Aldridge v. State

• Court: Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
• Writing for the Court: DAUGHTREY
• Citation: Aldridge v. State, 562 S.W.2d 216 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977)
• Decision Date: 08 December 1977
• Parties: Orville Curtis ALDRIDGE, Appellant, v. STATE of Tennessee, Appellee. 562 S.W.2d 216

Page 216

562 S.W.2d 216

Orville Curtis ALDRIDGE, Appellant, v. STATE of Tennessee, Appellee.

562 S.W.2d 216

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Dec. 8, 1977 Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court March 6, 1978.

C. Berkeley Bell, Jr., Greeneville, for appellant.

Brooks McLemore, Jr., Atty. Gen., Patricia J. Cottrell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Charles E. Fraley, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Charles R. Terry, Morristown, for appellee.

OPINION

DAUGHTREY, Judge.

As the result of an assassination plot to kill District Attorney General Heiskell Winstead and his wife, Barbara Winstead, the defendant-appellant, Orville Curtis Aldridge, was indicted for solicitation of murder in the first degree. Aldridge was subsequently convicted by a Hawkins County jury and sentenced to six to twenty-one years imprisonment. On appeal he attacks (1) the validity of the indictment, (2) the failure of the trial court to order a continuance, (3) both the sufficiency of the evidence and the admissibility of certain items of evidence introduced at trial, and (4) the trial court's refusal to order a mistrial following the entry of guilty pleas by his two co-defendants after trial had begun. Because we find no error, we affirm the conviction.

The defendant first contends that the indictment returned against him was not sufficiently specific to protect him from subsequent prosecution for the same offense, because it is not possible to tell which of several arguably applicable offenses is charged in the body of the indictment. We reject this contention. The language of the charging instrument is almost exactly that of the applicable statute T.C.A. § 39-115 ("Solicitation to commit crime"), and it therefore follows that the notice requirements which must be met by an indictment have been fulfilled. Erby v. State, 181 Tenn. 647, 184 S.W.2d 14 (1944). Nor is the indictment duplicitous because it charges the existence of more than one intended victim. According to the proof at trial, the solicitation involved was a single act; therefore, soliciting two murders constituted part of the same transaction. Under such circumstances, conduct which might otherwise involve the commission of two offenses may be charged in one count of an indictment. State v. Smith, 194 Tenn. 608, 253 S.W.2d 992 (1952); Cornell v. State, 66 Tenn. 520 (1874); State v. Ailey, 50 Tenn. 8 (1870); Womack v. State, 47 Tenn. 508 (1870). The trial court did not err in overruling the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, and the assignment is likewise overruled.

There was also no error in the trial judge's refusal to grant a continuance. The defendant's attorney contends that he was not given adequate time to prepare a defense, citing his inexperience in criminal cases, the relatively short period of time between his appointment and the trial (25 days), and the even shorter period between his first interview with the defendant, who was incarcerated in the State Penitentiary for another offense, and the trial (nine days). But the record refutes the attorney's modest assessment of his own professional abilities. The technical record reveals that he filed a total of nine pretrial motions, and a review of the bill of exceptions demonstrates vigorous and able pursuit of his client's interests at trial. Furthermore, the record fails to disclose that the defendant's case was prejudiced in any way by inadequate preparation, nor are any such specific instances alleged in the motion for a new trial or in the brief filed on appeal. We note also that prior to trial the district attorney offered to furnish defense counsel with a criminal investigator from his office, in order to aid the defendant in finding witnesses alleged to be "scattered over several counties." There is no intimation in the record that any material defense witnesses were unavailable at trial. We conclude that the defendant's appointed attorney did a commendable job in the face of overwhelming evidence...