Alcantar v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 14 September 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15-cv-01448-REB
• Citation: 207 F.Supp.3d 1206
• Parties: Patricia ALCANTAR, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

207 F.Supp.3d 1206

Patricia ALCANTAR, Plaintiff,

v.Carolyn W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15-cv-01448-REB

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Signed September 14, 2016

Diane Katherine Bross, Diane K. Bross, P.C., Colorado Springs, CO, for Plaintiff.

Danielle Alicia Pedderson, Melissa Carol Schuenemann, Social Security Administration, J. Benedict Garcia, U.S. Attorney's Office, Denver, CO, for Defendant.

ORDER REVERSING DISABILITY DECISION AND REMANDING TO COMMISSIONER

Blackburn, United States District Judge

The matter before me is plaintiff's Complaint [#1],¹ filed July 8, 2015, seeking review of the Commissioner's decision denying plaintiff's claim for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. I have jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The matter has been fully briefed, obviating the need for oral argument. I reverse and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the ALJ to clarify the basis of his mental residual functional capacity determination.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges she is disabled as a result, inter alia , of post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") and a mood disorder. After her application for supplemental security income benefits was denied, plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. This hearing was held on November 25, 2013. At the time of the hearing, plaintiff was 29 years old. She has an eighth grade education and past relevant work experience as a customer service representative, carpet installer helper, and construction laborer. She has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 21, 2012, the date of her application for benefits.

The ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled and therefore not entitled to supplemental security income benefits. Although the evidence established plaintiff suffered from severe impairments, the judge concluded that the severity of those impairments did not meet or equal any impairment listed in the social security regulations.² The ALJ found plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a reduced range of light, unskilled work which, relevantly, required no more than occasional interaction with the general public and the ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions. Although this finding precluded plaintiff's past relevant work, the ALJ concluded there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national and local economies she could perform. He therefore found plaintiff not disabled at step five of the sequential evaluation. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appeals Council. The Council affirmed. Plaintiff then filed this action in federal court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A person is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act only if her physical and/or mental impairments preclude her from performing both her previous work and any other "substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2). "When a claimant has one or more severe impairments the Social Security [Act] requires the [Commissioner] to consider the combined effects of the impairments in making a disability determination." Campbell v. Bowen , 822 F.2d 1518, 1521 (10^th Cir.1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(c). However, the mere existence of a severe impairment or combination of impairments does not require a finding that an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. To be disabling, the claimant's condition must be so functionally limiting as to preclude any substantial gainful activity for at least twelve consecutive months. See Kelley v. Chater , 62 F.3d 335, 338 (10^th Cir.1995).

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled:

1. The ALJ must first ascertain whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. A claimant who is working is not disabled regardless of the medical findings.

2. The ALJ must then determine whether the claimed impairment is "severe." A "severe impairment" must significantly limit the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.

3. The ALJ must then determine if the impairment meets or equals in severity certain impairments described in Appendix 1 of the regulations.

4. If the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant can perform his past work despite any limitations.

5. If the claimant does not have the residual functional capacity to perform her past work, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant can perform any other gainful and substantial work in the economy. This determination is made on the basis of the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity.

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(I)–(v). See also Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750–52 (10^th Cir.1988). The claimant has the initial burden of establishing a disability in the first four steps of this analysis. Bowen v. Yuckert , 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294 n. 5, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). The burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy. Id. A finding that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Services , 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10^th Cir.1991).

Review of the Commissioner's disability decision is limited to determining whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hamilton v. Secretary of Health and Human Services , 961 F.2d 1495, 1497–98 (10^th Cir.1992) ; Brown v. Sullivan , 912 F.2d 1194, 1196 (10^th Cir.1990). Substantial evidence is evidence a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Brown , 912 F.2d at 1196. It requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence. Hedstrom v. Sullivan , 783 F.Supp. 553, 556 (D.Colo.1992). "Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or constitutes mere conclusion." Musgrave v. Sullivan , 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10^th Cir.1992). Further, "if the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal test, there is a ground for reversal apart from a lack of substantial evidence." Thompson v. Sullivan , 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10^th Cir.1993). Although a reviewing court should meticulously examine the record, it may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner. Id.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in weighing the two medical source opinions of record regarding her alleged mental impairments,³ discrediting her subjective complaints of functional mental limitations, and failing to explain why some limitations endorsed by the non-examining medical source were not adopted. The first two of these arguments are patently meritless. However, the third has traction and requires remand for the very limited purpose of allowing the ALJ to more fully articulate his findings as to the precise nature and vocational impact, if any, of plaintiff's moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace.

In almost every respect, the ALJ's opinion is a model of clarity and well-substantiated ratiocination. The evidence of record fully supports the ALJ's characterization of plaintiff's history of mental health treatment as minimal and conservative.⁴ Against that backdrop, the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff's subjective complaints regarding her mental limitations were not credible admits of no reversible error. In general, "credibility determinations ‘are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact,’ and should not be upset if supported by substantial evidence." White v. Barnhart , 287 F.3d 903, 909 (10^th Cir.2001) (citing Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 390–91 (10^th Cir.1995) ). The ALJ here gave clear, specific, legitimate reasons linked to specific evidence in the record for his credibility assessment. His findings in this regard find support in the record, and his determination therefore is entitled to substantial deference. White , 287 F.3d at 910 ; see also Qualls v. Apfel , 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10 ^th Cir.2000). Accordingly, I find no reversible error on this basis.⁵

Moreover, I perceive no error in the relative weights the ALJ assigned to the medical source opinions of record. The ALJ articulated valid reasons for affording "little weight" to the opinion of the consultative psychiatric examiner, Dr. Victor Neufeld (see Tr. 379-387), most notably that it was contrary to the medical evidence which showed minimal, conservative mental health treatment. (Tr. 27.) Not only is this an appropriate basis for affording less weight to a medical source opinion, see Fernandez v. Colvin , 2014 WL 928246 at *3 (D.Colo. Mar. 10, 2014) (citing Frey v. Bowen , 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10^th Cir.1987) ), but the ALJ appropriately tied that assessment to the evidence of record. Nor can the ALJ be faulted for finding Dr. Neufeld's opinions too broad and conclusory to be of much help in crafting a viable residual functional capacity assessment. Dr. Neufeld's suggestion that plaintiff was "moderately to markedly impaired in understanding and recalling instructions, social interaction, persistence and pace" (see Tr. 385)⁶ failed to quantify in any helpful way just how those limitations might be thought to play out in terms of real-world, work-related functioning.

By contrast, the ALJ afforded "moderate weight" to the opinion of the non-examining state agency psychiatrist, Dr. James Wanstrath, on the grounds that it was "rendered after a thorough review of the record" and was "somewhat consistent with the record." However, whereas Dr. Wanstrath opined that plaintiff should have only superficial interaction with...