Albion Lumber Co. v. De Nobra
Decision Date | 10 February 1896 |
Docket Number | 230. |
Citation | 72 F. 739 |
Parties | ALBION LUMBER CO. v. DE NOBRA. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
C. E Wilson and Warren Olney, for plaintiff in error.
A. B Hunt, for defendant in error.
Before GILBERT and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and HAWLEY, District Judge.
The plaintiff in error was the defendant in the court below in an action brought by Maria De Nobra, as administratrix, to recover damages for the death of Jose De Nobra, who was killed while being transported on the logging train of said defendant. It was alleged in the complaint that the defendant was engaged in operating a railroad, and carrying passengers and freight thereon; that it received De Nobra as a passenger on one of its trains; that the employes in charge of the train were careless and reckless and incompetent to manage the same which fact was known to the defendant; and that while being transported thereon, the train was carelessly and negligently run, and at a dangerous and reckless rate of speed, to wit, at more than 30 miles per hour, whereby the cars were thrown from the track, and De Nobra was killed. It was proven that the defendant operated its railroad as a logging road solely for the transportation of its own property; that one Hickey had general charge of the road and the logging camps, and had authority to employ men in the woods to work for the company; that the deceased and some others who were with him applied to him for employment on the day of the accident, and were engaged to work for the defendant. There was evidence to the effect that Hickey inquired if they had blankets, and on being informed that the deceased and another had blankets at the Big River Hotel, several miles distant, he told them to get on the cars, and go down and get their blankets, and come up the next day, and start in to work. Hickey testified, however, that he did not tell the men to get on the cars; that he had no authority to permit it; that it was not safe, for the reason that the logs were liable to roll off. The conductor of the train at the time of the accident was riding on top of the logs, and had seen the deceased on the top of the logs before the train started, and knew that he was there. He testified that he did not object to him riding or to any one riding on the train. The general manager of the defendant testified that there was no way of getting down the road except by riding on the train or walking; that those who rode on the train had to ride on the logging cars; that there was no other place for the brakeman and conductor or anybody else except to ride on the logging cars; that he knew of no instance where the company had objected to persons riding on the train if they wanted to do so. It was shown that the train was a long one, consisting of 13 cars loaded with logs, drawn by a single locomotive. There was testimony that the speed of the train at first was only about 8 or 10 miles an hour, for the first half mile, and that, upon coming to a steep down grade, the train increased its speed, and ran 'like the wind,' and, in the opinion of a witness, at the rate of 30 miles an hour, when a sudden jerk was felt, and the train went off the track. A witness testified that 30 or 40 miles an hour was a dangerous rate of speed for that road.
Upon the writ of error to this court, the principal assignment of error is that the court gave the following instruction:
It is said that this is error, because there was no evidence whatever that running the train at a less rate of speed than 30 miles per hour was dangerous, and that, by the instruction, the court left the jury to determine whether or not any rate of speed between 10 miles an hour and 30 miles an hour was negligence. It is true that, ordinarily, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the elements of which the negligence consists must be proven by the plaintiff, and the burden of proof rests upon him. But, if it is shown that the injury complained of resulted from an accident which in itself is indicative of negligence, the plaintiff is relieved from the burden of further proving the negligence of the defendant, for the law presumes its existence. The derailment of a train has been held to be of itself sufficient to raise the presumption of negligence on the part of the railroad company. Seybolt v. Railroad...
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