Aldridge v. United States
Citation | 75 L.Ed. 1054,73 A.L.R. 1203,51 S.Ct. 470,283 U.S. 308 |
Decision Date | 20 April 1931 |
Docket Number | No. 683,683 |
Parties | ALDRIDGE v. UNITED STATES |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
Mr. James Francis Reilly, of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
The Attorney General and Mr. Leo A. Rober, of Washington, D. C., for the United States.
The petitioner was convicted, in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, of murder in the first degree, and was sentenced to death. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 47 F.(2d) 407. This Court granted a writ of certiorari, 282 U. S. 836, 51 S. Ct. 333, 75 L. Ed. —, limited to the question raised by the exception to the ruling of the trial court on the examination on voir dire of prospective jurors.
The petitioner is a negro, and the deceased was a white man, a member of the police force of the District. The record shows the following proceedings on the examination of jurors on the voir dire:
The court 'inquired if any of them knew the defendant, Alfred Scott Aldridge, or his counsel, or any of the witnesses whose names have been called. The court further inquired if any of the prospective jurors knew any of the facts in the case or if any of them ever remembered having read of it in the newspaper, or if they had any prejudice or bias against circumstantial evidence, or if any of the prospective jurors had any conscientious scruples against capital punishment. The court further inquired if any prospective juror had formed or exercised an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and further inquired whether any prospective juror was acquainted with any member of the Metropolitan Police Force of the District of Columbia, or more particularly those attached to the third precinct.
'Whereupon, with the consent of the court, counsel for the parties hereto approached the bench and in a whispered tone, out of the hearing of the prospective jurors, the following took place:
'Counsel for the defendant requested the court to allow the record to show that the question relative to racial prejudice be propounded to each and every prospective juror, with the exception heretofore noted on behalf of the defendant.'
In accordance with the existing practice, the questions to the prospective jurors were put by the court, and the court had a broad discretion as to the questions to be asked. The exercise of this discretion, and the restriction upon inquiries at the request of counsel, were subject to the essential demands of fairness. We find no reason to doubt the nature of the inquiry which the counsel for the accused desired. It was admitted at the bar of this Court that the members of the jury were white. In ask- ing that the question relative to 'racial prejudice' be put to the jurors, it is only reasonable to assume that counsel referred, not to immaterial matters, but to such a prejudice as would disqualify a juror because precluding an impartial verdict. The reference to what cousel had heard as to the attitude of a juror on the previous trial, where the jury had disagreed, indicated the purpose of the question, which was clear enough to invite appropriate action by the court. If the court had permitted the question, it doubtless would have been properly qualified. But the court, interrupting counsel, disposed of the inquiry summarily. The court failed to ask any question which could be deemed to cover the subject. If the defendant was entitled to have the jurors asked whether they had any racial prejudice, by reason of the fact that the defendant was a negro and the deceased a white man, which would prevent their giving a fair and impartial verdict, we cannot properly disregard the court's refusal merely because of the form in which the inquiry was presented.
The propriety of such an inquiry has been generally recognized. In Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 8 So. 837, 838, 26 Am. St. Rep. 75, the counsel for the accused sought to have the jurors asked on their voir dire: 'Could you give the defendant, who is a negro, as fair and impartial a trial as you could a white man, and give him the same advantage and protection as you would a white man upon the same evidence?' The Supreme Court of Florida held that the refusal of the court to allow the question was error and reversed the conviction.1 In Hill v. State, 112 Miss. 260, 72 So. 1003, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that it was fatal error to refuse to permit a negro on trial for murder to put to prospective jurors on their voir dire the following question: 'Have you got any prejudice against the negro, as a negro, that would induce you to return a verdict on less or slighter evidence than you would return a verdict of guilty against a white man under the same circumstances?' The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the conviction of a negro because of the refusal of the trial judge to permit a juror to be asked if 'he believed he could, as a juror, do equal and impartial justice between the State and a colored man.' State v. McAfee, 64 N. C. 339.2 See, also Fendrick v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 147, 45 S. W. 589; State v. Sanders, 103 S. C. 216, 88 S. E. 10.
The right to examine jurors on the voir dire as to the existence of a disqualifying state of mind has been upheld with respect to other races than the black race, and in relation to religious and other prejudices of a serious character. Potter v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 380, 384, 216 S. W. 886; People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347, 349; Watson v. Whitney, 23 Cal. 375, 379; People v. Car Soy, 57 Cal. 102; Horst v. Silverman, 20 Wash. 233, 234, 55 P. 52, 72 Am. St. Rep. 97. In People v. Reyes, supra, Mexicans were charged with assault with intent to commit murder, and conviction was reversed because of the refusal to allow questions to determine whether a prospective juror was a member of the Know Nothing party, and whether he had taken any oath or obligation which resulted in prejudice, or whether independent of such an oath he entertained a prejudice, which would prevent him from giving the accused a fair trial.3
We do not overlook the reference of the Court of Appeals, in support of the ruling of the trial court, to conditions in the District of Columbia 'where the colored race is accorded all the prvileges and rights under the law that are afforded the white race, and especially the ight to practice in the courts, serve on the jury,' etc. But the question is not as to the civil privileges of the negro, or as to the dominant sentiment of the community and the general absence of any disqualifying prejudice, but as to the bias of the particular jurors who are to try the accused. If in fact, sharing the general sentiment, they were found to be impartial, no harm would be done in permitting the question, but if any one of them was shown to entertain a prejudice which would preclude his rendering a fair verdict, a gross injustice would be perpetrated in allowing him to sit. Despite the privileges accorded to the negro, we do not think that it can be said that the posibility of such prejudice is so remote4 as to justify the risk in forbidding the inquiry. And this risk becomes most grave when the issue is of life or death.
The argument is advanced on behalf of the government that it would be detrimental to the administration of the law in the courts of the United States to allow questions to jurors as to racial or religious prejudices. We think that it would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that persons entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were barred. No surer way could be devised to bring the processes of justice into disrepute.
We are of the opinion that the ruling of the trial court on the voir dire was erroneous, and the judgment of conviction must for this reason be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
Our jurisdiction over this case is limited by section 391, Title 28, U. S. Code (28 USCA § 391), which provides:
The petitioner, a negro, killed a white policeman in the District of Columbia. He was indicted, tried, and found guilty by a jury. He moved for a new trial upon the ground, among others, 'that this court committed error in refusing to examine the jury on their voir dire as to whether any juror may entertain racial prejudice in a matter of homicide...
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