Aldridge v. City of St. Louis

• Decision Date: 17 April 2019
• Docket Number: No. 4:18-CV-1677 CAS,4:18-CV-1677 CAS
• Parties: RASHEEN ALDRIDGE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

RASHEEN ALDRIDGE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:18-CV-1677 CAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

April 17, 2019

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This civil rights matter under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is before the Court on a motion to dismiss and alternative motion to strike plaintiff Rasheen Aldridge's First Amended Complaint ("complaint"), filed by defendants City of St. Louis, Missouri ("City"), John Hayden, and William Olsten.¹ Plaintiff opposes the motion in all respects and the defendants have replied, so it is ready for ruling. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the motion to dismiss, and will deny the motion to strike. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his complaint.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Rasheen Aldridge alleges that he is currently the elected Democratic Committeeman for City's 5th Ward, lives in the City, and is known for meeting with President Obama in the Oval Office to discuss police brutality and the plight of America's black youth. The complaint alleges facts concerning the Circuit Court for the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit of Missouri's issuanceof findings and verdict in State of Missouri v. Stockley, Cause No. 1622-CR02213-01, on September 15, 2017, acquitting former St. Louis police officer Jason Stockley of the charge of first-degree murder of Anthony Smith. The complaint alleges the Stockley verdict prompted some members of the public to engage in protest activities in the City and surrounding communities, as the "acquittal was yet another example of white St. Louis-area police officers killing African-American citizens with impunity," and "supported their view that the American criminal justice system does not believe that Black lives matter." (Doc. 18, ¶¶ 19-21.) The complaint alleges that although most of the protests were non-violent, in response St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department ("SLMPD") officers "amassed at several protests wearing military-like tactical dress, helmets, batons, and full-body riot shields" and carrying chemical agents. (Doc. 18, ¶¶ 19-27.)

The complaint alleges that plaintiff took part in a peaceful public protest against police violence on September 29, 2017. The protest occurred on the streets of downtown St. Louis, including near Busch Stadium, beginning at approximately 7:00 p.m. The complaint alleges that at around 9:00 p.m., protestors who had been marching elsewhere in downtown St. Louis began making their way south on Broadway towards Busch Stadium and the intersection of Broadway and Walnut Street. The complaint alleges that when the protestors reached the intersection of Broadway and Walnut, SLMPD officers "began indiscriminately using pepper spray on civilians without provocation of violence or criminal behavior." Video evidence shows the protestors were acting peacefully and calmly. (Doc. 18, ¶¶ 45-46.)

The complaint alleges that without warning, a SLMPD officer violently threw one protestor, a Reverend Gray, to the ground, breaking his glasses, and the protestors then began to loudly voice their disapproval of the force used, and many people in the area, including protestors, loudly questioned why the police decided to use violence. The complaint alleges that two SLMPD officersbegan to chase another protestor, Calvin Kennedy, and tasered him without warning after an officer grabbed Mr. Kennedy. The protestors then began demanding why the SLMPD had deployed a Taser.

The complaint alleges that video shows defendant Olsten, a SLMPD officer, yelled at a protestor, "Come and fuck me up then," and moved toward the protestors, while two other SLMPD officers tried to grab Olsten, calm him down, and move him away from the crowd. The complaint alleges the video shows defendant Hayden, at the time a SLMPD major, standing approximately five feet to the right of Olsten. The complaint alleges that although Olsten was not in danger or trying to extricate himself from a dangerous situation, he became more agitated as evidenced by his "very pronouncedly chomp[ing] on his gum and begin[ing] to flex his muscles." (Doc. 18, ¶¶ 55-58.) Then, Olsten pulled out and fired a "large fogger like canister of pepper spray" without first giving any dispersal order or warning, and the spray hit plaintiff and three other citizens. (Id., ¶¶ 59-61.)

The complaint alleges that plaintiff began to feel excruciating pain from the pepper spray, his eyes began to burn, mucus ran from his nose, and his breathing became labored. The complaint alleges that defendant Olsten made no attempt to effectuate any arrests after spraying plaintiff and other with the pepper spray, and instead walked away. The complaint alleges that during the incident, defendant Hayden was in the middle of the SLMPD officers wearing a white shirt, indicating he was a supervisor. The complaint alleges, "Hayden took no steps to prevent his officers from inflicting punishment on peaceful protestors and members of the media," and "is observed in the video using a cell phone to record the activities and the police response." (Doc. 18, ¶ 67.)

The complaint contains factual allegations describing other instances when SLMPD officers without warning deployed chemical agents against individuals observing, recording, or participatingin protest activity; and this Court's issuance in a prior case, Templeton,² of a temporary restraining order and its subsequent approval of a settlement agreement restricting the SLMPD from enforcing any rule, policy, or practice that granted law enforcement officials the authority or discretion to utilize chemical agents for the purpose of dispersing groups of individual engaged in non-criminal activity without, among other things, first issuing clear and unambiguous warnings that chemical agents would be utilized, and providing sufficient opportunity for the individual to heed the warnings and exit and area; or to utilize chemical agents on individuals engaged in non-criminal activity for the purpose of frightening them or punishing them for exercising their constitutional rights. (Doc. 18, ¶¶ 26-36.)

The complaint also contains factual allegations concerning this Court's issuance of a preliminary injunction in a subsequent case, Ahmad,³ that the SLMPD's customs or policies of (1) committing discretionary authority to police officers to declare unlawful assemblies in the absence of any threat of force or violent activity, (2) permitting officers to issue vague dispersal orders to protestors exercising First Amendment rights in an arbitrary and retaliatory way and then enforce those orders without sufficient notice and opportunity to comply before being subjected to use or force or arrest, and (3) using chemical agents without warning on citizens engaged in expressive activity that is critical of police or who are recording police, in retaliation for the exercise of their First Amendment rights; all permit officers to exercise their discretion in a manner that impermissibly curtails citizens' First Amendment rights of assembly and free speech, and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 68-71.)

Attached to the complaint as exhibits are the Findings and Verdict issued in State of Missouri v. Stockley, No. 1622-CR02213-01 (22nd Jud. Cir., State of Missouri); the Temporary Restraining Order issued in Templeton on Dec. 11, 2014; a Settlement Agreement in Templeton dated March 25, 2015; the transcript of a preliminary injunction hearing held in Ahmad on October 28, 2017; and a Memorandum and Order of Preliminary Injunction issued in Ahmad on November 15, 2017.⁴ The exhibits are part of the complaint for all purposes. See Rule 10(c), Fed. R. Civ. P.

Plaintiff filed this action on October 2, 2018, asserting the existence of federal question jurisdiction. The complaint asserts the following federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Violation of plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to assembly, association, free speech, and a free press against defendants Olsten and Hayden (Count I); conspiracy claims against all defendants for violating plaintiff's civil rights by using excessive force against him, assaulting him, depriving him of his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and maliciously prosecuting him (Count II); a Monell claim against the City claiming the violations of plaintiff's civil rights were caused by a policy, practice, or custom of the City, and by its failure to train, discipline, and supervise SLMPD officers with respect to use of force (Count III);⁵ and a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim against defendant Olsten (Count VII). The complaint also asserts supplemental state law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), against all of the defendants: assault (CountIV); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V); negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count VI); and battery (Count VIII).

All of the defendants move to dismiss the complaint in its entirety for failure to comply with the "short and plain statement" requirement of Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant Hayden moves to dismiss plaintiff's § 1983 claims against him in Count I on the basis that the complaint fails to show he personally participated in or tacitly collaborated in Olsten's use of force against plaintiff. Defendant City moves to dismiss plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against it in Counts II and III for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., and the state law tort claims in Counts IV, V, VI, and VIII on the basis of sovereign immunity. Defendants Hayden and Olsten move to dismiss plaintiff's state law claims against them in Counts IV, V, VI, and VIII on the basis of the Missouri official immunity doctrine. In the alternative, all defendants move to strike certain paragraphs of the complaint as immaterial or impertinent pursuant to Rule 12(f),...