Albrecht v. Walker

• Decision Date: 30 September 1874
• Citation: 1874 WL 8928,73 Ill. 69
• Parties: JACOB ALBRECHTv.MARY L. WALKER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

73 Ill. 69

1874 WL 8928 (Ill.)

JACOB ALBRECHT

v.MARY L. WALKER.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1874.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Bureau county; the Hon. EDWIN S. LELAND, Judge, presiding.

This was an action on the case, by Mary L. Walker against Jacob Albrecht, to recover damages for the sale of intoxicating liquor to the plaintiff's husband by the defendant.

Mr. G. GILBERT GIBONS, for the appellant.

Mr. J. J. HERRON, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Bureau county, rendered in an action on the case, in which Mary L. Walker was plaintiff, and Jacob Albrecht defendant, brought under section 5 of the act of 1872, called the Liquor Law.

There was a trial by jury, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff, of two thousand dollars, for which the court, refusing a motion for a new trial, rendered judgment, to reverse which defendant appeals.

Appellant was a brewer of beer, and, in that occupation, aided the farmers who raised barley and hops, and contributed, by the heavy taxes paid to the general government, to the payment of our public debt. He had no license to sell beer in small quantities. That plaintiff's husband imbibed at this brewery, pretty freely at times, is satisfactorily proved. He was not an habitual drunkard, but indulged occasionally in drinking to excess, impelled thereto, as he testified, by the cruel and abusive conduct of his wife towards him, and she knew his weakness in this regard before her marriage to him. There is nothing in this record commending this woman to the favorable consideration of any court. She became pregnant whilst a widow of some years, and was in that condition when she married Walker, and though they have been divorced, yet it is proved Walker has the same sexual intercourse with her he had when her husband. This shows the parties are of loose morals, and not possessed of very nice sensibilities. There is a want of evidence of injury to her person, property or means of support to any appreciable extent. This court has uniformly held this proof must be made before the jury can find actual damages, and without finding such damages, they can not find exemplary damages. Freese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496; Keedy v. Howe et al. ante, p. 134; Kellerman v. Arnold, 71 Ill. 632, and other cases there cited; and we may refer to two cases decided at this term, on this point: Brantigam v. While, post, p. 561, and Blank et al. v. Falford.

Appellant makes the point that the court erred in refusing his challenge, for cause, of Mr. Carpenter and Mr. Steckel, called as jurors.

It is a familiar principle, that jurors must be free from all exception. There have been innovations upon this old maxim of the common law, by the legislation of some States, among them our own, as will be seen by reference to section 14 of chapter 78, title “Jurors,” R. S. 1874, p. 633. This change of the law was rendered necessary for the due administration of criminal justice, and demanded by its exigencies, and will, no doubt, work well in practice.

Carpenter, on his cross-examination on his voir dire, testified that he had a prejudice against the business in which the defendant was engaged, but not against the defendant himself, and although he might have a prejudice against the man engaged in the business, he did not know that he would start out in the investigation with a prejudice against the man engaged in it. All honest men have a prejudice, so to speak, against larceny and other crimes, but if no prejudice exists against a party charged with the crime, we do not think that of itself is ground of challenge for cause. The court did not err in disallowing the challenge, for cause, of Mr. Carpenter.

The case is different as it regards Steckel. He seems to have been full of prejudices of the most unalloyed character. He said he thought the business of selling and manufacturing lager beer was a “perfect nuisance;” thinks it a very low business; thinks no man should be allowed to manufacture or sell it; has no sympathy at all for a man who would go into that kind of business; it is a curse to the community; is bitterly opposed to those places for the manufacture and sale of lager beer, and will do all that lays in his power, except raising mobs, to break them down. Being asked by the court if he felt a consciousness of a leaning in favor of one party or the other on a question of this kind, to start with, he answered: “Well, my feeling on that is, to have the thing stopped--that is what I feel.”

This juror, we think, was disqualified. A man who will, under oath, assert that he will do anything, short of inciting a mob, to put down the manufacture of beer, and he that sells it, is not in a fit condition of mind to judge impartially. Life, liberty or property would not be safe with such a man. Lamentable indeed would be the condition of each and of all, if the jury box shall be occupied by men who are governed by their own mean prejudices--by men who fancy themselves pre-eminently virtuous and good, in proportion as they are bigoted and fanatical. This man, if he would stop at nothing short of mob violence to put down the manufacture of beer, would not hesitate a single moment to visit one engaged in it with the heaviest damages....