Aleman v. State
| Citation | 230 A.3d 97,469 Md. 397 |
| Decision Date | 30 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 60, Sept. Term 2019,60, Sept. Term 2019 |
| Parties | Pablo Javier ALEMAN v. STATE of Maryland |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by Piedad Gomez, Assistant Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, Maryland of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioner
Argued by Benjamin A. Harris, Assistant Attorney General (Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General, Maryland of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent
This case calls upon us to construe the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD"). The IAD is a congressionally-sanctioned compact among the states designed to facilitate the prompt disposition of a detainer lodged by one state against a person incarcerated in another state. In particular, the IAD allows for the temporary transfer of the prisoner from the state of incarceration to the state in which charges are pending, upon the request of either the prisoner or the prosecuting jurisdiction.
Shortly after commencing an 11-year sentence in Ohio for felony assault, Petitioner Pablo Javier Aleman requested a transfer under the IAD to Maryland where a murder charge was pending against him in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. After he arrived in Maryland, Mr. Aleman pled guilty to second degree murder but, as permitted by Maryland law, requested a jury trial on the issue of criminal responsibility. The jury returned a verdict of "not criminally responsible."
Such a verdict ordinarily requires that a defendant be committed to the Department of Health for treatment or released. However, the State maintained that, because Maryland had obtained only temporary custody of Mr. Aleman from Ohio, the IAD required that he first return to Ohio to finish his sentence. Mr. Aleman sought to remain in Maryland, but the Circuit Court denied his petition for habeas corpus seeking such relief. Mr. Aleman appealed and the Circuit Court stayed his return to Ohio, as well as a commitment to the Department for treatment, pending his appeal.
On appeal, Mr. Aleman argued that the Maryland statute providing for commitment to the Department superseded the State's obligation under the IAD to return him to Ohio. He also argued that the not criminally responsible verdict exempted him from the IAD by the terms of the compact itself. The Court of Special Appeals rejected both arguments and, after carefully analyzing the IAD and other relevant statutes, affirmed the Circuit Court's denial of Mr. Aleman's habeas corpus petition. We agree with that analysis and disposition.
This case concerns the intersection of two laws: (1) an interstate compact concerning the disposition of detainers based on criminal charges – the IAD – codified in Maryland as Maryland Code, Correctional Services Article ("CS"), § 8-401 et seq. , and (2) the State law concerning the consequences of a not criminally responsible verdict, codified as Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article ("CP"), § 3-112. To place the facts of this case in their legal context, we first outline the provisions of the IAD and the State statutes concerning the mental health status of a defendant in a criminal case, including CP § 3-112.
As pertains to the IAD, an interstate detainer has been described as "a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction."1 Prosecuting authorities in the jurisdiction where the charges are pending may file a detainer with the institution in the jurisdiction where the prisoner is incarcerated to ensure that the prisoner, upon completing the term of incarceration, will be available to answer the pending charges.
Prior to enactment of the IAD, there was no uniform method for managing an interstate detainer and resolving the charges on which it was based. Moreover, a detainer could be lodged without proof of the underlying charges, a judicial officer was not involved in issuing it, and the filing of a detainer did not obligate the jurisdiction that lodged it to take any further prosecutorial action. Pitts v. North Carolina , 395 F.2d 182, 187-88 (4th Cir. 1968). As a result, there sometimes arose "a practice of filing detainers based on untried criminal charges that had little basis." Carchman v. Nash , 473 U.S. 716, 729, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985). This created the potential for abuse in which a detainer could be lodged against a prisoner, adversely affect the circumstances of the prisoner's current incarceration,2 and later be withdrawn as the prisoner came to the end of that sentence. Even apart from the effect of a detainer on a prisoner's treatment in the place of incarceration, there was also a concern that the charges on which a detainer was based should be resolved "before the passage of time has dulled the memory or made witnesses unavailable." S. Rep. No. 91-1356 (1970).
In 1948, the Joint Committee on Detainers ("Joint Committee"), an ad hoc group of law enforcement and corrections associations, was formed to address the problems posed by the detainer process. The Joint Committee issued a report that recommended certain basic principles for the use and disposition of detainers. Among those basic principles were that detainers should be disposed of "as promptly as possible," that "[n]o prisoner should be penalized" as a result of a pending detainer until it had been investigated and found valid, and that jurisdictions should observe principles of comity in settling detainers and disposing of pending charges. See Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation, Program for 1957, at 74-75 (1956) ("Council of State Governments Report"). With respect to the transfer of a prisoner from the place of imprisonment to the place where charges were pending, the Joint Committee included the following basic principle:
There should be assurance that any prisoner released to stand trial in another jurisdiction will be returned to the institution from which he was released . An important cause of long-standing detainers is the presence of unsettled charges pending against a prisoner held by another jurisdiction. If the charges appear to be valid and if the individual is to be brought to trial before completion of his sentence, then it is essential that the institution holding him in custody be assured of his return after the trial has been completed. Unless there is such assurance, many jurisdictions will understandably hesitate to cooperate.
Id . at 75 (emphasis in original). The principles stated by the Joint Committee served as the foundation of the IAD when, a few years later, the Council of State Governments drafted legislative proposals concerning detainers, including the IAD.3 See id. at 78-85.
Congress had assented in 1934 to the creation of such a compact. See 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) ; see also Cuyler v. Adams , 449 U.S. 433, 438-42 & n.9, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). As a congressionally-sanctioned compact, the IAD falls within Article I, § 10, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution and thus qualifies as a federal law.4 Id. Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted the IAD. See National Center for Interstate Compacts, Interstate Compacts – Agreement on Detainers, available at https://perma.cc/X9N5UMNK. The federal government itself became a party to the compact in 1970. Pub. L. 91-538, 84 Stat. 1397.
Maryland became a party to the compact in 1965. Chapter 627, § 1, Laws of Maryland 1965.
The IAD is organized as nine "Articles" designated by roman numerals – i.e ., Article I, Article II, etc. – which, in Maryland, correspond to sections of the Correctional Services Article of the Maryland Code.5 Cases in various jurisdictions construing the IAD generally refer to the provisions of the IAD by their Article designations. Accordingly, we shall use those designations in the text of this opinion and cross-reference the Maryland Code analogs in footnotes, as appropriate.
For purposes of this case, the key provisions of the IAD can be summarized as follows.
The first Article of the IAD sets forth the problem that the compact was intended to address and the means of addressing that problem. Article I.6 It briefly refers to the fact that unresolved detainers based on outstanding charges can "obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation." Id. Accordingly, the IAD is intended "to encourage the expeditious and orderly" disposition of detainers based on untried charges. Id . To that end, the IAD provides "cooperative procedures." Id. The last Article of the IAD states that it is to be "liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes." Article IX.7
The IAD applies when a state in which there are untried charges pending against an individual imprisoned in another state lodges a detainer with the state in which the individual is imprisoned. The IAD uses the phrase "receiving state" to refer to the jurisdiction that has pending charges against the individual and that lodges a detainer. It uses the phrase "sending state" to refer to the jurisdiction where the individual is already incarcerated and the detainer is lodged. Article II(b), (c).8
After a detainer is lodged, a transfer of the prisoner9 from the sending state to the receiving state under the IAD can be initiated in two ways: (1) by the prisoner or (2) by the state in which charges are pending – i.e ., the receiving state.
First, Article III provides that a prisoner subject to a detainer may initiate a transfer. The official in charge of the prisoner in the place of incarceration – i.e ., the sending state – must inform the prisoner of the source and contents of any detainer, as well as of the...
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