Aldossari v. Ripp

• Decision Date: 05 May 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION No. 20-3187
• Citation: 537 F.Supp.3d 828
• Parties: Nader Turki ALDOSSARI, ON BEHALF OF as parent and natural guardian of Rakan Nadar ALDOSSARI, Plaintiff v. Joseph C. RIPP et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

537 F.Supp.3d 828

Nader Turki ALDOSSARI, ON BEHALF OF as parent and natural guardian of Rakan Nadar ALDOSSARI, Plaintiff

v.Joseph C. RIPP et al., Defendants

CIVIL ACTION No. 20-3187

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed May 5, 2021

Filed May 6, 2021

James T. Tallman, Elliott & Davis PC, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiff.

Lawrence F. Stengel, Saxton Stump, Lancaster, PA, for Defendant Mohammed bin naif Alsaud.

Andrew C. Shen, Kellogg Huber Hansen Todd Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C., Katherine C. Cooper, Michael K. Kellogg, Kellogg Hansen Todd Figel & Frederick PLLC, Washington, DC, Randall P. Hsia, Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed Bin Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud.

Alvaro Peralta, Carolyn B. Lamm, Hansel T. Pham, Nicolle Kownacki, White & Case LLP, Washington, DC, Roberta D. Liebenberg, Fine, Kaplan and Black, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant Saudi Aramco.

Joseph C. Ripp, Broomall, PA, Pro Se.

MEMORANDUM

Pratter, United States District Judge

Subject matter jurisdiction derails many cases. Here, there are two such dead-end detours. Because the plaintiff cannot avoid either, this case must stop before it ever starts.

First and foremost, Article III, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that he has standing—i.e. , that he is the proper party to bring the suit. Stated most simply, the plaintiff must show that he, and not someone else, is the one aggrieved. Here, apparently, the actually aggrieved parties are either a corporation or its deceased former principal, neither of whom is bringing the claims at issue; nor is any successor-in-interest pursuing any claim. Instead, Plaintiff Nader Turki Aldossari asks the Court to grant him standing because of injuries allegedly done to non-parties and non-beneficiaries to any contracts supposedly at issue. Mr. Aldossari argues for standing based on an inventive theory, namely, that a family member who is not a personal representative of an estate can bring the claims of the decedent as if the claims were his own. The Court declines to endorse these novel work-arounds in the face of the well-established constitutional standing guardrails.

The second impediment that Plaintiff cannot overcome is the broad limitation on the federal courts’ power to hear claims brought against foreign states and their officials. That limitation, which is grounded both in statute and in principles of comity to foreign states and our coordinate branches of government, precludes the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over these stated claims against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its state-run oil authority Saudi Aramco, and Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman.

The Court dismisses all claims against all defendants for lack of standing.¹

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The roots of this case are found in a 1994 agreement to build and operate an oil refinery in the Caribbean island of St. Lucia.²

In September 1994, Trans Gulf entered into a memorandum of understanding with Transcontinental Oil and Financial Group of America, Inc. and Export Refinery Western Hemisphere, Ltd. in contemplation of a future agreement to operate an oil refinery in St. Lucia. It appears that Trans Gulf was owned and/or controlled by Plaintiff's father, Turki bin Farraj bin Nader ("Turki"), and that Transcontinental and Export were each owned or controlled by defendant Joseph Ripp. Mr. Aldossari alleges that Turki and Joseph Ripp also entered into an agreement a month later in October 1994, related to the refinery project. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17-33. This October agreement appears to have re-allocated the ownership interests as between Turki's and Mr. Ripp's companies, with Mr. Ripp agreeing to transfer 10% of Transcontinental's interests in the refinery to Turki, in his capacity as president of Transcontinental.

Two months, later in Saudi Arabia, Trans Gulf, Transcontinental, Export and Saudi Est. for Development of Riyadh formally signed an "Ownership Agreement." Id. ¶¶ 18-19; Am. Compl. at Ex. C ("Ownership Agreement"). Export agreed to develop, finance, and construct the refinery. Saudi Est. agreed, as a condition precedent, to obtain a "contract for the supply of crude oil from [Saudi Arabia] and/or Saudi Aramco" for at least 20 years. Ownership Agreement at 4, 6. Provided that Saudi Est. successfully secured a supply contract, the four parties to the Ownership Agreement would divide profits from the refinery in roughly equal shares. Id. at 6. The Ownership Agreement further provided that "any dispute between the parties shall be arbitrated in accordance with the rules and regulations then pertaining by the International Chamber of Commerce in Switzerland." Id. at 8.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the former and current Crown Princes, Saudi Aramco, and Plaintiff are not parties to this Ownership Agreement.

The Amended Complaint avers that Export eventually entered into a supply agreement at some unspecified time with Saudi Aramco and that Turki played a role in arranging that agreement. Am. Compl. ¶ 26. Sometime after that, Joseph Ripp and the former Crown Prince allegedly "cut Turki [ ] out of the deal." Id. ¶ 27. It appears that the "deal" referred to is the Ownership Agreement. That is because, in 1995, the "Crown Prince" allegedly notified Turki that, if the parties made "another deal in St. Lucia," "you will get your 24%." Id. ¶ 28.³ Mr. Aldossari then alleges that "future agreements and deals resulting in substantial profits transpired." Id. ¶ 29. There are no allegations that these agreements and deals involved any of the named defendants as parties.

Turki passed away in 1999. Id. ¶ 30. Mr. Aldossari alleges he spoke with the former Crown Prince in 2014, at which point, the former Crown Prince "acknowledged the agreement" and Turki's "right to receive payment." Id. ¶ 31. Despite the former Crown Prince's alleged promise to "arrange for payment ... in the coming weeks," no such payment was made. Id. Nor has the current Crown Prince arranged for whatever payments Mr. Aldossari claims is due. Id. ¶ 32. Mr. Aldossari instead alleges that the current Crown Prince arrested the former Crown Prince, seizing his assets as well. Id.

Mr. Aldossari claims an interest in the profits of the refinery endeavor on the sole ground that he is Turki's heir. Mr. Aldossari also appears to have assigned this claimed interest to his son, Rakan, a minor who is a U.S. resident. Neither Mr. Aldossari nor Rakan claim to represent Turki's estate or Trans Gulf. The suit is instead brought by Mr. Aldossari for Rakan's benefit.

Mr. Aldossari is proceeding against a host of defendants. He names the original parties to the Ownership Agreement as well as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Aramco, the former and current Crown Princes, and Joseph Ripp.

The Kingdom, the current Crown Prince, Saudi Aramco⁴ , and Mr. Ripp have each filed a motion to dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARD

A challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the litigation. GBForefront, L.P. v. Forefront Mgmt. Grp., LLC , 888 F.3d 29, 34 (3d Cir. 2018). When a party questions the court's power to hear the case, the court must determine whether the challenge is a facial or factual attack. Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele , 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014).

A facial attack requires the court to consider "a claim on its face." It "asserts that it is insufficient to invoke subject matter jurisdiction ... because, for example, ... there is no indication of a diversity of citizenship among the parties[.]" Id. at 358. When a defendant advances a facial attack, the "Court must consider the allegations of the complaint as true." Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). For that reason, the standard to evaluate a 12(b)(1) facial attack is similar to that used for evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion.

A factual attack, on the other hand, challenges the allegations underlying the plaintiff's assertion of jurisdiction. This can be through filing an answer or "otherwise presenting competing facts." Davis v. Wells Fargo , 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). As a result, for this analysis the Court may consider evidence outside of the pleadings. In this case, a plaintiff does not enjoy the same procedural safeguards as with a facial attack, and instead has the burden to establish that subject matter jurisdiction does exist. Mortensen , 549 F.2d at 891.

DISCUSSION

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Crown Prince, and Saudi Aramco each challenge Mr. Aldossari's standing to assert claims against them. They also argue that they are immune from this particular suit and that no exception applies that would otherwise give this Court jurisdiction over Mr. Aldossari's claims. Both challenges are jurisdictional and thus could be raised sua sponte. Meyer v. Del. Valley Lift Truck, Inc. , 392 F. Supp. 3d 483, 494 (E.D. Pa. 2019). The Court will consider each in turn.

I. Mr. Aldossari's Standing

As a threshold matter, the Court must determine whether Mr. Aldossari has standing to assert the five common law counts in his Amended Complaint. "Although standing and merits questions may involve overlapping facts, standing is generally an inquiry about the plaintiff: is this the right person to bring this claim"? Davis , 824 F.3d at 348. The party seeking the exercise of jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that he is the proper party.

Article Ill's "case or controversy" requirement means that the plaintiff must have a "personal stake in the outcome" of the litigation. U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty , 445 U.S. 388, 397, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980). The plaintiff must adequately establish he "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 578 U.S. 330, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). An injury in...