Alderman v. ADT, LLC
| Decision Date | 01 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:22-cv-512 |
| Parties | PAUL ALDERMAN, III, Plaintiff, v. ADT, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Pending is plaintiff's motion to remand, filed December 9, 2022. ECF 5. The motion is ripe for adjudication.
On September 22, 2022, plaintiff filed his complaint in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia. ECF 1-1. Plaintiff alleges he was previously employed by defendant as an associate service technician. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. During his employment, plaintiff “was involved in an automobile accident while in the performance of his duties for the [d]efendant” which caused plaintiff to suffer neck, back, and leg injuries. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Due to the accident, plaintiff took time off work, and filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Id. ¶¶ 911. Also, while employed by defendant plaintiff suffered “from additional physical impairments which substantially limited him in one or more major life activities.” Id. ¶ 12. These “impairments and conditions included...stroke, coronavirus, covid pneumonia, acute hypoxemic respiratory failure, hyperkalemia, migraines, elevated LFT's, hyperglycemia, hypoxemia, hypomagnesemia, epistaxis, congenital renal agenesis, unilateral dyspnea[,] and hypertension.” Id.
Due to these conditions and the ensuing treatments, plaintiff requested leave pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and the West Virginia Human Rights Act (“WVHRA”). Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff was granted leave for a period of time, before being discharged by defendant on March 1, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 20-24.
The complaint asserts four causes of action. Counts I and III are being brought under the WVHRA for disability discrimination and retaliation, respectively. Id. ¶¶ 28-32; ¶¶ 38-42. Count II asserts a claim under the FMLA, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615, while Count IV brings a claim for workers' compensation discrimination, based on retaliatory discharge, in violation of W.Va. Code § 23-5A-1. Id. ¶¶ 33-37; ¶¶ 43-48.
On November 9, 2022, defendant filed its notice of removal. ECF 1. Defendant has invoked this court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, inasmuch as plaintiff's Count II (FMLA) raises a federal question.[1] Id. ¶¶ 6-7. Defendant then avers the court has supplemental jurisdiction over Counts I, III, and IV pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367 and 1441(c). Id. ¶¶ 8-9. In its notice of removal, defendant recognizes that generally under 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), workers' compensation claims are nonremovable. Id. ¶ 9. However, defendant believes that because the court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the workers' compensation claim. Id.
Plaintiff timely filed a motion for remand in which he argues his workers' compensation claim in Count IV is a “nonremovable action” under the express provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), and that the force and effect of § 1445(c) applies whether the court exercises federal question or diversity jurisdiction. ECF 6 at 2-8. According to plaintiff the court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's three other claims, as they all arise from a single wrong, which also forms the basis of his workers' compensation claim. Id. at 1, 6-7. Therefore, plaintiff asserts remand of all claims is warranted. Id. at 8.
In response, defendant argues plaintiff relies on outdated case law and that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) supports removal. See ECF 10. Defendant claims that, because plaintiff has stated a federal question, remand of the entire action is improper. Id. at 4-5. According to defendant, when jurisdiction has been properly conferred, the court lacks authority to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction. Id. Defendant claims the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims brought under the WVHRA (Counts I and III). Id.
In his reply, plaintiff asserts defendant has abandoned its argument, raised in the notice of removal, that the court has jurisdiction over the workers' compensation claim; and that regardless of whether the court exercises jurisdiction over his FMLA claim, the court should remand all state law claims. ECF 11 ¶¶ 1-2.
28 U.S.C. § 1441 governs removal jurisdiction. In relevant part the statute states:
[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). An action first filed in state court may be removed to a district court, if the district court would have had original jurisdiction over the action had it been originally filed in federal court. See Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S.Ct. 1743, 1748 (2019) (). The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists, and that removal is proper. Hoschar v. Appalachian Power Co., 739 F.3d 163 (4th Cir. 2014).
One source of original jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “[R]emoval is appropriate if the face of the complaint raises a federal question.” Lontz v. Tharp, 413 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2005). A second source of original jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which confers jurisdiction to the district courts when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is diversity of citizenship amongst the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
If a district court “lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, [the court] must strictly construe removal jurisdiction.” Common Cause v. Lewis, 956 F.3d 246, 252 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994)). “If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary.” Id.
The court finds defendant has failed to present sufficient evidence to show that this court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. While in its notice of removal, defendant generally claims that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied and that the parties are diverse, these assertions are insufficient to support federal jurisdiction once challenged by plaintiff.
The party seeking to invoke the court's diversity jurisdiction “bears the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to show the parties' citizenship to be diverse.” Zoroastrian Ctr. and Darb-E-Mehr of Metro. Washington, D.C. v. Rustan Guiv Found. of New York, 822 F.3d 739, 748 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Mulcahey, 29 F.3d 148). Here, because defendant is a limited liability company, in order to determine its citizenship, the court must know the citizenship of all of its members/directors. See Gen. Tech. Applications, Inc. v. Exro Ltda., 388 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2004) () (emphasis omitted); see also Horne v. Lighting Energy Services, LLC, 123 F.Supp.3d 830, 837 (N.D. W.Va. 2015).
In this instance, defendant has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the citizenship of the parties is diverse. The only support defendant provides is found in footnote two of its notice of removal where it is stated that defendant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. ECF 1 ¶ 6 n.2. Defendant then adds that, “no managers/directors of ADT LLC reside within the State of West Virginia.” Id. The court finds these unsupported, unverified allegations are insufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence, that the citizenship of the parties is diverse. Thus, the court finds it is without jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
The court finds it has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as Count II arises “under ...the laws...of the United States.” Count II clearly raises a federal question as it is titled “Violation of Family Medical Leave Act” and seeks relief for violations of FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. ECF 1-1 at ¶¶ 33-37. Moreover, plaintiff is seeking damages awardable under 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1) and is also seeking attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3). Id. at ¶¶ 35, 37. The court thus finds plaintiff's complaint has raised a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
In determining whether removal is proper, the court considers the interplay between 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) and 28 U.S.C § 1445(c). 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) states:
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