Alexander v. Caraustar Indus., Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 March 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 11 C 1007.
• Parties: Donald ALEXANDER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CARAUSTAR INDUSTRIES, INC., et al, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

930 F.Supp.2d 947

Donald ALEXANDER, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.CARAUSTAR INDUSTRIES, INC., et al, Defendants.

Case No. 11 C 1007.

United States District Court,

N.D. Illinois,

Eastern Division.

March 19, 2013.

Walker R. Lawrence, Aaron Benjamin Maduff, Maduff & Maduff, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Cardelle Bratton Spangler, Michael Lawrence Mulhern, Daniel John Fazio, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JEFFREY COLE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Introduction

Defendant Caraustar Industries, Inc., is the parent company of defendant Caraustar Custom Packing Group, Inc., which, in turn, runs Chicago Carton, a paperboard products manufacturing facility on Chicago's west side. The plaintiffs are several employees of that facility who claim they were underpaid for the hours they worked.

In their complaint, they alleged that although they were required to arrive before their shifts started and stay after their shifts ended in order to put on required protective gear—what the parties call “donning and doffing”—and discuss certain things to ensure a smooth shift transition, they were not paid overtime for these activities. ( Complaint, ¶¶ 13–18). They further alleged that although they were required to clock in a minimum of 10 minutes before their shifts were scheduled to start, they were not paid for this extra time. ( Complaint, ¶¶ 22–23). If they clocked in even 1 minute after their shift was scheduled to begin, defendants docked them a full 15 minutes pay. ( Complaint, ¶ 24). If an employee was not relieved on time and had to continue working at their station, they were not paid overtime until an hour elapsed. ( Complaint, ¶ 25). The plaintiffs filed sworn declarations in support of their motion for conditional certification [Dkt. # 22] which detailed their additional, uncompensated work duties. We have summarized the allegations in the following Table:

Tabular or graphic material set at this point is not displayable.

Essentially, the plaintiffs complain that they were paid by the shift rather than by the hour, and that as a consequence they generally worked many more than forty hours a week, but were only paid for forty hours. They bring claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”). Both sides have filed motions for summary judgment. The defendants seek judgment on the entire case, the plaintiffs on just a portion. The defendants argue that donning and doffing of eyeglasses, earplugs, and shoes and walking to work stations are not compensable as a matter of law. They also contend that they are entitled to an offset for any unpaid, compensable time because the plaintiffs were given a 30–minute paid lunch period every day. Finally, the defendants submit that time records and the plaintiff's own testimony reveal, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs are not entitled to any overtime pay.

But the conspicuous feature of the defendants' presentation is the vigorously advanced contention that the plaintiffs have perjured themselves by making repeated, knowingly false statements under oath in pre-deposition, sworn declarations regarding their claims and that as a consequence of their perjury their claims should be dismissed as a sanction under the court's inherent authority to impose the drastic sanction of dismissal when a litigant engages in conduct that abuses the judicial process. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991). See infra at 957–58.The plaintiffs do not deny that the declarationswere false, but insist that at all times they have acted in good faith and that they did not perjure themselves.¹

The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment addresses the sole issue of the offset for the paid lunch periods. They argue that because the defendants and they treat the 30–minute lunch period as “hours worked,” it must be included in calculating the 40–hour a week requirement for overtime compensation.

Local Rule 56.1

As always, the facts underlying this summary judgment proceeding are drawn from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 submissions. “For litigants appearing in the Northern District of Illinois, the Rule 56.1 statement is a critical, and required, component of a litigant's response to a motion for summary judgment.” Sojka v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 686 F.3d 394, 398 (7th Cir.2012). The party opposing summary judgment must respond to the movant's statement of proposed material facts, and that response must contain both “a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement,” Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B), and a separate statement “consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment,” Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C); Sojka, 686 F.3d at 398;Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643 (7th Cir.2008). Each response, and each asserted fact, must be supported with a reference to the record. Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B); Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir.2009); F.T.C. v. Bay Area Business Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 633 (7th Cir.2005).

The district court is entitled to expect strict compliance with the rule. Shaffer v. American Medical Ass'n, 662 F.3d 439, 442 (7th Cir.2011); Benuzzi v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 647 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir.2011). Responses and facts that are not set out and appropriately supported in an opponent's Rule 56.1 response will not be considered, see Shaffer, 662 F.3d at 442 (court need not consider any fact not contained in the parties' Rule 56.1 statements); Bay Area Business Council, 423 F.3d at 633 (court properly disregarded affidavits not referenced in 56.1 submission), and the movant's version of the facts—if compliant with the rule—will be deemed admitted. Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C); Rao v. BP Products North America, Inc., 589 F.3d 389, 393 (7th Cir.2009); Montano, 535 F.3d at 569;Cracco, 559 F.3d at 632.

Factual Background

At Chicago Carton, hourly manufacturing employees like the plaintiffs were typically scheduled to work one of three shifts: (a) first shift, from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.; (b) second shift, from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. or (c) third shift, from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. These shifts generally operated continuously, beginning at 6:00 a.m. on Mondays and concluding at 6:00 a.m. on Saturday mornings, with shifts occasionally scheduled for Saturdays and/or Sundays. For purposes of calculating overtime, the workweek began at 6:00 a.m. on Sunday morning and ended at 5:59 a.m. on Sunday morning. ( Defendants' Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts (“ Def.St.”), ¶ 6; Plaintiff's Response to Portions of Def.St. (“ Pl.Rsp.”), ¶ 6). All of the plaintiffs, except Donald Alexander, worked on manufacturing machines located on the plant floor, where they typically would replace an employee on their machine from the previous shift, and would typically be replaced by another employee on their machines at the end of their shifts. ( Def.St., ¶ 7; Pl.Rsp., ¶ 7). Mr. Alexander was a maintenance mechanic. ( Def.St., Ex. 2, ¶ 3).

Chicago Carton requires employees to wear four items of personal protective equipment (“PPE”) prior to entering the plant floor: a hairnet, earplugs, goggles, and steel-toed shoes. While the hairnet is not technically “protective” gear, it is required because the facility manufactures products used by the food industry. Chicago Carton provides a locker room and lockers for those employees who choose to change clothes at the facility or to store their personal belongings during the work day. The locker room is located on the second level above the plant floor. Chicago Carton does not require employees to don or doff this PPE at the facility (or in the locker room), but permits them to do so at their homes, in their cars, or wherever else they so choose. ( Def.St., ¶¶ 8–11). Significantly, the named plaintiffs all swore in their declarations that all defendants' employees were required to change on site. ( Def.St., ¶ 23; Exs. 2–9, ¶ 15). All those plaintiffs who were later deposed had to change their stories to match reality. ( Def.St., ¶ 10; Ex. 10, at 66–67, 89–92, 188–93; Ex. 11, at 47, 50–51, 113; Ex. 12, at 97–100, 329–31).

As can be seen from the chart detailing the plaintiffs' sworn declarations, supra, at 949, the time plaintiffs had to spend performing uncompensated tasks, donning and doffing protective gear, was a major portion of their lawsuit. The plaintiffs averred that it daily took them between 24 to 40 minutes to put on and take off their safety glasses, hairnets, earplugs, and steel-toed boots and walk to and from their stations. See Table, supra at 949. For other employees, the ritual was not nearly so time-consuming, and their testimony accords with common experience. Marques Bienaime swore it took him no more than 30 seconds to put on and take off all of his protective gear and less than a minute to walk to and from the locker room to his machine. ( Def.St., ¶ 9; Ex. 14, ¶¶ 4, 8). Enrique Garcia spends about a minute putting on his boots in the locker room, then puts on the rest of his protective gear on the way to his machine. It takes him 30 seconds. He spends another 30 seconds taking it off after his shift as he walks to the locker room, where he takes off his boots. ( Def.St., ¶ 9; Ex. 15, ¶¶ 4–5, 8). Lee Globke puts on and takes off his boots at home; the rest of his gear he dons and doffs in about 30 seconds. ( Def.St., ¶ 9; Ex. 16, ¶¶ 3, 6). For Kina Martin, putting on all her gear including boots takes about one minute. ( Def.St., ¶ 9; Ex. 17, ¶ 3). Carmen Rivera puts on and takes off her boots at home. Donning the rest of her protective gear takes less than a minute; doffing it takes less than 30 seconds. ( Def.St., ¶ 9; Ex. 18, ¶¶ 4, 8). Finally, Steven Shelley puts on and takes off his boots at home; donning and doffing the rest of his protective gear takes about 30 seconds. ( Def.St., ¶ 9; Ex. 19, ¶¶ 4, 8). The...