Aldrich v. Town of Milton

• Decision Date: 24 July 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 09–11282–JLT.
• Citation: 881 F.Supp.2d 158
• Parties: Robert ALDRICH, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF MILTON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

881 F.Supp.2d 158

Robert ALDRICH, Plaintiff,

v.TOWN OF MILTON, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 09–11282–JLT.

United States District Court,

D. Massachusetts.

July 24, 2012.

Courtney M. Evanchuk, Ilene Robinson Sunshine, Michelle Iandoli, Sullivan & Worcester LLP, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.

John J. Cloherty, III, Pierce, Davis & Perritano, LLP, Alexandra B. Alland, Lisa Skehill Maki, City of Boston Law Department, Raquel D. Ruano, Attorney Raquel D. Ruano, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

ORDER

TAURO, District Judge.

1. After reviewing Defendant Lawrence Lundrigan's Limited Objection to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on Summary Judgment [# 229], this court ACCEPTS and ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Collings' Report and Recommendation on Defendants Lawrence Lundrigan's and Officer Nee's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 219] as it applies to the claim of Defendant Lundrigan's alleged unconstitutional search of Plaintiff's vehicle.¹

2. After reviewing Magistrate Judge Collings Report and Recommendation on Defendants Town of Milton and Milton Police Department's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 234] and Plaintiff's Objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation on Defendant Town of Milton and Milton Police Department's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 246], this court ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the July 9, 2011 Report and Recommendation [# 234]. For the reasons set forth in the Report and Recommendation [# 234], this court hereby orders that Defendants Town of Milton and Milton Police Department's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 166] is ALLOWED.

3. After reviewing Magistrate Judge Collings Report and Recommendation on Defendant Michael Breen's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendant Michael Breen Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [# 235], Plaintiff's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on Defendant Michael Breen's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendant Michael Breen [# 247], and Defendant's, Michael Breen, Limited Objection to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on Summary Judgment [# 251], this court ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the recommendation in the July 9, 2012 Report and Recommendation [# 235]. This court hereby orders that Defendant Michael Breen's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 158] and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendant Michael Breen Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DENIED. Whether Defendant Breen needed reasonable suspicion or probable cause to initiate his interaction with Plaintiff is an issue better addressed by the parties in motions in limine. The court, nonetheless, finds that there is a material fact in dispute as to whether Defendant Breen had either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to initiate his interaction with Plaintiff.

4. Plaintiff's Motion to Trial Judge Requesting Continuance of Trial [# 239], Plaintiff's Motion to Trial Judge to St[r]ike Defendants' Attorneys' Unsworn Statement of Facts, and Attached Depositions and Exhibits Filed with Summary Judgment Motions, as Being Inadmissible Evidence Because It Was not Authenticated by Affidavits [# 240], and Plaintiff's Motion to Trial Judge Requesting Additional Discovery of Concealed Bankruptcy Proceedings Filed by Defendant Michael Breen [# 241] are STRICKEN. These motions were filed by the Plaintiff, not his counsel. At a Status Conference held before Magistrate Judge Collings on June 29, 2011, Magistrate Judge Collings explained to Plaintiff that he was now represented by counsel and the he could no longer file pleadings pro se. Magistrate Judge Collings made it clear that all pleadings filed on behalf of Plaintiff must be filed by his counsel, and Plaintiff acknowledged that he understood this requirement.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT MICHAEL BREEN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 158) AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT MICHAEL BREEN UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (# 160)

COLLINGS, United States Magistrate Judge.

The plaintiff, Robert Aldrich (“Aldrich”), and defendant, Michael Breen (“Breen”), have filed cross-motions ( 158,160) each respectively seeking the entry of judgment as a matter of law.

The starting point is the federal claim for an unlawful stop under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The facts reveal that on March 9, 2007, two citizens in the town of Milton called the Milton Police Department to report home break-ins. (# 163 ¶ 6) The first call came at 5:15:48 A.M. with a citizen reporting that someone had tried to break into her house. (# 163 ¶ 6) At 5:35:33 A.M., a second citizen called to report that she had seen a man who had tried to get into a neighbor's house run into the backyard at 5:15 A.M. (# 163 ¶ 7) This second citizen stated that the man “had an old car that made a lot of noise”... that the man's vehicle was “[j]ust a big SUV ... [that] must have been like, navy blue. Or dark. It was dark. And it must have been old, ‘cuz I could hear the engine, that's what woke me up, or something wrong with his car.” (# 163–4 at 10–11) She also reported that the man “raced up to either the expressway or up towards Dorchester.” (# 163–4 at 12) At 5:38:55 A.M., the Milton Police dispatcher directed an officer to go over to talk with the second citizen and “[j]ust take down information. She doesn't have much.” (# 163–4 at 13)

At 5:40:19 A.M., the Milton Police dispatcher radioed all units that, with respect to the earlier reported attempted B & E, “the woman reports that it was an SUV, dark in color, headed north on Granite.” ¹(# 163–4 at 14) At 5:46:11 A.M., the dispatcher reiterated that “it was a large SUV, dark in color, with a loud exhaust. No description on the person.” (# 163–4 at 14) The dispatcher also thereafter advised that the suspect had dark clothing and a brown coat. (# 163–4 at 15)

Breen, a sergeant in the Milton Police Department, began to drive on Granite Avenue, looking for a vehicle that matched the description given by the second citizen. He drove approximately one quarter of a mile on Granite Avenue and crossed into Boston onto Gallivan Boulevard.

Breen observed an SUV on a side street, Lenoxdale Avenue, facing onto Gallivan Boulevard, stopped about one hundred fifty feet up the street with no headlights on.² (# 163–6 at 144–145) Breen did “not particularly” consider the circumstances suspicious, but thought “it warranted getting a look.” (# 163–6 at 147) Breen was past the side street, so had to continue to a traffic light and make a u-turn. (# 163–6 at 147–148) In the meantime, the SUV came down Lenoxdale Avenue and turned onto Gallivan Boulevard heading towards Neponset Circle. (# 163–6 at 148) The SUV then turned onto another side street, St. Brendan's Road, went up the street a distance, pulled into a driveway and turned around coming back down St. Brendan's Road toward Gallivan Boulevard. (# 163–6 at 152–153)

Breen had “no idea” if the SUV was the one for which they were looking, but it did match the description. (# 163–6 at 157) As Breen drove down St. Brendan's Street with the SUV driving towards him in the opposite direction, he had his hand out the window, pointing at the SUV's headlights to inform the driver that the lights were not on.³ (# 163–6 at 155) Breen pulled up so his cruiser and the SUV were window-to-window, and Breen and the occupant of the SUV, Aldrich, had a conversation. (# 163–6 at 157–160) While Breen was still “evaluating” the situation in his mind, he asked Aldrich if he had a license and Aldrich handed him a Massachusetts ID card. (# 163–6 at 163–164) Because he was blocking the road, Breen took Aldrich's ID card, drove up the road, turned around and pulled up behind the SUV, at which point he radioed the station to do a license check. (# 163–6 at 166) Breen states as an undisputed fact that he “conducted a motor vehicle stop of the Plaintiff on March 9, 2007.” ⁴ (# 163 ¶ 4)

The law is clear that Fourth Amendment protections apply in the context of brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); U.S. v. Brake, 666 F.3d 800, 804 (1 Cir., 2011); U.S. v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 724 (1 Cir., 2011). To be constitutional and “justif[y] the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (footnote omitted); Brake, 666 F.3d at 804 (“[T]he officer must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity, rooted firmly ‘in specific and articulable facts.’ ”) (citation omitted); U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (“It is enough to say that, if police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.”). To more fully explain, “[b]ecause the balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security tilts in favor of a standard less than probable cause in such cases, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot.” U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009); Camacho, 661 F.3d at 726;U.S. v. Ramos, 629 F.3d 60, 65 (1 Cir., 2010), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 3045, 180 L.Ed.2d 862 (2011). Further, “[i]n evaluating whether reasonable suspicion existed, we ‘look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer ha[d] a particularized and...