Alcala v. State
| Decision Date | 29 June 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 3873,3873 |
| Citation | 487 P.2d 448 |
| Parties | Jess ALCALA, Appellant (Defendant below), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
John E. Stanfield, of Smith & Stanfield, Laramie, for appellant.
James E. Barrett, Atty. Gen., Richard A. Stacy, Frederic C. Reed, Asst. Attys. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.
Before McINTYRE, C. J., and PARKER, McEWAN, and GRAY, JJ.
Jess Alcala has appealed to this court from a conviction of manslaughter in connection with the death of his wife, Emma Alcala.
Counsel for the defendant concedes a person accused of crime cannot ordinarily expect a perfect trial. He also concedes most of his many assignments of error do not involve major error. He says, however, even if we do not find any one thing sufficient to constitute reversible error, we should consider that an accumulation of all departures from a fair standard adds up to sufficient prejudice for reversal in this case.
Our review of the record convinces us that, on the whole, defendant had a fair trial and there was ample circumstantial evidence for a conviction of unlawful killing. Although the assignments of error are multitudinous, we need to take them one by one and point out why we consider them insufficient for reversal.
We begin with the contention that the state failed to properly establish the corpus delicti for a homicide conviction. This will afford an opportunity for a brief review of the facts and will deal with what we understand to be one of appellant's major contentions.
Undisputed facts in the case reveal Mrs. Alcala disappeared from her home in Laramie and about thirty-six days later her body was discovered in Lake Sodergreen, approximately twenty miles southwest of Laramie. The body was wrapped in a tarp with rope tied around. Another rope connected the wrapped body of the deceased to a cement block. The block and body had been in the central part of the lake, but a current or some other force caused the body, with the block dragging, to be moved to a corner of the lake where it became partially exposed and was discovered.
We recognize proof of defendant's connection with the crime as the operative agent, although essential for conviction, is not part of the corpus delicti. 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, § 17 (12 ed.)
However, as stated in 23 C. J. S. Criminal Law § 916(4), p. 633:
'* * * the facts and circumstances from which the corpus delicti is proved may connect accused with the commission of the offense, and the same evidence which tends to prove the one also may tend to prove the other, so that the existence of the crime and the guilt of accused may stand together inseparable on one foundation of circumstantial evidence. * * *'
We think in this case some of the facts and circumstances are inseparable and they will therefore be discussed together.
There was evidence that Alcala and his wife had been having domestic troubles and a considerable argument the night she disappeared. On the morning before his wife's disappearance, defendant visited a neighbor lady, Ofelia Cortez, who testified Alcala stated:
There was testimony that the rope which connected the body of the deceased to the cement block was similar in color, composition, construction and diameter to two ropes found in the defendant's possession. These ropes were described as relatively unusual in type. The ropes found on the body of the deceased were not unusual in There was evidence that Alcala owned a garbage trailer which was used for hauling trash. The trailer formerly had a tarp over it, but the tarp disappeared some time during the summer of 1969, when Mrs. Alcala was last seen alive. The defendant owned a boat and was known to make trips to Sodergreen Lake.
type. They were, however, shown to be similar to rope in the defendant's possession.
Although two days after Mrs. Alcala's disappearance the defendant stated to others he had notified police of the situation, it was ten days after her disappearance before he reported it. Also, two days after the disappearance, when riding in an automobile with a daughter, Alcala stated he thought he saw his wife's car, which also had been missing. The car proved to be where he said, but police testified he could not have seen it from the point where he supposedly saw it. A photograph was introduced in evidence to substantiate this theory.
A substantial part of the circumstantial case against the defendant consists of numerous untrue statements which he made to investigating officers concerning his actions around the time of his wife's disappearance. In several instances the police had learned facts from neighbors and other witnesses which made the defendant's first explanations suspect. The result was changes in the defendant's story.
The state considers particularly damaging to Alcala the fact that when questioned about a shovel, apparently for soil tests, he claimed he could not find his shovel. Afterwards he reported he had found it. Later it was proved and defendant admitted he had purchased the proferred shovel the night before at a second-hand store. He also then admitted that, before taking it to the police, he 'tried' it out in his back yard.
Appellant seeks to rely on State v. Osmus, 73 Wyo. 183, 276 P.2d 469, where proof was held insufficient to show that a newborn infant had not died of natural causes. There, however, the mother was unmarried and her pregnancy had not been known to her family and friends. Thus, the defendant-mother had reason to conceal the birth of the child, and under such circumstances proof that the body had been disposed of did not prove that its death was the thing being concealed. Proof was held insufficient in Osmus because criminal conduct cannot be attributed to nonfeasant acts of a mother during the travail of childbirth, even though the child should die. The principle has no application here.
In Bennett v. State, Wyo., 377 P.2d 634, 635, we said, to establish the corpus delicti in a prosecution for the killing of a newborn child these elements must concur: (1) That the infant was born alive; and (2) that death was caused by the criminal agency of the accused. With respect to homicide cases which do not involve the death of a newborn infant, this court indicated in State v. Lindsay, 77 Wyo. 410, 317 P.2d 506, 509, that proof of the corpus delicti consists of proof of the fact of death by the criminal agency of another.
It is indeed quite generally accepted that corpus delicti in the ordinary criminal homicide case consists of these two elements: (1) Death; and (2) the criminal agency of another as a cause. 1 In the Bennett case we said circumstantial evidence may be used to prove both the corpus delicti and the connection of the accused with a crime. In Lindsay it was said proof of the corpus delicti may be made by any legal evidence; and the best proof thereof is the finding and inspection of the dead body.
In this particular case, Alcala came to us after his preliminary hearing, on a petition seeking alternatively writs of habeas corpus, prohibition and certiorari. We denied the petition and stated:
'The file shows prima facie probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that defendant has committed it.
'There is no necessity for the State to negate all possible circumstances which might excuse or explain accused's conduct but is obligated to present only sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference of accused's guilt.
'It is not the purpose of the writs of habeas corpus, prohibition, or certiorari to interrupt orderly administration of criminal laws by a competent court acting within its jurisdiction.'
The evidence adduced at defendant's trial, although circumstantial, was sufficient to establish the corpus delicti and defendant's connection with the crime so as to make a case for the jury. As stated in Murdock v. State, Wyo., 351 P.2d 674, 678, even where the evidence is entirely circumstantial, if it reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, a verdict based thereon carries the same presumption of correctness as other verdicts and should not be disturbed unless wholly unwarranted.
Dr. Sakai, who examined the body of Mrs. Alcala, was of the opinion that the probable cause of death was asphyxia. While death by asphyxia is not necessarily caused by criminal agency, where there was a rather elaborate attempt to conceal the body by wrapping it and tying a cement block to it and depositing it in a lake, as in this case, there was sufficient evidence to warrant a conclusion that death was caused by criminal agency.
The facts in People v. Miller, 71 Cal.2d 459, 78 Cal.Rptr. 449, 459, 455 P.2d 377, 387, were similar to those in the case we are dealing with, in that there was an attempt to conceal the body and, because of decomposition, the pathologist was unable to reach a definite medical opinion as to the cause of death. In that case the Supreme Court of California held no reasonable inference could be drawn other than that death was caused, not by accident, but by a criminal agency. It stated: 'The criminal agency causing death may be proved by circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.'
Officers had taken conflicting and untrue statements from the defendant concerning his wife's disappearance. Then, after viewing the body of the deceased and its wrappings at a funeral home, they determined Alcala should be arrested. It was in the evening, after the body was discovered,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Crozier v. State
...or less probable than it would be without the evidence.' Rule 401, W.R.E." 714 P.2d at 739-740. Support is found in Alcala v. State, Wyo., 487 P.2d 448 (1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 997, 92 S.Ct. 1259, 31 L.Ed.2d 466, reh. denied 406 U.S. 911, 92 S.Ct. 1613, 31 L.Ed.2d 823 (1972), wherein e......
-
Vasquez v. State
...search incident to arrest for a weapon within the arrestee's immediate control or the plain-view doctrine recognized in Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 448, 453 (Wyo.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997, 92 S.Ct. 1259, 31 L.Ed.2d 466 (1972). Nevertheless, it is clear that this Court deliberately shu......
-
Black v. State
...effect of the errors "constitutes prejudice and the conduct of the trial is other than fair and impartial." Id. (quoting Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 448, 462 (Wyo. 1971) ). "Without question cumulative error may assemble in such proportion that reversal is required." Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2......
-
State v. Singh
...P.2d 1180 (1976); State v. Radabaugh, 93 Idaho 727, 471 P.2d 582 (1970); State v. Patriarca, 112 R.I. 14, 308 A.2d 300 (1973); Alcala v. State, Wyo., 487 P.2d 448, cert. den. 405 U.S. 997, 92 S.Ct. 1259, 31 L.Ed.2d 466, reh. den. 406 U.S. 911, 92 S.Ct. 1613, 31 L.Ed.2d 823 (1971); State v. ......