Alexander Oil Co. v. City of Seguin

Citation825 S.W.2d 434
Decision Date13 November 1991
Docket NumberNo. C-9317,C-9317
PartiesALEXANDER OIL COMPANY, Petitioner, v. CITY OF SEGUIN, Respondent.
CourtSupreme Court of Texas
OPINION

GONZALEZ, Justice.

The key issue in this case is whether the Texas Legislature intended to allow a private party judicial relief to set aside annexation for alleged procedural irregularities, or whether the complaints may only be raised in a quo warranto proceeding. Alexander Oil Company ("Alexander") brought suit as a private party to void the annexation of its property by the City of Seguin ("the City"). Alexander alleged that the City did not comply with the notice, hearing or service plan requirements of the Municipal Annexation Act. 1 Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary judgment for the City. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 823 S.W.2d 309. We affirm.

FACTS

Prior to annexation, Alexander paid the full expense to have water lines brought from the City to its property. Thereafter, the City began to consider annexation of 192.43 acres of land within its extraterritorial jurisdiction, including property owned by Alexander. To meet the requirements of the Municipal Annexation Act the City published notices on November 14 and 16, 1986, of two public hearings on the annexation to be held on November 25 and 26, 1986. The City Secretary also posted the agenda of the public hearings on the front door of the Seguin Municipal Building on November 19, 1986. At the first of their scheduled hearings, Alexander's counsel presented Alexander's concerns and requests regarding service to the annexed area, including its request to be reimbursed for its water line installation expenses. A quorum of council members was present at the November 25 hearing but not at the November 26 hearing. Despite notice, no members of the public attended the November 26 hearing. After readings on December 16 and 17, 1986, the city council passed an ordinance annexing the land on December 18, 1986.

After Alexander filed suit, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Alexander sought summary judgment on the grounds that the ordinance was void for the want of a proper presentation of a service plan and inadequate notice of public hearing. The City sought summary judgment on the grounds that the summary judgment proof shows the annexation ordinance was not void ab initio, and therefore Alexander's collateral attack must fail as a matter of law.

ALEXANDER'S ALLEGATIONS

Alexander does not complain that it did not have actual notice of the hearings, because, as the summary judgment record reflects, Alexander fully participated in the hearing. Rather, Alexander alleges and claims to have shown that the notice given by the City did not comply with the Municipal Annexation Act. TEX.LOC. GOV'T CODE § 43.056(a). 2 Alexander also claims to have shown that the City failed to conduct proper and timely hearings and failed to provide, and continues to fail to provide, a service plan as required by the Municipal Annexation Act. Finally, Alexander alleges that the City annexed the property for the purpose of levying ad valorem taxes, and that the City had no ability or intention to provide service to the property. 3 The basis of the City's motion for summary judgment and resisting Alexander's motion is that since this is not a quo warranto proceeding, Alexander's suit is a collateral attack. The City argues that the challenged ordinance in the summary judgment record is not void, and therefore the collateral attack must fail as a matter of law.

QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS

The only proper method for attacking the validity of a city's annexation of territory is by quo warranto proceeding, unless the annexation is wholly void. Hoffman v. Elliott, 476 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Tex.1972) (per curiam); Kuhn v. City of Yoakum, 6 S.W.2d 91, 91 (Tex. Comm'n App.1928, judgm't adopted); Graham v. City of Greenville, 2 S.W. 742, 745 (Tex.1886); City of Hurst v. City of Colleyville, 501 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), on appeal after remand sub nom. State ex rel. City of Colleyville v. City of Hurst, 521 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); L. LOWE, 6A TEXAS PRACTICE § 1203 (1973). The purpose of a quo warranto proceeding is to question the right of a person or corporation, including a municipality, to exercise a public franchise or office. In this case, Alexander questions the City's annexation authority. Through quo warranto proceedings, "the State acts to protect itself and the good of the public generally, through the duly chosen agents of the State who have full control of the proceeding." Fuller Springs v. State ex rel. City of Lufkin, 513 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex.1974). Therefore, the State must bring the action to question irregular use of the delegated annexation authority.

Furthermore, quo warranto proceedings serve another purpose. By requiring that the State bring such a proceeding, we avoid the specter of numerous successive suits by private parties attacking the validity of annexations. Kuhn, 6 S.W.2d at 92. The judgments of suits brought by private parties are binding only on the parties thereto so conflicting results might be reached in subsequent suits by other individuals. These problems are avoided by requiring quo warranto proceedings because the judgment settles the validity of the annexation on behalf of all property holders in the affected area. Id.; see also Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 726 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir.1984). 4

The requirement that an action seeking to set aside annexation for irregular use of power be brought as a quo warranto proceeding dates back as early as 1886. Graham v. City of Greenville, 67 Tex. 62, 2 S.W. 742, 744-45 (1886). It continues to be followed today. See, e.g., Hoffman, 476 S.W.2d at 846; City of Houston v. Savely, 708 S.W.2d 879, 889 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928, 107 S.Ct. 3212, 96 L.Ed.2d 698 (1987); Larkins v. City of Denison, 683 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1984, no writ); City of Nassau Bay v. Webster, 600 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] ), writ ref'd n.r.e., 608 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.1980). The fact that the Legislature has reacted to other holdings regarding annexation, 5 but has not acted to expressly provide a private action to set aside annexation in reaction to these cases, supports the position that a quo warranto proceeding is required to set aside annexation unless it is void. The only express remedy for failure to provide services to the annexed area is disannexation. TEX.LOC.GOV'T CODE § 43.141; see also Larkins, 683 S.W.2d at 757. Because this is not a direct attack by quo warranto, the City will be entitled to summary judgment if it can show as a matter of law that the ordinance is not void.

FAILURE TO FOLLOW STATUTORY PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS--IS
ACTION TAKEN VOID OR VOIDABLE?

The City offered proof in support of its argument that the City had subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the ordinance which was fully activated by giving proper notice under the Code. Alexander's reply to the City's motion is that certain procedural irregularities render the ordinance void. Alexander relies on City of Duncanville v. City of Woodland Hills, 489 S.W.2d 557, 558 (Tex.1972) (per curiam), to support its contention that "full compliance with statutory requirements as to notice and hearing is necessary to the validity of an ordinance."

Historically, private challenges of annexation ordinances have been sustained and the ordinance held void in the following instances: an annexation of territory exceeding the statutory size limitations, Deacon v. City of Euless, 405 S.W.2d 59, 64 (Tex.1966); an attempted annexation of territory within the corporate limits of another municipality or which was not contiguous with its own limits, City of West Orange v. State ex rel. City of Orange, 613 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex.1981); City of Waco v. City of McGregor, 523 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex.1975); an attempted annexation in which the boundary of the annexed territory did not close using the description contained in the ordinance, State ex rel. Rose v. City of La Porte, 386 S.W.2d 782, 789 (Tex.1965). The common trait in these cases is whether the municipality exceeded the annexation authority delegated to it by the Legislature. The power to annex is committed to the political branches of state government; it is a legislative prerogative. See City of Wichita Falls v. State ex rel. Vogtsberger, 533 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 298, 50 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976); Hammonds v. City of Corpus Christi, 226 F.Supp. 456, 459 (S.D.Tex.1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 162 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 837, 86 S.Ct. 85, 15 L.Ed.2d 80 (1965). The Annexation Act expressly states that "[a] municipality may annex area only in its extraterritorial jurisdiction unless the municipality owns the area." TEX.LOC.GOV'T CODE § 43.051. The extraterritorial jurisdiction of a municipality depends on its size, and the limits are specified in section 42.021. Section 43.055 sets forth the limits on the amount of territory which may be annexed in one year. As discussed previously, the Act also expressly prohibits strip annexation. Id. at § 43.054.

Alexander's allegations regarding the timing of the hearing notice and commencement of annexation proceedings are without basis because the City met the minimum notice posting requirements as a matter of law. The record establishes that the City published notice of the hearings more than ten days in advance and that the City did not begin to commence annexation proceedings until 20 days after the second hearing. TEX.LOC.GOV'T CODE § 43.052....

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