Alexander v. Alexander

• Decision Date: 09 May 1955
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 1649.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Verna Cook ALEXANDER, Plaintiff, v. Alonzo B. ALEXANDER, Defendant.

131 F. Supp. 605

Verna Cook ALEXANDER, Plaintiff, v. Alonzo B. ALEXANDER, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 1649.

United States District Court W. D. South Carolina, Spartanburg Division.

May 9, 1955.

Sam R. Watt, Kerr & Evins, Spartanburg, S. C., Redfearn & Ferrell, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff.

Holcombe & Bomar, Spartanburg, S. C., Price & Poag, Greenville, S. C., for defendant.

WYCHE, Chief Judge.

The above case is before me upon the motion of the defendant "to set aside the verdict and the judgment entered thereon," and "to have judgment for the Defendant entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict", and, "in the event the Court should fail to order judgment for the Defendant under Rule 50(b) 28 U.S.C.A. the Defendant moves the Court for a new trial" on the grounds set out in the motion.

By agreement of the parties the motions were submitted upon written briefs, after a careful consideration of which, it is my opinion that the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied, and

It is so ordered,

and that the motion for a new trial upon the first six grounds and the eighth ground should be denied, and

It is so ordered.

As to the seventh ground, the defendant moves for a new trial upon the ground, "The verdict for $175,000 actual damages and $75,000 punitive damages is `so grossly excessive as to be explained only on the basis of sentiment, sympathy and prejudice'".

Courts have, and sometimes exercise, the power to set aside verdicts on the ground of excessiveness, yet it is a power to be cautiously used. Brown v. Evans, C.C., 17 F. 912, affirmed, Evans v. Brown, 109 U.S. 180, 3 S.Ct. 83, 27 L.Ed. 898; Jones v. Atlantic Refining Co., D.C., 53 F.Supp. 17. Courts in general are most reluctant to disturb a jury's verdict on the ground of excessiveness where the damages are unliquidated and there is no fixed measure of mathematical certainty. This is particularly significant with respect to damages in tort actions for personal injuries. Armit v. Loveland, 3 Cir., 115 F.2d 308, 314; Jones v. Atlantic Refining Co., D.C., 55 F.Supp. 17. And, this is equally true in actions for damages for malicious prosecution.

As to the verdict for $175,000 actual damages, it would be mere speculation for me to say that it could be "explained only on the basis of sentiment, sympathy and prejudice".

How much actual damages should be awarded to the plaintiff in this case for the mental anguish she suffered for fear of the probability of being incarcerated in an insane asylum or mental institution for the remainder of her life, and the fact that she has a lifetime of shame, humiliation and disgrace facing her as the result of the incompetency proceedings instituted against her by the defendant, and the humiliation and shame that will probably accompany her through life and explaining why she was incarcerated in such mental institution, and other damages that she sustained by reason thereof, cannot be measured to any degree of mathematical certainty either by a judge or a jury.

Courts differ widely and juries are at great variance in the amount of a verdict to be rendered in a case of this kind. What may be...