Alex A. v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 23 September 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 22-573-SDD-RLB
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana
• Parties: ALEX A., by and through his guardian, MOLLY SMITH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. GOVERNOR JON BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of Louisiana; WILLIAM SOMMERS, in his official capacity as Deputy Secretary of the Office of Juvenile Justice, JAMES M. LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections

ALEX A., by and through his guardian, MOLLY SMITH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. GOVERNOR JON BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of Louisiana; WILLIAM SOMMERS, in his official capacity as Deputy Secretary of the Office of Juvenile Justice, JAMES M. LEBLANC, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections

Civil Action No. 22-573-SDD-RLB

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana

September 23, 2022

RULING

SHELLY D. DICK CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,^[1]filed by Alex A., by and through his guardian, Molly Smith (“Plaintiff”), which also included a request for injunctive relief. Defendants Governor Jon Bel Edwards, in his official capacity as Governor of Louisiana, William Sommers (“Sommers”), in his official capacity as Deputy Secretary of the Office of Juvenile Justice (“OJJ”), and James M. Leblanc, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections (“DOC”)(collectively “Defendants”), filed an Opposition^[2] to Plaintiff's motion. The Court denied Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order^[3] and set the matter for a Preliminary Injunction hearing,^[4] which was held on September 6 through September 8, 2022.^[5] The Parties were granted leave to file post-hearing memoranda.^[6]

This case presents an untenable proposition to house adolescents some as young as 12 years old, who have been determined to be juvenile delinquents, at the notorious Angola Penitentiary in a cell block which once housed death row inmates. A few of the adolescents adjudicated as “delinquent” and placed in the secure care of the OJJ present formidable security and safety risks. OJJ is charged with a rehabilitative, not punitive, mission. But a small handful of youth have wreaked havoc, endangering themselves, other youth, OJJ staff, and members of the general public. Ongoing and repeated acts of violent and disruptive behavior by a few has reduced OJJ to becoming security enforcers instead of rehabilitators.

For the reasons which follow, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction shall be denied. The prospect of putting a teenager to bed at night in a locked cell behind razor wire surrounded by swamps at Angola is disturbing. Some of the children in OJJ's care are so traumatized and emotionally and psychologically disturbed that OJJ is virtually unable to provide a secure care environment. While locking children in cells at night at Angola is untenable, the threat of harm these youngsters present to themselves, and others, is intolerable. The untenable must yield to the intolerable.

The Court finds that OJJ has shown that it will provide a constitutional level of care to youth transferred to the Temporary Transitional Treatment Unit (“TTU”) proposed to be located at Angola. The Court is mindful that the specter of the prison surroundings alone will likely cause psychological trauma and harm. However, the public interest and the balance of harms require that OJJ be afforded the latitude to carry out its rehabilitative mission for the benefit of all youth in its care.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 19, 2022, in response to several recent incidents of serious events at OJJ secure care facilities, including riots, attempted and successful escapes, and acts of violence against staff, other youth, and members of the public, Louisiana's Governor John Bel Edwards held a press conference announcing that the state will “temporarily move” approximately 25 youth in the custody of OJJ from Bridge City Center for Youth (“BCCY”), a juvenile secure care facility, to the grounds of the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola (“LSP” or “Angola”).^[7]

On August 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against the Defendants on behalf of a putative class of all current and future persons held at BCCY who might be transferred to LSP or another adult prison. Plaintiff asserts claims under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794.^[8] The Plaintiff moved for an Emergency Temporary Restraining Order seeking to: (1) enjoin Defendants from transferring or incarcerating Plaintiff or any proposed Class member at LSP, and (2) enjoin Defendants to immediately return any youth who may have already been transferred to LSP to BCCY or another appropriate OJJ facility for youth.^[9] On August 23, 2022, the Court held a telephonic status conference, during which Defendants stipulated that no youth had been or would be moved to Angola until on or after September 15, 2022.^[10] The Court denied Plaintiff's emergency motion for a TRO and set this matter for a Preliminary Injunction hearing.^[11] The Court set expedited deadlines for discovery, including depositions and disclosure of experts.^[12] The Parties conducted limited, expedited discovery. The Preliminary Injunction hearing was held from September 6 through September 8, 2022.

I. PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT (“PLRA”) EXHAUSTION

The Parties dispute whether Alex A. exhausted administrative remedies under the PLRA before filing this action. At the Preliminary Injunction hearing, neither Plaintiff nor Defendants presented evidence on this issue, and they offered no arguments other than those previously briefed. Thus, the Court will rule on this issue based on the pleadings before the Court.

Alex A. lodged an emergency Administrative Remedy Procedure (“ARP”) grievance, which was denied.^[13] Defendants contend that, following denial of the emergency ARP, Alex A. was required to engage the general ARP procedure, which he did not do, and thus he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The general ARP process takes 51 days, which Plaintiff claims would render the emergency process meaningless.

Defendants maintain that there is nothing in the ARP policy of OJJ that exempts a youth from utilizing the “still available” general ARP process before filing suit; thus, Plaintiff's claims are not exhausted and not properly before the Court. The same argument advanced by the Defendants was recently rejected by another section of this Court. In J.H. v. Edwards,^[14] Judge deGravelles noted that:

The Fifth Circuit has explained the following about exhaustion of remedies under the PLRA:

The PLRA requires inmates to exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before filing suit in federal court to challenge prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion obligation is mandatory-there are no “futility or other [judicially created] exceptions [to the] statutory exhaustion requirements....” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001). So long as the State's administrative procedure grants “authority to take some action in response to a complaint,” that procedure is considered “available,” even if it cannot provide “the remedial action an inmate demands.” Id. at 736, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (emphasis added); see also id. at 739, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (“Congress meant to require procedural exhaustion regardless of the fit between a prisoner's prayer for relief and the administrative remedies possible.”).

By contrast, a remedy is not “available”-and exhaustion is not required-when:

1. The procedure “operates as a simple dead end” because “the relevant administrative procedure lacks authority to provide any relief,” or “administrative officials have apparent authority, but decline ever to exercise it.”

2. The “administrative scheme [is] so opaque that ... no reasonable prisoner can use them.”

3. Or when “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross v. Blake, ----U.S.-----, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1859-60, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) (quotation omitted).^[15]

Turning to OJJ's ARP policy, the Court observed that: “the ARP Policy does not appear to require youth to exhaust the standard two-step procedure after they have filed an emergency procedure.”^[17] OJJ's emergency ARP policy provides:

If a youth's ARP contains statements which indicate he believes he is at immediate risk of harm and any delay in responding to the grievance would subject the youth to substantial risk of immediate personal injury or cause other serious or irreparable harm, the ARP Coordinator shall immediately forward the ARP, or that portion of the ARP which alleges substantial risk of imminent personal injury or cause serious or irreparable harm, to the Facility Director, Regional Director, and IS. The Regional Director shall provide an initial response with 48 hours and issue a final decision with five (5) calendar days.^[18]

Based on the plain language in the ARP policy, the Court in J.H. reasoned: “both the ARP Policy and the youth ARP Instructions indicate that the Emergency ARP results in a ‘final decision,' which would logically mean that the Youth could proceed to the ‘next step' of filing suit.”^[19]

In this matter, without mentioning J.H., Defendants endeavor to get around the Court's ruling on exhaustion by stating:

103. OJJ's ARP does not except Youths from addressing grievances through the standard two-step process if they do not receive emergency relief where requested. See generally ARP Policy (Doc. No. 28-1). In other words, the ARP includes no provision for complete curtailment of the two-step grievance process, even where a Youth is denied emergency relief. In fact, the ARP specifically states that a Youth may seek judicial review after the conclusion of Step 2 of its standard process but contains no such language in the emergency grievance provision. See id. at 9-10. Thus, the ordinary grievance

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