Aldridge v. Watts Mill

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MARION, J.
• Citation: Aldridge v. Watts Mill, 131 S.C. 222, 127 S.E. 213 (S.C. 1925)
• Decision Date: 19 March 1925
• Docket Number: 11723.
• Parties: ALDRIDGE v. WATTS MILL ET AL.

127 S.E. 213

131 S.C. 222

ALDRIDGE v. WATTS MILL ET AL.

No. 11723.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 19, 1925

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Laurens County; J. Henry Johnson, Judge.

Action by O. T. Aldridge, administrator of A. E. Aldridge, deceased against the Watts Mill and Huntington & Guerry, both corporations. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Fraser J., dissenting.

Nicholls & Wyche, of Spartanburg, and Quinn, Hamrick & Harris, of Rutherfordton, for appellant.

Simpson Cooper & Babb, of Laurens, and Haynsworth & Haynsworth, of Greenville, for respondents.

MARION J.

Action for damages on account of the death of A. E. Aldridge by alleged wrongful act of the defendants, brought by the administrator for the benefit of his intestate's widow, Hester C. Aldridge, as sole beneficiary. From judgment on verdict for the defendants, plaintiff appeals.

"The answer of respondent Watts Mill admits the death of Aldridge and denies the other allegations of the complaint, and alleges contributory negligence and contributory willfulness and wantonness on the part of A. E. Aldridge, and assumption of risk. The respondent Huntington & Guerry admits the death of A. E. Aldridge, and alleges contributory negligence and contributory willfulness and wantonness, assumption of risk, and sets up a release from Hester C. Aldridge, the widow of A. E. Aldridge, deceased."

Appellant's fifth exception imputes error to the trial court in permitting the defendant Huntington & Guerry (a corporation) to elicit, on cross-examination, over objection, testimony from the plaintiff's witness, Hester C. Aldridge, to the effect that she had received the sum of $1,400 from a life insurance policy on the life of her husband, A. E. Aldridge, which had been carried by the said Huntington & Guerry. When this testimony was first sought to be elicited from the defendant's witness, Huntington, it was excluded after the following colloquy:

"Mr. Haynsworth: My question was whether or not Mr. Huntington carried insurance for the benefit of his employees, life insurance at his own expense or the expense of the company, without cost to Aldridge, and the proceeds of this insurance, $1,400, were paid to Mrs. Aldridge.

Mr. Haynsworth: That is competent because it bears upon the question of damages she has sustained. The reply to this release here is fraud. I think I can show Huntington's attitude towards this matter, whether he has acted in a blood-seeking manner or in a generous manner.

Mr. Nicholls: Anything that the insurance company may have paid to this lady was a separate and distinct transaction, they had to pay it, it doesn't make any difference how this man was killed. This was paid by the insurance company. Suppose her father had died and left her $1,400, would that have anything to do with this case? Suppose he left his own insurance.

Court: I will have to sustain the objection, Mr. Haynsworth."

Subsequently, substantially the same testimony was admitted on the cross-examination of Hester C. Aldridge, after the following colloquy and ruling:

"Mr. Haynsworth: I want to submit the question that I asked when the jury was sent out, the question I asked the other witness.

The Court: What is your theory of the competency of that testimony?

Mr. Haynsworth: It bears upon her attitude towards him, the relations of her and Huntington, when Huntington was up there, as she said, 'trying to defend himself.' I want to show she didn't intend to sue.

The Court: I will let you ask the question for that purpose.

Mr. Nicholls: We object to this testimony.

Q. After your husband's death Huntington came to you and told you that they had carried life insurance for your husband, Huntington & Guerry had paid the premiums, and that it had not cost your husband a penny, and that you were going to get $1,400? A. He didn't tell me anything about it.

Q. He didn't tell you about the life insurance? A. Of course, I knew it.

Q. You didn't have any dealings with Huntington about it? A. Yes, sir.

Q. You did get $1,400? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the premiums had not cost your husband a penny? A. I don't know about that."

Respondent makes the point that the ground of objection to this testimony was not stated, and invokes the rule that, when the ground of objection specified and relied on here was not stated at the trial, alleged error in the admission of evidence will not be considered by this court. Bryce v. Cayce, 62 S.C. 546, 562, 40 S.E. 948; Rhodes v. Granby Cotton Mills, 87 S.C. 18, 28, 68 S.E. 824; Thornhill v. Director General, 121 S.C. 49, 113 S.E. 370, 24 A. L. R. 617. That point, upon the record here made, cannot be sustained. In propounding the question as to the insurance matter upon the cross-examination of Mrs. Aldridge, defendant's counsel stated that it was "the question * * * asked the other witness." In renewing the objection generally to the admission of this testimony, we think it is fair to assume that the ground of objection was the same as that which had been previously stated by plaintiff's counsel--a ground of which both the court and defendants had been fully apprised. Since the reason for the rule requiring that the grounds of objection be stated lies largely in the consideration that error may not fairly be imputed to a trial judge for a ruling upon or involving a point not raised before him, if in the course of a trial the ground of objection to a certain line of testimony has once been sufficiently presented to the presiding judge, it would seem clear that a mere failure to repeat the grounds of the objection when it is subsequently renewed should not be held to justify the application of the rule. We are therefore of the opinion that the appellant is entitled to have the question raised as to the inadmissibility of this testimony upon the ground first stated, considered by this court.

That ground of objection was, in substance, that the testimony sought to be adduced was irrelevant in that it related to "a separate and distinct transaction" which had nothing "to do with this case." In so far as the trial of the cause involved the determination of the general issue joined as to whether the defendants were liable in damages for the alleged wrongful death of plaintiff's intestate, there can be no doubt that the testimony objected to was legally irrelevant and of a character reasonably calculated to prejudice the interests of the objecting party. Upon that issue the harmful tendency of this testimony, from the viewpoint of the plaintiff's interests, is sufficiently analogous to that of evidence establishing that the defendant carried indemnity insurance ( Horsford v. Glass Co., 92 S.C. 258, 75 S.E. 533; Burgess v. Germany-Roy-Brown Co., 120 S.C. 285, 113 S.E. 118; Duke v. Parker [S. C.] 118 S.E. 802) to require its exclusion. The circuit judge, in effect, so held. When the testimony was first offered, the issue as to the validity of the release had not been raised by the evidence then before the court. In that status of the case the testimony was properly excluded. But when the defendant Huntington & Guerry had proved the execution of the release and introduced the instrument in evidence and the plaintiff had introduced evidence tending to impeach its validity, an issue was raised between the plaintiff and the defendant Huntington & Guerry which, in a sense that is sufficiently apparent, took priority over the issue as to whether that defendant was responsible in damages for the wrongful death of the plaintiff's intestate. If the release was valid regardless of liability under the general issue, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover against Huntington & Guerry. The trial court so ruled and charged, and to that ruling no exception has been taken. In that state of the evidentiary facts, the...