Aldridge v. City of St. Louis
| Docket Number | 22-1735,22-1910,22-2213 |
| Decision Date | 28 July 2023 |
| Parties | Rasheen ALDRIDGE, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI; John Hayden, Col., in his individual and official capacities; William Olsten, Officer, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants - Appellees Jazmin Franks, Plaintiff - Appellant v. City of St. Louis, Missouri; John Hayden, Col., in his individual capacity; William Olsten, Officer, in his individual capacity, Defendants - Appellees Crystal Brown, Plaintiff - Appellant v. City of St. Louis, Missouri; John Hayden, Col., in his individual and official capacities; William Olsten, Officer, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants - Appellees |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant and appeared on the brief was James R. Wyrsch, of Saint Louis, MO. The following attorney(s) appeared on the appellee brief; Javad Mohammed Khazaeli, of Saint Louis, MO. Omri E. Praiss, of Saint Louis, MO.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee and appeared on the brief were Brandon David Laird, of Saint Louis, MO. Brian P. Millikan, of Kirkwood, MO.
Before GRASZ, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
Appellants Rasheen Aldridge, Jazmin Franks, and Crystal Brown were each pepper-sprayed by Police Officer William Olsten while participating in a protest in downtown St. Louis. Each of them sued Officer Olsten, Chief of Police John Hayden, and the City of St. Louis, alleging First Amendment retaliation and excessive force claims, as well as various other federal and state law claims. In each case, the district court1 granted summary judgment in favor of the city officials on all the federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction on the state law claims. We consolidated the cases and, having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, affirm.
Following the acquittal of a police officer on first-degree murder charges, protests occurred around St. Louis over several weeks. During one such protest in the downtown area, St. Louis Police Department officers tased and arrested one of the protestors. A group of other protestors, including the three appellants, began to follow the officers as they led the arrestee away from the scene. Various video images of the protest confirm that while members of the crowd verbally questioned and sometimes taunted officers, they generally remained non-violent.
Officer Olsten was one of the numerous officers at the scene. Various officers can be heard on the video recordings repeatedly directing the group of protestors to "get back" as Officer Olsten and others attempted to lead the arrested protestor away. At this point, protestor Amir Brandy shouted "I'm going to f*** you up." In response, Officer Olsten stepped toward Brandy and said, "well, come on, f*** me up then" and "keep coming." After Brandy noticed a pepper spray fogger in Officer Olsten's hand, Brandy yelled, "If you put that s*** in my face, I'll f*** you up." He then proceeded to call Officer Olsten a "p**** a** white boy." Appellant Aldridge, who was standing next to Brandy, then asked Officer Olsten, "Y'all f***ing tase [the arrested protestor]?" Officer Olsten replied, "I didn't tase him."
Next, an unidentified protestor shouted out. The appellants claim the protestor shouted, "shut this motherf***er down," while the appellees claim the protestor said something like, "shoot these motherf***ers." Almost immediately following this unidentified protestor's shout, Officer Olsten quickly looked to his right and then without warning deployed his pepper spray on the crowd. Although Aldridge and Brandy were immediately in front of Officer Olsten, other members of the crowd were also impacted because Officer Olsten sprayed side to side in a sweeping motion. Officer Olsten did not arrest any protestors after he deployed his pepper spray. Each appellant sued Officer Olsten, Chief of Police John Hayden, and the City of St. Louis (collectively, "City Officials") alleging various claims including, as most relevant to this appeal, a First Amendment retaliation claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In the Aldridge case, the district court granted summary judgment to Officer Olsten on the First Amendment retaliation claim because "Aldridge base[d] his First-Amendment-retaliation claim on an allegation of excessive force," and the district court had already granted summary judgment to Officer Olsten on the excessive force claim. The district court also held the Monell claim2 must fail because there was no individual liability, and it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
In both the Franks and Brown cases, the district court granted summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claims because Franks and Brown failed to demonstrate Officer Olsten deployed his pepper spray in response to their actions. On the Monell claims by Franks and Brown, the district court also granted summary judgment to the City because municipal liability could not attach without a finding of individual liability. Finally, the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims in either case.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity de novo. Dooley v. Tharp, 856 F.3d 1177, 1181 (8th Cir. 2017). Summary judgment is appropriate "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, [meaning] there is no 'genuine issue for trial.' " Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). We view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, granting them the "benefit of all reasonable inferences." Goffin v. Ashcraft, 977 F.3d 687, 690-91 (8th Cir. 2020).
The City Officials are "entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s], demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation." Bell v. Neukirch, 979 F.3d 594, 602 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1116 (8th Cir. 2014)).
Aldridge, Franks, and Brown each raise three arguments in support of reversal: Officer Olsten retaliated against them in violation of the First Amendment; the City is liable under Monell; and the district court should have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims. We address these arguments in turn.
The appellants argue Officer Olsten deployed his pepper spray in retaliation for their protesting against the police. "The First Amendment prohibits laws 'abridging the freedom of speech.' " Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, — U.S. —, 142 S. Ct. 1253, 1259, 212 L.Ed.2d 303 (2022) ). Thus, "as 'a general matter,' " the First Amendment "prohibits government officials from subjecting individuals to 'retaliatory actions' after the fact for having engaged in protected speech." Id. (quoting Nieves v. Bartlett, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722, 204 L.Ed.2d 1 (2019)). "To prevail on their retaliation claim, the plaintiffs must show that 'they engaged in protected [First Amendment] activity.' " Molina v. City of St. Louis, 59 F.4th 334, 338 (8th Cir. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Quraishi v. St. Charles Cnty., 986 F.3d 831, 837 (8th Cir. 2021)). "If they can make that showing, then the focus shifts to whether the officers 'took [an] adverse action . . . that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the [protected] activity.' " Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Hoyland v. McMenomy, 869 F.3d 644, 655 (8th Cir. 2017)). Finally, the plaintiffs must prove the officers "would not have taken the adverse action but for harboring 'retaliatory animus' against the plaintiff[s] because of [the] exercise of [their] First Amendment rights." Mitchell v. Kirchmeier, 28 F.4th 888, 896 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722).
We focus our attention on the third element3—whether Officer Olsten deployed his pepper spray in retaliation for the appellants' exercise of their First Amendment right to protest. "To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must establish a 'causal connection' between the government defendant's 'retaliatory animus' and the plaintiff's 'subsequent injury.' " Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 259, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006)). In other words, the plaintiffs must demonstrate they were "singled out" due to their protected expression. Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 481 (8th Cir. 2010). "If the response was driven not by 'animus' but by the defendant's understanding—however mistaken—of his official duties, then it was not 'retaliatory.' " Mitchell, 28 F.4th at 896.
Aldridge focuses his attention on the fact that he asked Officer Olsten a question shortly before he was pepper sprayed. While others in the crowd, such as Brandy, were more verbally antagonistic to Officer Olsten, the only question in the record asked by Aldridge was, "Y'all f***ing tase him?," referring to another protestor's arrest. Officer Olsten responded, "I didn't tase him." After this brief exchange, an unknown protestor can be heard shouting something. Officer Olsten argues this was the precipitating incident for deploying the pepper spray as he believed this unknown protestor shouted, "shoot these motherf***ers." Aldridge, however, argues Officer Olsten was "singling out those protestors standing in front of him and doing so because they were questioning the police and protesting their activities." Aldridge also points out...
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