Alderman v. Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 02 November 1979
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 79-0331-R.
• Citation: 480 F. Supp. 600
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Nina Helen ALDERMAN, Administratrix, etc. v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION et al.

480 F. Supp. 600

Nina Helen ALDERMAN, Administratrix, etc. v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION et al.

Civ. A. No. 79-0331-R.

United States District Court, E. D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

November 2, 1979.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Isreal Steingold, Steingold & Steingold, Virginia Beach, Va., for plaintiff.

J. E. Clarkson, Norfolk, Va., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

WARRINER, District Judge.

I

Charles Elvis Alderman was killed in an automobile accident on 5 January 1969. Plaintiff Nina Alderman, the deceased's widow, was a passenger in the car when the accident occurred and suffered personal injuries. The car in which plaintiff and her husband were riding was manufactured by defendant Chrysler Corporation and was sold by it to defendant Chrysler Motors Corporation. By successive sales the vehicle eventually was purchased by one Margaret Alderman from a Chrysler dealer, McGrady Motor Company, Inc. The latter two entities are not parties to this suit.

Soon after the accident Nina Alderman filed two law suits in the Circuit Court of Charlotte County, Virginia. She sued Chrysler Corporation, Chrysler Motors Corporation, and McGrady Motor Company, Inc., for her personal injuries. She also sued the same defendants in her capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Alderman for the wrongful death of her husband. A third suit was filed against the same defendants by Margaret Alderman for property damage to her car.

The three cases were consolidated for trial. During the trial Nina Alderman as Administratrix and Margaret Alderman took nonsuits. In the remaining action the State court ruled that Nina Alderman, individually, failed to prove her case against any of the defendants and thereupon struck the evidence and entered judgment for the defendants. That decision has been affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Virginia.

Nina Alderman now brings this suit in federal court as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Alderman and seeks damages for wrongful death. The defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint based on pleas of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Plaintiff has not responded to defendants' motion. The issue is ripe for determination.

II

Plaintiff is a citizen of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Defendants are corporations organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with their principal place of business in the State of Michigan. The amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds the sum of $10,000.00. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

The Court notes that venue does not lie in this judicial district.¹ The defendants filed a timely motion to dismiss for improper venue, along with their answer and plea of res judicata. The defendants' motions were denied without prejudice because they did not comply with a rule of practice for the Eastern District of Virginia.² Defendants subsequently conformed their pleadings with the Local Rules and renewed their motion to dismiss based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. The defendants did not renew their motion to dismiss for improper venue, however, and the Court therefore regards venue as waived. Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(h)(1).

III

Because this is a diversity case the Court is obligated to apply the substantive law of the State in which it sits. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Accordingly, the Court will evaluate the defendants' pleas of res judicata and collateral estoppel under the laws of the Commonwealth of virginia. See Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965).

In Virginia, a judgment of nonsuit does not operate as a bar to a subsequent suit between the same parties on the same cause of action. Payne v. Buena Vista Extract Co., 124 Va. 296, 98 S.E. 34 (1919). The only effect of a nonsuit is to put an end to the pending litigation without prejudice to either party. Cf. Thomas Gemmell, Inc. v. Svea Fire & Life Ins. Co., 166 Va. 95, 184 S.E. 457 (1936) (later suit in State court); Popp v. Archbell, 203 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1953) (later suit in federal court.)³ Therefore, the prior suits in State court for property damage by Margaret Alderman, the car owner, and the wrongful death action by Nina Alderman as Administratrix of Charles Alderman's estate are of no legal consequence here. They will not be further considered or referred to in this opinion. The Court will consider only the suit in State court brought by Nina Alderman, individually, for personal injuries, a suit which resulted in judgment on the merits for the defendants.

The distinction between the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata was stated succinctly by the Supreme Court in a recent case:

Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action.

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 n.5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). The Virginia courts make a like distinction. See, e. g. Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 202 S.E.2d 917 (1974); Doummar v. Doummar, 210 Va. 189, 169 S.E.2d 454 (1969); Kemp v. Miller, 166 Va. 661, 186 S.E. 99 (1936).

Collateral estoppel and res judicata serve the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy, and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971); Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 202 S.E.2d 917 (1974). Two classic maxims of the law represent these objectives. Nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa and interest republicae ut sit finis litium.

The defendants argue that because Mrs. Alderman failed to prevail in State court on the personal injury claim, she is precluded, by res judicata and related doctrines, from maintaining in federal court a wrongful death action in her capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Alderman. Defendants would have this Court find that Nina Alderman, in her capacity as Administratrix, is the same party as the plaintiff in the State proceeding; that the statutory wrongful death beneficiaries of Charles Alderman's Estate were in privity with the parties to the State proceeding; and that both suits are based on the same cause of action. For the reasons that follow, the Court accepts the defendants' first contention but rejects the remaining two.

1. Same Party

The general rule is that a judgment has conclusive force only between persons who were parties to the prior proceeding or who were in privity with them.⁴ Ciaffone v. Community Shopping Corp., 195 Va. 41, 77 S.E.2d 817 (1953); Ferebee v. Hungate, 192 Va. 32, 63 S.E.2d 761 (1951). Named plaintiff in the State proceeding was Nina Alderman, individually; Nina Alderman, Administratrix, is named plaintiff here. Two of the three defendants in the State proceeding are the defendants here.⁵ These apparent similarities mask significant differences. In State court Nina Alderman brought suit individually to recover for her personal injuries; she brings this suit in her capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Alderman. Further, the beneficiaries of Charles Alderman's Estate, who are the real parties in interest here, were not represented as such in Nina Alderman's State court litigation.

When a judgment is rendered against a person in a suit in which he is acting solely on his own account, the rules of res judicata do not prevent a subsequent action in which he is a party solely in a representative capacity or is otherwise acting solely for the benefit of another. Restatement of Judgments § 80(1) (1942). By rote application of this rule, the State court judgment against Mrs. Alderman would not bar the present suit. Mrs. Alderman sought relief in State court as an individual; here she seeks relief in her capacity as Administratrix of Charles Alderman's Estate. Several considerations, however, militate against a mechanical application of the rule in this instance.

Although Nina Alderman brings this suit as representative or Administratrix of Charles Alderman's Estate, Mrs. Alderman, as widow, is one of the beneficiaries of that estate under Virginia's Death by Wrongful Act statute. Va.Code § 8.01-53 A(ii) (Repl. Vol. 1977).⁶ Accordingly, Mrs. Alderman asserts not only the rights and interests of others, but also—because she too is a beneficiary —her own rights and interests. The Court thus regards Mrs. Alderman not merely as a nominal party, but as one of the real parties in interest.

To support their charge that Nina Alderman should be wholly precluded from maintaining the present suit, defendants rely principally on Taylor v. Anderson, 303 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1962) (applying Virginia law). In Taylor, an automobile accident resulted in the death of a young boy and injury to his three siblings. The boy's father, as co-executor of the estate, and the injured children, as statutory wrongful death beneficiaries, brought suit in State court against the driver of one of the cars involved in the collision. The parents of the deceased child disclaimed their statutory share to any wrongful death damages awarded. After a trial on the merits, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant and judgment was entered accordingly.

The children and their father then pressed their claims in federal court. In addition to the children's personal injury claims, the father sued individually for medical expenses incurred and to be incurred by him for the injured children. The defendant asserted that the plaintiffs...