Aldrich v. Schweiker, Civ. A. No. 80-279.

• Decision Date: 14 April 1982
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 80-279.
• Citation: 555 F. Supp. 1080
• Parties: Jonathan ALDRICH, Leroy Bishop, Beverly Clothey, Ruth MacLeod and Richard Nichols, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. Richard SCHWEIKER, in his official capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Services and Theodore Allen, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Vermont Disability Determination Services.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Vermont

555 F. Supp. 1080

Jonathan ALDRICH, Leroy Bishop, Beverly Clothey, Ruth MacLeod and Richard Nichols, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. Richard SCHWEIKER, in his official capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Services and Theodore Allen, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Vermont Disability Determination Services.

Civ. A. No. 80-279.

United States District Court, D. Vermont.

April 14, 1982.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James Libby, Vt. Legal Aid, Inc., Montpelier, Vt., and Dan Jerman, Vt. Legal Aid, Inc., St. Johnsbury, Vt., for plaintiffs.

P. Scott McGee, Asst. U.S. Atty., Burlington, Vt., for defendant Schweiker.

Michael McShane, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Vt., Montpelier, Vt., for defendant Allen.

OPINION AND ORDER

COFFRIN, District Judge.

This is a civil action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state and federal officials. Plaintiffs claim that regulations, policies, and practices that defendants use in evaluating claims for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 and Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385, are inconsonant with the definition of disability established in the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d), 1382c(a)(3), as interpreted by the federal courts.¹ Presently before the court is defendant Schweiker's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although defendant Allen has not moved to dismiss, it is a familiar principle that the court may dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion. For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss plaintiffs' claims against defendant Allen and hold that we have jurisdiction of plaintiffs' claims against defendant Schweiker. Additionally, we grant plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

I. Background

A. The Statutory and Regulatory Scheme

The entitlement programs under Title II and Title XVI of the Act provide disability benefits to persons who demonstrate inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment...." §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Pursuant to §§ 421, 1383b, the programs are administered jointly by the Social Security Administration (SSA) of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and state agencies such as the Vermont Disability Determination Services (DDS). A claimant submits his application to the state agency for an initial determination of disability. SSA then reviews the state agency's initial determination. If these entities concur that a claimant is not entitled to benefits, SSA notifies the claimant of the denial. The claimant may seek reconsideration by the state agency and a second review by SSA. If the reconsidered decision is unfavorable, a claimant has a right under §§ 405(b), 1383(c), to a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). If the ALJ's decision is adverse, the claimant may request review by the SSA Appeals Council. A claimant who pursues his claim through the Appeals Council and does not obtain a favorable decision has exhausted his administrative remedies and may seek judicial review of the Secretary's final decision under §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.901-404.990.

B. Plaintiffs' Claims

The five named plaintiffs in this class action are applicants for or current recipients of Title II disability benefits (DIB) or Title XVI disability benefits (SSI). They share the experience of having had their claims for disability benefits evaluated by the Vermont DDS under regulations promulgated by HHS. At one or more stages in the application process, DDS has found each plaintiff not to be disabled. In each plaintiff's case, defendant Schweiker (Secretary), or one of his predecessors as Secretary of HHS, has adopted the state agency's finding and denied an application for benefits or terminated an existing entitlement to benefits.

Plaintiffs' complaint, at paragraphs 43-84, details the labyrinthine administrative path that each plaintiff has trodden in his quest for disability benefits. Defendants do not dispute the facts set out in the complaint; indeed, they adopt and summarize them in their memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss. Below is a summary of the allegations of the complaint with respect to each named plaintiff.

Plaintiff Jonathan Aldrich applied for Title II benefits on November 15, 1977. The Secretary denied this application on December 5, 1977, after DDS determined that Aldrich was not disabled. Following a request for reconsideration, the Secretary again denied the application. Aldrich then requested a hearing before an ALJ. The ALJ rendered a decision on October 27, 1978, finding Aldrich to have been disabled as of March 15, 1977, and he started receiving benefits. In May 1980, however, the Secretary terminated Aldrich's disability benefits on the ground that DDS had determined that he was not disabled. On August 26, 1980, an ALJ found that plaintiff was still disabled and entitled to benefits. At the time he filed his complaint, Aldrich was receiving SSI and DIB benefits.

Plaintiff Leroy Bishop filed an application for Title II disability benefits on June 27, 1978. The Secretary, based on DDS' determination that he was not disabled, denied his claim on October 11, 1978. Upon reconsideration, the Secretary again denied his claim in a notice issued December 22, 1978. In a decision rendered June 19, 1979, an ALJ found Bishop to be disabled and eligible for Title II disability benefits. On August 1, 1980, after DDS reviewed his file, the Secretary terminated his entitlement to disability benefits. Bishop's request for reconsideration was pending before DDS at the time Bishop filed his complaint.

Plaintiff Beverly Clothey applied for Title II disability benefits on January 31, 1978. The Secretary denied her claim initially and upon reconsideration. An ALJ held a hearing and also found Clothey not disabled. The Appeals Council affirmed the denial of benefits. Clothey sought judicial review of the Secretary's determination in this court and we found her disabled and entitled to disability benefits. Clothey v. Harris, No. 79-111 (D.Vt. May 22, 1980). She continues to receive disability benefits.

Plaintiff Ruth MacLeod applied for DIB and SSI disability benefits on November 27, 1979. The Secretary has issued an initial denial and a denial upon reconsideration. MacLeod alleges that she has requested defendant Allen to review her claim a third time.

Plaintiff Richard Nichols applied for DIB disability benefits on October 17, 1977. The Secretary denied his claim initially and upon reconsideration. On June 30, 1978, an ALJ found plaintiff disabled and entitled to DIB disability benefits. In July 1980, DDS made a preliminary determination that Nichols' period of disability had ended. Nichols alleges that he has received no formal notice of a final determination.

Plaintiffs do not seek a decision that they are entitled to benefits. Rather, they seek a determination that they are entitled to have their eligibility for benefits determined under different standards. Plaintiffs contend that the Secretary and DDS are required to apply the same standards as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and this court apply, that each refuses to do so, and that therefore plaintiffs are subjected to needless administrative and judicial review. Although plaintiffs allege that DDS is applying improper standards in determining their entitlement to disability benefits, their consternation is focused on the Secretary. They fault DDS only for applying standards promulgated by the Secretary. Relying on Ithaca College v. N.L.R.B., 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir.1980) and Jones v. Califano, 576 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.1978), plaintiffs assert that defendants are bound to follow the law of the Circuit.

More specifically, plaintiffs allege four ongoing conflicts between the standards applied by DDS and the law of the Circuit.² First, DDS allegedly refuses to be bound by a treating physician's opinion that a claimant is disabled even though the treating physician's opinion is uncontradicted by substantial evidence. The law of the Circuit is to the contrary. E.g., Eiden v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 616 F.2d 63, 64 (2d Cir.1980); Alvarado v. Califano, 605 F.2d 34, 35 (2d Cir.1979); Bastien v. Califano, 572 F.2d 908, 912 (2d Cir.1978); Gold v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 463 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir.1972).

Second, plaintiffs alleged that DDS gives insufficient weight to a determination by another agency that a claimant is disabled. In Cutler v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1282, 1286 (2d Cir.1975), the Second Circuit said: "While the determination of another governmental agency that a social security disability benefits claimant is disabled is not binding on the Secretary, it is entitled to some weight and should be considered." See Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 233 (2d Cir.1980).

Third, plaintiffs allege that DDS gives inadequate weight to claimants' subjective complaints and therefore will not find a claimant to be disabled on the basis of subjective symptoms alone. This, they say, contravenes cases holding that the absence of objective evidence of an underlying impairment does not preclude a finding of disability. See, e.g., Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 107, 113 (2d Cir.1981); Hankerson v. Harris, 636 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir.1980); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 28 (2d Cir.1979); Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir.1964). See generally Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 1034 (1969).

Finally, plaintiffs assert that defendants' policy and practice is to misapply the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, a portion of the Secretary's regulations that describes, for each of the major body systems, impairments which the Secretary considers severe enough to prevent a person from doing any substantial gainful activity. No Second...