Aledo ISD v. Choctaw Properties

• Decision Date: 22 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 10-99-239-CV,10-99-239-CV
• Citation: 17 S.W.3d 260
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Waco 2000) ALEDO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant v. CHOCTAW PROPERTIES, L.L.C., ET AL., Appellees
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 260

17 S.W.3d 260 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000)

ALEDO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant v.CHOCTAW PROPERTIES, L.L.C., ET AL., Appellees

No. 10-99-239-CV

IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

March 22, 2000

From the 249th District Court Johnson County, Texas Trial Court # 249-120-98

Before Chief Justice Davis, Justice Vance, and Justice Gray

O P I N I O N

TOM GRAY, Justice

A school district denied children admittance to its schools based on the location of the children's residence.The parents sued the seller of the residential property for misrepresenting the location of that property.Within the same action, the seller sued the school district for a declaratory judgment.The school district filed a plea to the jurisdiction which the trial court denied.The school district appealed.We affirm the trial court's order.

Factual Background

This action stems from the sale of property by Choctaw Properties (Choctaw) to the Cunningham family upon the alleged representation that the property was located within the boundaries of the Aledo Independent School District(Aledo).The Cunninghams built a residence on the property, but their children were denied admittance to Aledo's schools.The Cunninghams sued Choctaw for various theories including misrepresentation of the school district in which the property was located.

Choctaw filed a third party petition against Aledo alleging the school district was estopped from denying that the property was within its boundaries and that Aledo breached its agreement with Choctaw that the children residing on the property would attend Aledo's schools.Aledo filed a plea to the jurisdiction which was denied.Aledo now brings this interlocutory appeal pursuant to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8)(Vernon Supp. 2000).

Applicable Law

Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case.Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443(Tex.1993);Bland Ind. School Dist. v. Blue, 989 S.W.2d 441, 445(Tex. App.--Dallas1999, pet. granted).The petitioner in a lawsuit must allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause of action.Texas Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446.A plea to the jurisdiction is the vehicle by which a party contests the trial court's authority to determine the subject matter of a cause.Bland, 989 S.W.2d at 445.

The trial court must base its decision whether to grant or deny a plea to the jurisdiction solely on the allegations in the petitioner's pleadings.Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 909 S.W.2d 540, 541(Tex. App.--Austin1995, writ denied).Where the pleadings do not affirmatively demonstrate an absence of jurisdiction, a liberal construction of the pleadings in favor of jurisdiction is appropriate.Continental Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 449(Tex.1996);Peek v. Equipment Service Co. of San Antonio, 779 S.W.2d 802, 804(Tex.1989).Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over a cause is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.Scott v. Prairie View A&M Univ., 7 S.W.3d 717, 719(Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.]1999, pet. denied), citing, Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928(Tex.1998).In our de novo review, we also base our decision on the allegations in the pleadings and accept factual allegations as true.Fireman's, 909 S.W.2d at 542.However, we are not bound by legal conclusions nor by any illogical factual conclusions drawn from the facts pled.Id.

Neither party has raised the propriety of whether it is appropriate to challenge or take an interlocutory appeal to only some issues or claims rather than the entire case.Traditionally, sustaining a plea to the jurisdiction requires dismissal of the entire cause of action.SeeSpeer v. Stover, 685 S.W.2d 22, 23(Tex.1985);City of Cleburne v. Trussell, No. 10-99-00287, slip op. at 4, 2000 WL 38842 *2(Tex. App.--Waco January 19, 2000, n.p.h.).If the district court has jurisdiction of any claim as alleged in a reasonable interpretation of the plaintiff's petition, then the trial court has jurisdiction of that claim and over that particular defendant; and an order denying a plea to the jurisdiction should properly be affirmed.City of Cleburne, slip op.at 4(the granting of a plea to the jurisdiction on the basis that some of the damages pled are not recoverable would be erroneous);Blum v. Restland of Dallas, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 546, 549(Tex. App.--Dallas 1997, no pet.)(because the trial court had jurisdiction over at least part of the case, denial of plea to the jurisdiction was proper).We believe it does not serve the legislative purposes for which interlocutory appeals of pleas to the jurisdiction were allowed to fragment the appeal on less than the entire case against a defendant.In this instance Aledo has alleged that the district court does not have jurisdiction of any of Choctaw's claims against Aledo; thus, the interlocutory appeal is proper.However, if we determine that the trial court has jurisdiction of any claim, but not all the claims, affirmance of the trial court's denial of the plea to the jurisdiction is the proper result.

Pleadings

In its Second Amended Third Party Petition, Choctaw alleges:

G.

Defendants would show that AISD has collected and accepted ad valorem taxes on the property ("Property") that is the subject of this cause of action.This caused Defendants to believe that the Property was in the Aledo Independent School District's boundaries.Defendants relied on this belief to their detriment.AISD is now estopped to deny that the Property is within its boundaries.Defendants request that this Court enter a final judgment or decree declaring that the Property is within AISD's boundaries and declaring that the school aged children residing at the Property shall attend AISD schools.Defendants further request that the Court award costs and reasonable and necessary attorneys (sic) fees as are equitable and just.

H.

Defendants would show that prior to April 2, 1996, they have paid ad valorem taxes on the Property to AISD.By letter dated April 2, 1996, AISD agreed that the children residing at the Property will attend AISD schools.Now AISD asserts that it will not allow the children residing at the Property to attend AISD schools.AISD's breach of its agreement has proximately caused damages to Defendants and may continue to cause damages to Defendants in the future.Defendant's (sic) would further show they are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code ann. §38.001 et seq.

In response to Choctaw's petition, Aledo filed a plea to the jurisdiction, in which it identified four theories upon which the trial court could determine it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Choctaw's claims.Those four theories were set out as follows:

1.Whether this [trial] Court has jurisdiction to consider Choctaw Properties' declaratory judgment action because Choctaw Properties has no standing to bring it.

2.Whether this [trial] Court has jurisdiction to consider Choctaw Properties' declaratory judgment action because the relief requested would not settle all of the issues among the parties.

3.Whether this [trial] Court has jurisdiction to consider Choctaw Properties' declaratory judgment action because Choctaw Properties is improperly asking the Court for a determination of fact.

4.Whether this [trial] Court has jurisdiction to consider Choctaw Properties' declaratory judgment action because Choctaw Properties has no contractual relationship with Aledo ISD.

Aledo interprets Choctaw's petition as a suit on behalf of the children living on the property to require their attendance at Aledo's schools.Aledo also claims that Choctaw is, in essence, asking the trial court to transfer the children to Aledo's schools or change the district boundaries to include the property so that the children may attend Aledo's schools.Choctaw argues that Aledo misconstrues their third party petition.Interpreting the pleadings liberally in favor of jurisdiction, we agree that Aledo has misconstrued the claims of Choctaw.

Transfer or Swap¹

In its first three issues, Aledo contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the cause because Choctaw is requesting a transfer of the children and failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.In its fourth issue, Aledo claims Choctaw did not exhaust its administrative remedies through the Texas Education Code to alter the district boundaries or transfer the children to Aledo's schools before resorting to the courts for relief.Choctaw denies they are asking the trial court to either transfer the children or change the district's boundaries and thus, had no administrative remedies to exhaust.

Reading Choctaw's petition and taking its factual allegations as true, we do not interpret the pleadings in the same manner as Aledo.Within the four corners of the petition, we believe Choctaw is primarily pleading for a determination that: (1) the property is in the Aledo school district²; (2) that Aledo is estopped from refusing to admit the children into their schools when it collected taxes on the property; and (3) that Aledo contractually agreed the children resided in the school district and is breaching that agreement by refusing to allow them to attend school.

A portion of Choctaw's pleadings could be construed as a request to compel a transfer or to alter the district boundaries.However, another reasonable construction is that Choctaw wants a judicial declaration that the property is in Aledo's district and, alternatively, that Aledo breached its contract with Choctaw; two claims over which the district court has jurisdiction.We will not stretch Choctaw's pleadings to include an action to compel a transfer of the children to the Aledo school district or a...