Alexander & Edgar Lumber Co. v. McGeehan

• Decision Date: 21 February 1905
• Citation: 124 Wis. 325,102 N.W. 571
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Parties: ALEXANDER & EDGAR LUMBER CO. v. MCGEEHAN.

124 Wis. 325

102 N.W. 571

ALEXANDER & EDGAR LUMBER CO.

v.MCGEEHAN.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Feb. 21, 1905.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Ashland County; John K. Parish, Judge.

Action by the Alexander & Edgar Lumber Company against J. J. McGeehan. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Appeal from the circuit court for Ashland county. Action to recover on contract. The answer was a general denial. The only issue litigated upon the trial was whether the contract was made by the defendant as agent for the Iron River Boom & Improvement Company under such circumstances as to preclude plaintiff from successfully charging him as the principal. It was shown that he did in fact act as agent, though he used language appropriate to a personal contract, and did not at any time expressly disclose his agency. There was evidence establishing, or tending to establish, circumstances which it was claimed, on the part of the defendant, so strongly suggested to the plaintiff at the inception of the contract the facts of the matter as to charge him with knowledge thereof. The court directed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff which was done and judgment rendered accordingly, from which defendant appealed.Lamoreux & Shea, for appellant.

Tompkins, Tompkins & Garvin, for respondent.

MARSHALL, J. (after stating the facts).

It may be, as counsel for appellant contends, that the learned circuit court directed the verdict upon the theory that if one person acting as agent contracts with another, without expressly declaring his agency and the name of his principal, he will bind himself regardless of whether that other has such knowledge of the facts respecting the matter, that a man of ordinary intelligence, acting with reasonable prudence under the circumstances, might know the real status of such person in the transaction and his intention. The way the rule is commonly stated in the books one might, looking thereto only, get that idea. In West v. Wells, 54 Wis. 525, 11 N. W. 677, speaking of the facts of that case, where there was no claim that the necessary disclosures were made, expressly or circumstantially, or that the facts were otherwise known to the person contracting with the agent, and there were no circumstances otherwise varying the rule, it was said that the sole question, as to whether the agent was personally liable or not, was, did he disclose his principal? The rule is often stated unqualifiedly thus: If in a...