Albright v. Gates, 19256.
| Decision Date | 21 June 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 19256.,19256. |
| Citation | 362 F.2d 928 |
| Parties | Charles E. ALBRIGHT and Vernie Albright, Appellants, v. Theodore J. GATES, Jane Gates, Milton J. Porter, Carmel Porter, Jacqueline C. Loos, and Tulsa United Petroleum, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Zad Leavy, Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellants.
James F. Nelson, Hightower & Nelson, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellees.
Before CHAMBERS, POPE and BARNES, Circuit Judges.
William Clark is involved in a controversy with the Albrights over oil securities purchased by the latter. Clark reached the courthouse first.
Alleging diversity, Clark sued the Albrights for slander, the words of which supposedly concerned Clark's oil security selling operations. The Albrights responded with a counterclaim against Clark for the price paid for alleged worthless oil rights or securities sold to the Albrights. As between Clark and the Albrights, it would seem obvious that the counterclaim was not less than permissive. The district court ruled that the counterclaim should stand as to Clark, and he has not appealed.
But the story does not stop at this point. Ex parte, the district court permitted the addition as defendants under the counterclaim the appellees Theodore Gates, Jane Gates, Milton J. Porter, Carmel Porter, Jacqueline C. Loos, and Tulsa United Petroleum, Inc.,1 none of which had theretofore been parties to the case.
Clark, the original plaintiff, and Tulsa United Petroleum are citizens of Oklahoma. All other parties are citizens of California.
The counterclaim asserts group responsibility of Clark and the new parties for fraudulent representations which caused the Albrights to part with their money far above the ten thousand dollar minimum jurisdictional requirement in diversity cases. Relief by way of damages and rescission is requested.
Clark and the new defendants on the counterclaim answered with sort of an old-fashioned general denial. Thereafter, they made a motion to dismiss the counterclaim, asserting that the counterclaim was not compulsory and therefore should be dismissed. Eventually, the district court let the counterclaim stand as to Clark, but dismissed it as to the new parties. An interlocutory appeal was authorized upon the district court's certificate of advisability.
We reverse, and hold there is ancillary jurisdiction as to the new parties for the case to proceed. We find sufficient identity or overlapping of...
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Moor v. County of Alameda 8212 10
...259 F.Supp. 624, 630—631 (SDNY 1966). 31 See, e.g., H. L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430, 433—434 (CA5 1967); Albright v. Gates, 362 F.2d 928 (CA9 1966); Union Paving Co. v. Downer Corp., 276 F.2d 468, 471 (CA9 1960); United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Productions, Inc., 221 F.2d......
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Walker v. New Mexico at Hobbs Ctr.
...in its antitrust claim, this would in all likelihood be a defense to the counterclaim for defamation. Instructive is Albright v. Gates, 362 F.2d 928 (9th Cir.1966). There plaintiff claimed that defendants had slandered it in uttering defamatory words about plaintiff's oil security selling o......
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Mattel Inc. v. Mga Ent. Inc.
...is compulsory is made at the time the pleading is filed, not at the end of discovery or at summary judgment. See Albright v. Gates, 362 F.2d 928, 929 (9th Cir.1966). A rule allowing perpetual reconsideration of whether discovery has revealed the absence of a logical [782 F.Supp.2d 1045] rel......
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In re Marshall
...counterclaims is generous and designed to promote judicial efficiency by avoiding multiplicity of lawsuits. See Albright v. Gates, 362 F.2d 928, 929 (9th Cir.1966). On the other hand, the standard delineating what is a core proceeding is much narrower because it is designed to comply with t......