Alejandro v. ST Micro Elecs., Inc., Case No. 15–CV–01385–LHK

• Court: United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Northern District of California
• Writing for the Court: LUCY H. KOH, United States District Judge
• Citation: 129 F.Supp.3d 898
• Parties: Jesse Alejandro, Plaintiff, v. ST Micro Electronics, Inc, Defendant.
• Docket Number: Case No. 15–CV–01385–LHK
• Decision Date: 09 September 2015

129 F.Supp.3d 898

Jesse Alejandro, Plaintiff,
v.
ST Micro Electronics, Inc, Defendant.

Case No. 15–CV–01385–LHK

United States District Court, N.D. California.

Signed September 9, 2015

129 F.Supp.3d 904

Mark Walter Hostetter, Law Office of Mark W. Hostetter, San Jose, CA, for Plaintiff.

Paul Wesley Sweeney, Jr., Saman M. Rejali, K and L Gates, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

LUCY H. KOH, United States District Judge

Defendant STMicroelectronics, Inc. has filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Jesse Alejandro's first amended complaint. ECF No. 14. Having considered the parties' submissions, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Defendant is a corporation incorporated in Delaware and with its principal place of

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business in Texas. ECF No. 2, Ex. A, ¶¶ 6–7. Plaintiff, a graduate of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was employed by Defendant as a sales engineer in Santa Clara, California from September 2012 until April 2014. First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), ECF No. 12, ¶ 6. Plaintiff alleges that he was well qualified for the position of sales engineer, as well as hard-working and productive. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff alleges that he earned high performance ratings and a substantial pay raise in 2013, his last full year of employment with Defendant. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that he suffered from bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and debilitating allergies, among other unspecified medical conditions. Id. ¶ 8. According to the FAC, Plaintiff's combination of medical conditions "limited many of Plaintiff's major life activities including working, concentrating, performing tasks, caring for himself, and interacting with others." Id. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that "[o]n a few unforeseeable occasions, these conditions have temporarily incapacitated Plaintiff such that he was unable to move or communicate effectively." Id.

In July 2013, Plaintiff suffered an episode of incapacitation that caused him to miss one week of work. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff used regular sick days to excuse this weeklong absence. Id. Upon his return to work, Plaintiff discussed his medical conditions with his manager. Id. He explained to his manager that "he was undergoing treatment" and that he would need "accommodation in the form of occasional temporary time off and/or work from home." Id. Plaintiff's manager responded that "in the event of a future episode, [Plaintiff] should contact the manager directly and avoid involving the human resources department." Id.

Plaintiff again had an episode in mid-to-late March 2014 that required him to miss work. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff alleges that he "promptly informed his manager that his medical condition rendered him unable to go to the office for several days." Id. On March 27, 2014, Plaintiff contacted his manager and explained that he was "still extremely ill and unable to go in to work." Id. On April 1, 2014, Plaintiff again contacted his manager to explain that "he was still extremely ill and unable to go in to work and needed additional time off." Id. For the next two days, April 2 and April 3, Plaintiff alleges that his "disabilities rendered him unable to work or to contact [Defendant] in the morning." Id.

On April 3, 2014, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment "for ‘job abandonment’ based on two days without contact." Id. Plaintiff explained to Defendant that his absence and inability to communicate with Defendant had been caused by his disabilities and Plaintiff provided Defendant with "documentation from a medical professional explaining the reasons behind his incapacity and excusing him from work during the relevant time period" within a week of his termination. Id. Defendant did not reconsider Plaintiff's termination. Id. ¶¶ 10–11.

Plaintiff subsequently submitted to Defendant and to the Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") complaints of disability discrimination and denial of medical leave stemming from his discharge. Id. ¶ 11. The DFEH issued Right–to–Sue Notices to Plaintiff. Id.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed suit in the Santa Clara County Superior Court on February 24, 2015. See ECF No. 2, Ex. A, ¶ 1. On March 25, 2015, Defendant filed a notice of removal based on diversity jurisdiction. See ECF Nos. 1–2. The case was assigned to the undersigned judge on April 1, 2015. ECF No. 8.

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On April 1, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff filed the FAC on April 14, 2015, ECF No. 12, and Defendant withdrew its motion to dismiss on April 22, 2015, ECF No. 13.

On May 1, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the FAC. ECF No. 14. Plaintiff filed a response on May 15, 2015, ECF No. 15, and Defendant filed a reply on May 22, 2015, ECF No. 16.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such a motion tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.2001). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient, the Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). However, the Court need not accept as true "allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit" or "allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). While a complaint need not allege detailed factual allegations, it "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's FAC brings eight causes of action: (1) disability discrimination in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Cal. Gov't Code § 12900 et seq. ; (2) failure to provide reasonable accommodation in violation of FEHA; (3) failure to engage in a good faith, interactive process, in violation of FEHA; (4) failure to prevent discrimination under FEHA; (5) violation of the California Family Rights Act ("CFRA"), Cal. Gov't Code § 12945.2 ; (6) wrongful termination in violation of California public policy; (7) disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ; and (8) violation of the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.See FAC. In addition to general and special damages, the FAC requests injunctive and declarative relief and punitive damages. Id. Defendant moves to dismiss each of Plaintiff's causes of action for failure to state a claim. Defendant additionally moves to dismiss Plaintiff's requests for declarative relief and punitive damages.

A. Disability Discrimination under FEHA and the ADA

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff's first and seventh causes of action fail to state causes of action for disability discrimination under either FEHA or the ADA. Defendant raises the same arguments with regard to both disability discrimination causes of action, so the Court addresses the disability discrimination claims under FEHA and the ADA together.

FEHA provides that it is an unlawful employment practice "[f]or an employer,

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because of the ... physical disability, mental disability, [or] medical condition ... of any person ... to bar or discharge the person from employment or from a training program leading to employment, or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Cal. Gov't Code § 12940. The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability...." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

In order to state a claim for disability discrimination under FEHA and the ADA, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) Plaintiff suffers from a disability; (2) Plaintiff is otherwise qualified to do his job; and (3) Plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action because of his disability. See Brundage v. Hahn, 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 236, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 830 (1997) ; Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th...