Alexander Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Vill. of Albany, 16CA19
Decision Date | 16 November 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 16CA19,16CA19 |
Citation | 2017 Ohio 8704,101 N.E.3d 21 |
Parties | ALEXANDER LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF ALBANY, Ohio, Defendant–Appellee. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Christopher L. McCloskey, Tarik Kershah, and Desmond J. Cullimore, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
Lawrence E. Barbiere, Mason, Ohio, Robert R. Rittenhouse, Athens, Ohio, and Scott Robe, Athens, Ohio, for Appellee.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from an Athens County Common Pleas Court judgment that dismissed the complaint filed by Alexander Local School District Board of Education, plaintiff below and appellant herein, against the Village of Albany, Ohio, defendant below and appellee herein. Appellant assigns the following errors for review:
{¶ 2} This appeal arises out of appellant's 2015 application to connect its newly-designed Wellness Center to appellee's sewer system. According to the complaint, in 2015 appellee denied appellant's application to connect its newly-designed Wellness Center to appellee's sewer system. Appellee asserted that a 2010 village ordinance prohibited the issuance of sewer taps outside the village unless the property served by the tap is annexed into the village. The village mayor drafted a letter to inform appellant that appellee
{¶ 3} Appellant subsequently filed an amended complaint against appellee that asserted four claims for relief: (1) a declaratory judgment that requested the trial court to declare the parties' rights and obligations created pursuant to a 2004 village resolution, written communications, and subsequently-enacted ordinances; (2) the breach of an agreement to allow the district to connect the Wellness Center to the sewer system and enacting ordinances that conflict with the agreement; (3) a request that the court to issue an injunction to prohibit appellee from imposing conditions for service that are contrary to, or that impair appellant's rights, under the sewer agreement; and (4) a writ of mandamus to order appellee to permit appellant to connect the Wellness Center to the sewer system without requiring appellant to annex, and further ordering appellee to issue a letter to the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in order to facilitate appellant obtaining approval for the Wellness Center project.
{¶ 4} Appellant premised its complaint upon an allegation that a 2004 resolution created a sewer services agreement between the parties. As background, appellant's complaint asserted that in 2004, it renovated and added onto its Ayers Road school facility. Appellant alleged that part of the project included constructing a sanitary sewer line that, for the first time, enabled it to discharge sanitary sewage from the school facility into appellee's sewer system. Appellant claimed that in the 2004 resolution, appellee agreed to provide it with a sewer tap, located on Rossiter Road, for appellant's school facility and authorized appellant to connect its sewer line to the tap and to discharge sewage into appellee's system. Appellee further averred that it paid appellee $95,000 for the sewer tap and that appellee authorized it to discharge flow through the tap in the amount of 111 Equivalent Dwelling Units (EDUs). Appellant attached the 2004 resolution to its complaint, as well as written communications between appellant and appellee concerning appellant's right to tap into the village sewer system and the amount of EDUs.
{¶ 5} The 2004 resolution states:
{¶ 7} Also attached to appellant's complaint is a June 30, 2004 letter that explains appellee's calculation of the Equivalent Dwelling Units (EDUs) for the school. The letter states that the village engineer expected the school to create 22,200 gallons per day of sewage, which equals 111 EDUs per day. Appellant additionally attached copies of documents evidencing its payment of $95,000 to appellee, as well as copies of recent sewer bills.
{¶ 8} Appellee filed a motion to dismiss appellant's amended complaint and alleged that appellant's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In particular, appellee asserted that the complaint is based upon the assertion that the 2004 resolution granted appellant the right to tap the Wellness Center into appellee's sewer system. Appellee contended, however, that the plain and unambiguous language of the resolution does not give appellant the right to connect the Wellness Center to the sewer system, and thus, all of its claims must fail.
{¶ 9} Appellee argued that appellant's claims for relief are all premised upon its supposition that the Wellness Center falls within the terms of the 2004 resolution that permitted appellant to connect its "new school facility" to the sewer system. Appellee argued that appellant's Wellness Center, constructed more than ten years from the date of the resolution, does not constitute part of appellant's "new school facility" as contemplated in the 2004 resolution. Instead, appellee claimed that the phrase "new school facility" clearly and unambiguously authorized appellant to connect only "the School that had newly been renovated in 2004." Appellee also asserted that the resolution used the verb "located" in the past tense to manifest its intention that the resolution only authorized appellant "to connect its new school facility, as it existed as of the date the resolution was passed, to [appellee]'s sewer system." Appellee further contended that the Wellness Center does not constitute a "school facility" because appellant alleged that the Wellness Center would also serve the community, as well as students. Appellee thus argued that even if the resolution represents a contract or an agreement between the parties, appellant could prove no set of facts to show that it has any right to connect the Wellness Center to appellee's sewer system.
{¶ 10} Additionally, appellee asserted that the trial court should reject appellant's request to consider additional written documents when...
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