Alejandro Garcia De La Paz v. U.S. Custom & Border Prot. Officers Jason Coy & Mario Vega & the United States

• Decision Date: 21 June 2013
• Docket Number: CV. No. SA–12–CV–00957–DAE.
• Citation: 954 F.Supp.2d 532
• Parties: Alejandro Garcia DE LA PAZ, Plaintiff, v. United States Custom and Border Protection Officers Jason COY and Mario Vega and the United States of America, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

954 F.Supp.2d 532

Alejandro Garcia DE LA PAZ, Plaintiff,

v.United States Custom and Border Protection Officers Jason COY and Mario Vega and the United States of America, Defendants.

CV. No. SA–12–CV–00957–DAE.

United States District Court,

W.D. Texas,

San Antonio Division.

June 21, 2013.

David Anton Armendariz, George William Aristotelidis, Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Lance Edward Curtright, De Mott, McChesney, Curtright & Armendariz, LLP, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff.

Joseph Cuauhtemoc Rodriguez, Assistant United States Attorney, San Antonio, TX, for Defendants.

ORDER: (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS VEGA AND COY; (2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; AND (3) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56(d) MOTION FOR DISCOVERY

DAVID ALAN EZRA, Senior District Judge.

On May 31, 2013, the Court heard a Motion to Dismiss and/or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Jason Coy (“Coy”) and Mario Vega (“Vega”) (collectively, “the Agents”) (doc. # 12); a Motion to Dismiss and/or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant United States of America (“United States”) (doc. # 13); and Plaintiff Alejandro Garcia de la Paz's (“Plaintiff”) Rule 56(d) Motion for Discovery (doc. # 22). David Anton Armendariz, Esq., and Lance Edward Curtright, Esq., appeared at the hearing on behalf of Plaintiff; Joseph Cuauhtemoc Rodriguez, Esq., appeared at the hearing on behalf of Defendants Coy, Vega, and the United States (collectively, “Defendants”). After reviewing the Motions and the supporting and opposing memoranda, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Agents' Motion, GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the United States's Motion, and GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion.

BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises from a traffic stop that occurred on the afternoon of October 11, 2010, at the intersection of Ranch Road 187 and Ranch Road 337. Plaintiff is Hispanic. (“Compl.,” Doc. # 1 ¶ 12.) According to Plaintiff, on October 11, 2010, he was a passenger in the front seat of a red Ford F150 truck (“the Truck”) with an extended cab. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff asserts that this kind of truck is “extremely common in Texas.” ( Id. ¶ 18.) The Truck was not altered in any way or for any special purpose—for example, to carry heavy loads—and the Truck's windows were not tinted or altered to obscure visibility. ( Id. ¶¶ 19, 20.) The Complaint states that visibility into the cab through the windows was clear and unobstructed. ( Id. ¶ 21.) According to Plaintiff, the Truck was traveling in accordance with applicable state traffic rules and regulations. ( Id. ¶ 32.)

Omar Hernandez was driving the Truck, and there were two other passengers in addition to Plaintiff: Miguel Cortez and a man named Marcos, both sitting upright in the rear seat. ( Id. ¶ 22.) The four men were returning from work near Vanderpool, Texas. ( Id. ¶ 23.) According to Plaintiff, they had left the work site in the late afternoon to return to San Antonio. ( Id.) They were originally traveling north on Ranch Road 187, and then turned right onto Ranch Road 337, going east. ( Id. ¶¶ 24–28.) The Complaint states that the intersection of those two roads is more than 100 miles from the Mexican border. ( Id. ¶ 28.) It further alleges that both roads are traveled by thousands of people daily, many of whom are Hispanic. ( Id. ¶ 29.) The Complaint alleges that the “overwhelming majority” of people traversing those roads do so for lawful purposes and are United States citizens or non-citizens present in the United States legally. ( Id. ¶¶ 30, 31.) It further alleges that there are no characteristics particular to that stretch of road that makes it more likely to be used as a route for illegal activity than other roads within Texas. ( Id. ¶¶ 73, 74.)

According to Plaintiff, Coy and Vega—agents with United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”)—were on patrol duty, driving south on Ranch Road 187 in separate patrol cars, when they saw the Truck. ( Id. ¶¶ 33, 34.) The Complaint alleges that the Agents saw the Truck, and “[b]ased principally upon their perception that the Truck had a Hispanic driver and other Hispanics inside,” decided to pull it over and interrogate the occupants shortly after it turned onto Ranch Road 337. ( Id. ¶ 42.) Accordingly, the Agents began following the Truck. Plaintiff claims that Hernandez (the driver) continued looking forward at the road and neither Plaintiff nor the two men in the rear seat of the Truck made any bodily movements out of the ordinary. ( Id. ¶¶ 44, 45.) When the Agents turned on their vehicles' emergency lights, Hernandez brought the Truck to a stop promptly. ( Id. ¶ 48.)

Plaintiff alleges that, after Hernandez brought the Truck to a stop, the Agents exited their vehicles and Coy approached the Truck's passenger side and Vega the driver's side. ( Id. ¶¶ 63, 64.) Without any explanation for the stop, Vega asked whether the occupants were United States citizens. ( Id. at 64.) According to the Complaint, when Plaintiff answered the question, Coy opened the passenger door, grabbed Plaintiff by the upper arm, pulled him out of the Truck and directed him to Coy's patrol car. ( Id. ¶¶ 65, 66.) Plaintiff asserts that the Agents did not have a warrant for his arrest or any reason to believe Plaintiff was likely to escape before an arrest warrant could be obtained. ( Id. ¶¶ 68, 72.) The Complaint alleges that Coy and Vega never searched the Truck for drugs or contraband; communicated with their agency to determine whether the agency had any information relating to Plaintiff or the Truck; or undertook any investigation specific to Plaintiff. ( Id. ¶¶ 69–72.)

On October 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint. (Compl.) The Complaint asserts causes of action against Coy, Vega, and the United States pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedures Act for violations of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(a)(2) and (a)(3); claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for false imprisonment and assault; and claims against the Agents for violations of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). On January 14, 2013, the Agents filed the Motion to Dismiss and/or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment that is currently before the Court. (“Agents' MSJ,” Doc. # 12.) That same day, the United States filed their own Motion to Dismiss and/or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (“U.S. MSJ,” Doc. # 13.) On February 4, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Rule 56(d) Motion for Discovery. (Doc. # 22.)

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Review is limited to the contents of the complaint and matters properly subject to judicial notice. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007). In analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “[t]he court accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’ ” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir.2004)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

A complaint need not include detailed facts to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In providing grounds for relief, however, a plaintiff must do more than recite the formulaic elements of a cause of action. See id. at 556–57, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, although all reasonable inferences will be resolved in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff must plead “specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations.” Tuchman v. DSC Commc'ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir.1994); see also Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir.2005) (“We do not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.”).

When a complaint fails to adequately state a claim, such deficiency should be “exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted). However, the plaintiff should generally be given at least one chance to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a) before dismissing the action with prejudice. See Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir.2002).

II. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff, as the party asserting jurisdiction, bears the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Choice Inc. of Tex. v. Greenstein, 691 F.3d...