Alcaraz v. Williams

• Decision Date: 24 May 2021
• Docket Number: Case No.: 2:13-cv-00818-JCM-BNW
• Parties: JUAN M. ALCARAZ, Petitioner, v. BRIAN WILLIAMS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

JUAN M. ALCARAZ, Petitioner, v. BRIAN WILLIAMS, et al., Respondents.

Case No.: 2:13-cv-00818-JCM-BNW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

May 24, 2021

Order

Juan M. Alcaraz, a Nevada prisoner, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This court denies Alcaraz's habeas petition, denies him a certificate of appealability, and directs the clerk of the court to enter judgment accordingly.

I. BACKGROUND

Alcaraz's convictions are the result of events that occurred in Clark County, Nevada on or about July 22, 2005. (ECF No. 12-9 at 2.) At approximately 11:00 p.m. on July 22, 2005, a surveillance videotape showed Alcaraz and a group of his companions walk past Roberto Rodriguez on the sidewalk outside of a market. (ECF No. 13 at 36.) While passing each other, Alcaraz and Rodriguez shared "a lot of hostile eye contact," and "it appear[ed] something must have been said" because Alcaraz and his companions "all turn around at the same time." (Id. at 37, 48.) Rodriguez then "placed his can of beer on a window ledge," while Alcaraz walked back towards him. (Id. at 37-38.) When the two individuals were "standing toe to toe," Rodriguez punched Alcaraz. (Id. at 38.) Alcaraz then placed his cigarette in his mouth, pulled out a semiautomatic handgun, manipulated the handgun in some way, and shot Rodriguez seven times, killing him. (Id. at 38-39, 52, 63.)

Following the shooting, Alcaraz ran to a nearby apartment building, hid his handgun in a dryer in a laundry room, and approached a man who was sitting outside of the apartment building to ask for a change of clothes. (Id. at 12; ECF No. 12-23 at 55-56.) Law enforcement arrived approximately a half an hour later and arrested Alcaraz, who initially gave them an incorrect name. (ECF No. 13 at 14; ECF No. 12-24 at 2-7.) Alcaraz also initially denied involvement in the shooting, but after being shown the surveillance videotape, Alcaraz "snickered and dropped his head." (ECF No. 13 at 41-42.) When law enforcement asked Alcaraz to talk, Alcaraz responded, "[t]alk. What for? You fuckin' have everything." (Id. at 42.) Alcaraz then confessed during his formal law enforcement interview, indicating "that the victim disrespected him" and "disrespected [his] neighborhood." (Id. at 70, 72.)

Alcaraz was charged with open murder and, following a jury trial, was found guilty of second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and carrying a concealed firearm. (ECF No. 13-3.) Alcaraz was sentenced to 10 years to life for the second-degree murder conviction plus a consecutive term of 10 years to life for the deadly weapon enhancement and 24 to 60 months for the concealed firearm conviction. (ECF No. 13-8 at 3.) Alcaraz appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on March 10, 2008. (ECF No. 13-25.) Remittitur issued on April 4, 2008. (ECF No. 13-27.)

Alcaraz filed a pro se state habeas petition on January 13, 2009. (ECF No. 14-1.) The state district court denied the petition on February 20, 2009. (ECF No. 14-7.) Alcaraz appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded, determining that the state district court should have appointed counsel for Alcaraz and conducted an evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 14-16.) Alcaraz filed a counseled supplemental petition on February 1, 2011. (ECF No. 14-20.) Following an evidentiary hearing, the state district court denied Alcaraz's supplemental petition on June 22, 2011. (ECF No. 15-12.) Alcaraz appealed again, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on May 10, 2012. (ECF No. 16-15.) Remittitur issued on June 6, 2012. (ECF No. 16-17.)

Alcaraz's pro se federal habeas petition was filed on May 16, 2014. (ECF No. 8.) Respondents moved to dismiss the petition on June 30, 2014. (ECF No. 10.) This court granted the motion, dismissing the petition with prejudice because it was untimely. (ECF No. 23.) Alcaraz appealed, and the United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, determining that Alcaraz was entitled to equitable tolling to excuse his late filing. (ECF No. 35.) Following the remand, Alcaraz filed a counseled first amended petition on April 9, 2018. (ECF No. 47.) Respondents moved to dismiss the first amended petition on June 8, 2018, arguing that it was not properly verified, untimely, and unexhausted, in part. (ECF No. 49.) This court granted the motion in part, dismissing grounds 3 and 5 without prejudice; finding that ground 2 was unexhausted; determining that grounds 1(2), 1(3), 1(4), 1(5), 1(6), and 1(7) were technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted; dismissing ground 6 as non-cognizable; and finding that ground 7 would proceed to the extent of any procedurally viable claims. (ECF No. 59.) Alcaraz filed a second amended petition deleting ground 2 on May 28, 2019. (ECF No. 67.) Respondents answered the remaining claims in Alcaraz's second amended petition on September 3, 2019, and Alcaraz replied on November 22, 2019. (ECF Nos. 73, 80.)

In his remaining grounds for relief, Alcaraz raises the following violations of his federal constitutional rights:

1(1). His trial counsel improperly introduced bad act evidence

1(2). His trial counsel failed to object to the state improperly commenting on his right to remain silent

1(3). His trial counsel failed to object to the state improperly advising the jurors to test the evidence themselves

1(4). His trial counsel failed to object to the state improperly shifting the burden of proof

1(5). His trial counsel failed to investigate and present evidence showing that Rodriguez was the initial aggressor

1(6). His trial counsel rushed through the proceedings

1(7). His trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his confession due to his impaired condition at the time of his law enforcement interview and to present evidence showing that he lacked intent due to his impaired condition

4. The state improperly commented that it would be a "freebie" to convict Alcaraz of manslaughter

7. There were cumulative errors

(ECF No. 67.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the standard of review generally applicable in habeas corpus cases under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"):

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing lawset forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000), and citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 75 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). "The 'unreasonable application' clause requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable." Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10) (internal citation omitted).

The Supreme Court has instructed that "[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has stated "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. at 102 (citing Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (describing the standard as a "difficult to meet" and "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Ground 1

In ground 1, Alcaraz alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective. (See ECF No. 67 at 15.) In Strickland, the Supreme Court propounded a two-prong test for analysis of claims of ineffectiveassistance of counsel requiring the petitioner to demonstrate (1) that the attorney's "representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and (2) that the attorney's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must apply a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. The petitioner's burden is to show "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. Additionally, to establish prejudice under Strickland, it is not enough for the habeas petitioner "to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Id...