Aldoupolis v. Com.
| Citation | 386 Mass. 260,435 N.E.2d 330 |
| Parties | , 26 A.L.R.4th 890 Alexander ALDOUPOLIS v. COMMONWEALTH (and four companion cases 1 ). |
| Decision Date | 13 May 1982 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
Stephen Hrones, Boston, for Alexander Aldoupolis.
Joseph R. Welsh, Randolph, for Robert J. Tarr.
Marie T. Buckley, Boston, for Richard Dovel.
William H. Pritchard, Holbrook, for John Strickland.
P. J. Piscitelli, Brockton (J. Russell Hodgdon, Boston, with him), for Mark Savoy.
Charles J. Hely, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.
Barbara A. H. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Attorney General, intervener.
Anthony M. Traini, Boston, for Massachusetts Ass'n of Crim. Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.
A grand jury indicted the defendants on August 5, 1980, for rape, unnatural rape, and malicious destruction of property. On October 5, 1981, each defendant pleaded guilty to the charges. 2 The judge accepted their pleas and sentenced each to a suspended sentence of from three to five years at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole, two years' probation, and imposed court costs of $500. 3 Subsequently, the defendants reported to the probation officer, signed probation contracts, and made partial payments of the court costs.
On October 8, 1981, counsel for each defendant was notified to appear in court the following day. Less than twenty-four hours' notice was given of this hearing, and the purpose of the hearing was not disclosed. On October 9, 1981, the judge, acting under the authority of Mass.R.Crim.P. 29, 378 Mass. 899 (1979), revoked the suspension of the defendants' sentences and ordered the defendants to stand committed for the three-to-five-year terms, with the provision that each could withdraw his guilty pleas on or before October 13, 1981, and stand trial in February, 1982. The judge revoked the suspension of the execution of the sentences (1) noting the "public interest in the sentences" previously imposed; (2) questioning the legality, in light of G.L. c. 279, §§ 1 and 1A, of a suspended sentence for the crime of rape charged under G.L. c. 265, § 22; and (3) "(i)n view of the statements of the District Attorney objecting to my imposing a suspended sentence, as well as a desire to have this case tried on its merits." None of the defendants was afforded an opportunity to argue, respond, or object to the proceedings. 4
On the same day, the defendant Aldoupolis moved before a single justice of this court to enjoin further proceedings in the Superior Court until the close of business on October 14, 1981. 5 The single justice issued the requested stay, heard oral arguments on October 14, and continued the matter to October 20, 1981. Before that day, all the defendants filed petitions for relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3. The single justice reserved and reported the matter to the full court. 6
The defendants raise three issues: (1) whether G.L. c. 279, § 1, prohibits the suspension of the execution of a sentence of imprisonment for an offense punishable by life imprisonment or for any lesser term of years; (2) whether the trial judge was authorized under Mass.R.Crim.P. 29 to convert the suspended sentence to a sentence of imprisonment without violating the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution; and (3) whether, if the answer to issue (2) is in the affirmative, the judge can take the action described on less than twenty-four hours' notice to the defendants, without any prior notification of the purpose of the hearing, and without the defendants' having an opportunity to be heard at the hearing.
Because the issues before the court are strictly those of law, a recitation of the facts of the substantive crimes involved is unnecessary. We turn directly to the legal questions raised on this report.
1. G.L. c. 279, § 1. General Laws c. 279, § 1, as amended through St.1975, c. 347 provides in pertinent part: At the time the offense was committed, the rape statute provided: "Whoever has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a person, and compels such person to submit by force and against his will, or compels such person to submit by threat of bodily injury, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years." G.L. c. 265, § 22, as then amended by St.1974, c. 474, § 1.
General Laws c. 279, § 1, prohibits the granting of a suspended sentence when a person is convicted of a crime "punishable by death or imprisonment for life." The words "punishable by death or imprisonment for life" may be clear standing alone, but the applicability of G.L. c. 279, § 1, to a variety of statutorily proscribed offenses is not. The parties argue the question whether the prohibition against suspension of a sentence is applicable only to a crime such as murder which is punishable by death or life imprisonment, G.L. c. 265, § 2, 7 or to all crimes that carry the possibility of life imprisonment. 8
The Commonwealth urges the court not to indulge in statutory interpretation, arguing that the meaning of G.L. c. 279, § 1, is clear. "The decisions of (the United States Supreme Court, however,) have repeatedly warned against the dangers of an approach to statutory construction which confines itself to the bare words of a statute ... for 'literalness may strangle meaning,' Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 44 (66 S.Ct. 889, 892, 90 L.Ed. 1071) (1946)." Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 1067, 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962). Despite its superficial clarity, we find ambiguity in the application of the phrase "death or imprisonment for life." See Sanker v. United States, 374 A.2d 304, 307 (D.C.Cir.1977). Put another way, it becomes necessary to clarify the question whether the proscription of G.L. c. 279, § 1, applies only to those crimes for which the punishment provided is "death or imprisonment for life" or also applies to those crimes for which the punishment is "imprisonment for life or for any term of years." Taken in the context of the statutory scheme of punishment, there is ambiguity in the meaning of G.L. c. 279, § 1.
"The words of a criminal statute must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt as to its meaning or the intention of the legislature ...." 3 C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59.04, at 13 (4th ed. 1974). Where the statutory language is unclear, we look to outside sources to determine the meaning of the statute. Barclay v. DeVeau, --- Mass. ---, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 2307, 2311, 429 A.2d 323. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 363 Mass. 685, 690, 296 N.E.2d 805 (1973). We turn first to the legislative history of the statute for insight into what the Legislature intended by enacting G.L. c. 279, § 1.
The Legislature amended G.L. c. 279, § 1, in 1925 by adding a new paragraph: "The provisions of this section shall not permit the suspension of the execution of the sentence of a person convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor if such offence was committed within a period of six years immediately following his final conviction of a like offence by a court or magistrate of the commonwealth." St.1925, c. 297, § 2. The following year the Legislature added to the end of the 1925 amendment: "or of a person convicted of a felony if it shall appear that he has been previously convicted of any felony." St.1926, c. 271, § 2. In 1934 the Legislature added two more categories of crimes in which suspension of execution of the sentence was forbidden: "a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for life or of a crime an element of which is being armed with a dangerous weapon." St.1934, c. 205, § 1. An amendment in 1936 eliminated the "operating under the influence" category, St.1936, c. 434, § 2, and one in 1939 added a new category of election law offenses, St.1939, c. 299, § 5. The last pertinent amendments appear in 1966 and 1967. The second felony category was deleted and the reference to particular sections of the election law was changed in 1966. St.1966, c. 292. In 1967, the Legislature deleted the election law offenses and the crimes, "an element of which is being armed with a dangerous weapon." St.1967, c. 333. Thus, the only category of crime remaining for which the suspension of execution of the sentence was prohibited was a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment.
This pattern of amendments is hardly helpful in evidencing the legislative intent on the issue presented for decision. The various amendments, without more, shed no light on the question whether the Legislature deleted all the other categories of offenses because it sought to prohibit suspension of execution of sentences only in murder cases or whether the Legislature intended the language to cover a broad category of felonies. Another provision of the General Laws, G.L. c. 266, § 14, however, indicates that the former interpretation is closer to the legislative intent underlying G.L. c. 279, § 1.
General Laws c. 266, § 14, defines the elements of the substantive crime of burglary while being armed and burglary coupled with making an assault. The punishment for the crime is "imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of not less than ten years." G.L. c. 266, § 14, as amended. The last sentence of § 14 states that "(t)he sentence imposed upon a person who, after being convicted of...
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