Albright v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc., C.A. No. 02-304 GMS (D. Del. 7/31/2002)
| Decision Date | 31 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 02-304 GMS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
| Parties | ROBERT ALBRIGHT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant. |
On April 25, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendant, W.L. Gore & Associates ("Gore") in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. The complaint lists a total of eighteen plaintiffs, all of whom are former Gore employees. Each of the plaintiffs alleges that Gore engaged in a pattern and practice of discriminating against older employees in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. Ten of the plaintiffs also allege that the defendant discriminated against them based on their disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991, ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Finally, one plaintiff also alleges that the defendant unlawfully discriminated against him based on his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, et seq.
Presently before the court is the defendant's motion to dismiss for improper venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). The defendant contends that according to the relevant venue statutes, venue is improper in Delaware because the plaintiffs worked at Gore's Maryland facility, the allegedly discriminatory acts took place in Maryland, and in the absence of any discrimination, the plaintiffs would have remained employed in Maryland, not Delaware. The plaintiffs counter by arguing that the defendant has waived any objection to venue in Delaware by participating in a mediation held in the District of Delaware. The plaintiffs also contend that waiver notwithstanding, venue is proper in Delaware because documents relevant to the plaintiffs' claims are located in Delaware. The defendant responds by stating that the defense of improper venue is waived only if not raised in a motion or responsive pleading. Gore therefore argues that it did not waive any objections to venue during the mediation because no complaint had been filed at that time, and therefore the obligation to file a motion or responsive pleading had not yet been triggered. Gore further asserts that the terms of the mediation dictated that neither party would waive any defenses by participating in the mediation. Finally, Gore argues that the Delaware documents are completely irrelevant to the plaintiffs' discrimination claims.
Upon review of the facts, the law, and the submissions of the parties, the court concludes that given the plain language of both Rule 12(b)(3) and the tolling agreement, the defendant did not waive its objections to venue. Additionally, the court concludes that under the venue provisions governing Title VII and ADA cases, venue is not proper in the District of Delaware. However, to prevent any prejudice or injustice to the plaintiffs, rather than dismissing this case outright, the court will transfer the case to the District of Maryland because the case could have (and should have) been brought there. The court will now explain the reasoning behind its decision.
The defendant Gore is a Delaware corporation. Although Gore's corporate headquarters are located in Newark, Delaware, it also has offices and facilities in Maryland. Each of the eighteen plaintiffs were employed by Gore. Each plaintiff worked at Gore's facility in Elkton, Maryland. The plaintiffs were terminated at various times between 1998 and 2000. The plaintiffs allege they were terminated in violation of their rights under federal law. All eighteen of the plaintiffs allege that Gore engaged in a pattern and practice of age discrimination in violation of the ADEA because Gore had a tendency to fire older employees in favor of retaining more youthful employees.
Additionally, ten plaintiffs allege that Gore discriminated against them by terminating them due to their various disabilities in violation of the ADA. Finally, one plaintiff, Gary Johnson, has alleged that he was unlawfully terminated by the defendant based on his race in violation of Title VII. The plaintiffs properly exhausted their administrative remedies at both the state and federal levels before filing the present suit. The plaintiffs filed claims with the Maryland Commission on Human Relations in 1999. The plaintiffs then filed claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") office in Baltimore, Maryland.
In December 2000, while the administrative claims were under consideration, Gore proposed that the parties participate in a mediation. The plaintiffs had been contemplating filing suit in the District of Delaware. Counsel for the plaintiffs wrote a letter to Magistrate Judge Mary Pat Thynge of the District of Delaware on March 2001. That letter expressed the plaintiffs' intent to file in the District of Delaware, but no complaint had yet been filed. Judge Thynge accepted the case for mediation. In anticipation of mediation, and in recognition of the statute of limitations on the plaintiffs' claims would expire if mediation was unsuccessful, the parties had previously entered into a tolling agreement in December 2000. The tolling agreement stated, "This Agreement shall not be considered a waiver of any claims or defenses by Gore or the Gore employees . . ." (D.I. 1, Ex. E.)
The mediation was held in September 2001 in Delaware. The plaintiffs and the defendant participated fully in the mediation. However, the mediation was unsuccessful. The plaintiffs filed their complaint in April 2002.
In support of their contention that venue is appropriate in Delaware, the plaintiffs contend that important employment related documents, "including plaintiffs' payroll records and other personal information" are located at Gore's corporate headquarters in Newark, Delaware. More specifically, the plaintiffs assert that the following records are located in Delaware: (1) a letter concerning the accuracy of Gore's employee database; (2) documents regarding Gore's employee stock ownership plan; (3) a memo discussing Gary Jackson's pay and benefits at the time of separation; (4) Gary Jackson's separation paperwork; and (5) the plaintiffs' pay statements and W-2 forms. The defendant does not dispute that these documents are located in Delaware. Rather, Gore contends that all of the documents are irrelevant to the plaintiffs' discrimination claims. Further, the defendants note that all of the relevant documents and potential witnesses (i.e. supervisors, employees, etc.) are employed or located at Gore's Elkton, Maryland facility.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) allows a defendant make a motion to dismiss for improper venue. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3). Upon such a motion, the district court must determine whether venue is proper according the appropriate statutes. See Reed v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 166 F. Supp.2d 1052, 1054 (E.D.Pa., 2001). See also Kerobo v. Southwestern Clean Fuels Corp., 285 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2002). The movant has the burden of proving that venue is improper in the selected forum. See Myers v. American Dental Ass'n, 695 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir. 1982).
The court will first discuss the waiver issue. The court will next consider whether venue is proper in the District of Delaware. Finally, the court will discuss why it is appropriate to transfer the case to the District of Maryland.
The plaintiffs assert that the defendant has waived any improper venue defense by participating in the September 2001 mediation. The court disagrees for two reasons. First, under a strict construction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Gore could not have waived its improper venue defense prior to the filing of the complaint. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h) governs waiver of defenses contained in Rule 12. Rule 12(h) states that the defense of improper venue is waived "if it is neither made by motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading . . .". See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1).
The plain language of Rule 12(h) thus makes clear that the improper venue defense is waived only when the defense is not asserted in a Rule 12 motion to dismiss or a responsive pleading. It goes without saying, however, that the obligation to file a Rule 12 motion or a responsive pleading arises only after the complaint has been filed. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a) ().
In the present case, the September 2001 mediation took place nearly seven months prior to the filing of the plaintiffs' complaint in April 2002. Since the plain language of Rule 12(h) clearly implies that the defendant's obligation to raise the venue defense did not arise until the filing of the complaint, the court finds that the defendant did not waive the venue defense.
Statutory construction aside, as a matter of policy, it makes little sense to require defendants to assert the venue defense before a complaint has actually been filed in a specific judicial district. Granted, in the present case, Gore was notified of the plaintiffs' intention to file in Delaware.
Nevertheless, in the seven months that passed between the mediation and the filing of the complaint, the plaintiffs could have changed their minds and decided to file elsewhere. Thus, adopting a rule that required defendants to raise venue objections prior to the actual filing of the complaint would require defendants to anticipate changes in their adversaries' litigation strategies. The court finds that such a rule is unnecessary and untenable. See, e.g., Neifeld v. Steinberg, 438 F.2d 423, 425 n. 1(3d Cir. 1971) ().
The terms of the tolling agreement also compel the court to...
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