, at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. Summary judgment may be appropriate, however, if the non-moving party's case rests merely upon "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Forestier Fradera v. Municipality of Mayaguez, 440 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Benoit v. Technical Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 173 (1st Cir.2003)).

II. Relevant Material Facts

Consistent with the summary judgment standard, the court states the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. See Iverson, 452 F.3d at 98. Additionally, in accordance with Local Rule 56, the court credits only facts properly supported by accurate record citations. See Local Rule 56(e). The court has disregarded all argument, conclusory allegations, speculation, and improbable inferences disguised as facts. See Forestier Fradera, 440 F.3d at 21; Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tabacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).

On February 6, 2003, defendant Reliable and plaintiff Santiago entered into an agreement whereby Reliable would provide financing for Santiago's purchase of a 2000 Ford Explorer. Santiago encumbered the title to the Explorer in order to secure payment of the purchase price balance, in accordance with the terms of the Purchase and Finance Agreement and the Puerto Rico Commercial Transactions Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 19, § 401 et seq. Santiago went into arrears and never paid the outstanding balance owed on the financing. Reliable filed a state action to collect the outstanding balance on the Purchase and Finance Agreement, which action was dismissed with prejudice for want of prosecution some time after the repossession at issue in this case took place. That judgment was entered on May 15, 2007, with notification to the parties on July 23, 2007.

On December 18, 2006, while the state collection action was still pending, a pre-repossession letter was sent to Santiago informing him that he had failed to make his payment to Reliable and that the Explorer was subject to repossession. Santiago has alleged that he never received this letter, which was sent to "Urb. Torremolinos, Marginal Carr. 177 B4, Guaynabo, PR 00969" ("Torremolinos"). Though Santiago had moved from the Torremolinos address to "Highland Park, Number 746, Acacia Street, San Juan, PR 00924" ("Highland Park"), he stated in his deposition that he used both his current and former address for his correspondence.

On April 14, 2007, Reliable conducted a self-help repossession of the automobile pursuant to the Commercial Transactions Act, by way of its agent, defendant Correa. On the day of the repossession, Santiago was not at home, though his son, plaintiff Feliciano, was present. The Explorer was parked on the street in front of their house. Feliciano stated in his deposition that around 9:00 or 9:30 a.m. he came out of the house because he heard the sound of clanking chains outside. Upon exiting the house, he saw a flatbed tow truck parked in front of the Explorer and a police car parked across the street, in front of their neighbor's house. In his subsequent report of the repossession, Correa indicated that he had requested an escort from the police department because the repossession was to take place in a neighborhood that is next to the Monte Park public housing project.

According to Feliciano, when he came out of the house the tow truck operator was fastening chains unto the Explorer. Feliciano spoke with Correa, who identified himself as an agent from the bank and indicated to Feliciano that the SUV was being repossessed because money was owed to the bank. During Feliciano's interaction with Correa, he did not speak with any police officers, nor did anyone make physical contact with him or threaten him in any way. However, Feliciano testified that the police officers, defendants Pérez and Chevalier, were standing next to Correa, at a distance from which they could hear the conversation. At this point, Feliciano told Correa to wait before taking the vehicle because he wanted to call his father, and went into the house to contact Santiago over the phone. According to Santiago, he told his son over the phone not to let Reliable take the Explorer until he arrived or saw the paperwork.

After speaking with his father, Feliciano came out of the house a second time and saw that the tow truck operator had already secured the Explorer to the truck and was towing it onto the flatbed. He testified that, upon seeing this, he told Correa to wait because his father was on his way. He also stated that the police officers were standing next to Correa at that time. According to Feliciano, Correa ignored him and walked away toward his vehicle, for which reason he called out to Correa loudly several times, telling him to wait. When Feliciano began to walk in Correa's direction in order to get his attention, officer Pérez crossed over in front of him, pointed at him, and told him to lower his voice and calm down "unless he wanted to have problems with [the officer]." Docket No. 87-3 at 27. Although officer Pérez did not make physical contact with Feliciano, the latter testified that he had to step back in order to avoid contact: "If I hand't steped back a little bit, he most likely would've poked me in the chest." Id. at 31. Moreover, Feliciano testified that officer Pérez spoke to him loudly and aggressively. After this confrontation with the police officer, Feliciano went back inside the house. He never had any communication with the second police officer, defendant Chevalier.

According to plaintiff Santiago, the first time he saw the Explorer after the repossession was that same day, on the back of a flatbed truck, as it was leaving his neighborhood. Santiago stated that the tow truck was being escorted by a police car and was taken to the Monte Hatillo Police Headquarters. There, Santiago spoke with Correa and with a police officer who he thought was involved in the repossession, and told them they were making a mistake because the vehicle was the object of ongoing litigation in the courts of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Santiago testified that he also requested to take some personal property from the vehicle, but was not allowed to do so because he refused to sign a piece of paper required by Correa. Santiago asked for Correa's name...