Albrecht v. Butts

• Decision Date: 27 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 1:09-cv-470-SEB-DML,1:09-cv-470-SEB-DML
• Parties: MICHAEL G. ALBRECHT, Petitioner, v. KEITH BUTTS, Respondent.1
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

MICHAEL G. ALBRECHT, Petitioner, v. KEITH BUTTS, Respondent.¹

No. 1:09-cv-470-SEB-DML

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

Dated: January 27, 2012

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability

I.

Michael Albrecht seeks habeas corpus relief with respect to his 2000 conviction in an Indiana state court for the murder of his wife, Cynthia. Having considered the pleadings and the expanded record in this action for habeas corpus relief brought by Michael Albrecht, the court concludes that his petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied.

A. Applicable Law

Albrecht seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(a). In the exercise of its habeas jurisdiction, a federal court may grant relief only if the petitioner shows that he is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." Id.

When a habeas petitioner's claim was Aadjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,@ section 2254(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides that a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if: (1) the state court's adjudication of the claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(d)(1), or (2) the state court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(d)(2).

Cheeks v. Gaetz, 571 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2009). AClearly established federal law@ means Athe governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.@ Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003).

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000), the Supreme Court explained that a state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law" or "if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to ours."

! As relevant here, a state court's decision is Acontrary to@ federal law if it is Asubstantially different@ from or Aopposite to@ relevant Supreme Court precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000); Sutherland v. Gaetz, 581 F.3d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2009).

! Under the "unreasonable application" prong of the AEDPA standard, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that although the state court identified the correct legal rule, it unreasonably applied the controlling law to the facts of the case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407; see also Badelle v. Correll, 452 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 2006). AA decision is not objectively unreasonable unless it falls well outside the boundaries of permissible differences of opinion.@ Leiser v. Thurmer, 367 Fed. Appx. 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, Aa state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.@ Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 845 (2010).

AUnder AEDPA, federal courts do not independently analyze the petitioner=s claims; federal courts are limited to reviewing the relevant state court ruling on the claims.@ Rever v. Acevedo, 590 F.3d 533, 536 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Leiser, 367 Fed.Appx. at 698 (ABecause the Wisconsin court reviewed the merits of this claim directly, we may review the Wisconsin court's decision rather than conduct our own ineffective-assistance analysis.@) (citing Sturgeon v. Chandler, 552 F.3d 604, 611-12 (7th Cir. 2009)).

In summary: "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). "If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Id.

With respect to ' 2254(d)(2), state-court determinations of factual issues are "presumed correct" unless the petitioner can rebut the presumption "by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(e)(1); Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 1996).

In addition to the substantive standards noted above, A[o]ut of respect for finality, comity, and the orderly administration of justice, a federal court will not entertain a procedurally defaulted constitutional claim in a petition for habeas corpus absent a showing of cause and prejudice to excuse the default.@ Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388 (2004). A petitioner's habeas claims are procedurally defaulted unless the petitioner "first submit[s] his claims through one full round of state-court review." Johnson v. Hulett, 574 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 2009). Procedural default "occurs when a claim could have been but was not presented to the state court and cannot, at the time that the federal court reviews the habeas petition, be presented to the state court." Resnover v. Pearson, 965 F.2d 1453, 1458 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 962 (1993). If a claim has been presented to state courts, but those courts reject it on the basis that it has not been raised in compliance with a state procedural rule, it too has been procedurally defaulted. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).

A federal habeas court is barred from considering procedurally defaulted claims unless the petitioner Acan establish cause and prejudice for the default or that the failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.@ Johnson v. Hulett, 574 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). ACause@ for a procedural default exists if the petitioner can demonstrate that Asome objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel=s efforts to comply with the State=s procedural rule.@ Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. Prejudice is demonstrated by showing that the errors worked to the petitioners Aactual and substantial disadvantage.@ United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). In this context, a fundamental miscarriage of justice means actual innocence. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. A>[A]ctual innocence= means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.@ Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998). A claim of actual innocence requires a petitioner to show (1) new reliable evidence not presented at trial establishing (2) that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner in the light of the new evidence. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). For purposes of the actual-innocence exception, evidence is Anew@ only if it Awas not available at trial and could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence.@ Osborne v. Purkett, 411 F.3d 911, 920 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1569 (2006).

B. Background

Albrecht's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in Albrecht v. State, 737 N.E.2d 719 (Ind. 2000)(Albrecht I). The trial court's denial of Albrecht's petition for post-conviction relief was affirmed in Albrecht v. State, 900 N.E.2d 826 (Ind.Ct.App. Jan. 14, 2009) (Table) (Albrecht II).

The pleadings and the expanded record establish the following:

1. The circumstances surrounding Cynthia Albrecht=s death and the prosecution of Michael Albrecht for her death were summarized by the Indiana Supreme Court in deciding Albrecht=s direct appeal:

Cynthia and Michael Albrecht worked for different owners participating in the Championship Auto Racing Teams (CART) series. During the 1992 CART season the Albrechts began experiencing marital difficulties. As a result, Cynthia moved out of the marital home and thereafter filed for divorce. On October 26, 1992, one day before the divorce was scheduled to become final, Cynthia returned home from the final CART race of the season. She had made plans to meet a male friend in Florida later that week. However, after making a telephone call at approximately 9:30 p.m., Cynthia disappeared. Her naked and decapitated body was discovered several weeks later in a field in Northern Indiana.

On June 4, 1997, after a five-year criminal investigation, the State charged Albrecht with Cynthia=s murder. One of the State=s key witnesses at trial was William Filter, a long-time friend of Michael Albrecht. He had initially provided Albrecht with an alibi for the evening Cynthia disappeared. However, Filter later changed his story and told police that Albrecht had planned to murder Cynthia after their marriage soured. The plan included decapitating Cynthia to make identification of her body difficult. A jury convicted Albrecht of murder, and the trial court sentenced him to sixty years in prison.

Albrecht I, 737 N.E.2d at 723.

2. In his direct appeal, Albrecht raised the following claims for relief: (1) insufficient evidence because witness Filter was not credible; (2) the State failed to disclose a FBI agent=s original notes in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (3) the court=s instructions were confusing and misleading; (4) the trial court improperly excluded evidence to support Albrecht=s defense theory; (5) the trial court improperly admitted Albrecht=s statements to police; and (6) the jury was unfair and not impartial. In his action for post-conviction relief, Albrecht raised the following claims for relief: (1) an FBI agent witness who testified at trial was not credible; (2) evidence regarding the FBI agent=s credibility was newly discovered evidence; and (3) the trial used improperaggravating factors not found by a jury in sentencing Albrecht and that his sentence was inappropriate under Indiana law.

3. The filing of the present action followed. Albrecht=s habeas claims are:

a. The evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State=s key witness, FBI

...