Alexander v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 20 June 1958
• Docket Number: No. 34822,34822
• Citation: 14 Ill.2d 261,151 N.E.2d 319
• Parties: Louis G. ALEXANDER, Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 319

151 N.E.2d 319

14 Ill.2d 261

Louis G. ALEXANDER, Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Appellees.

No. 34822.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 20, 1958.

Moore, Ming & Leghton, Chicago (William R. Ming, Jr., and Mark E. Jones, Jr., Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

John C. Melaniphy, Corp. Counsel, and Philip A. Lozowick, Chicago (Sydney R. Drebin, Edward E. Plusdrak, and Harry R. Posner, Chicago, of counsel).

DAVIS, Chief Justice.

This case poses the question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, herein referred to as the act, entitled: 'An Act in relation to an exchange of certain functions, property and personnel among cities, and park districts having coextensive geographical areas and populations in excess of 500,000,' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 105, pars. 333.51-333.70 incl.,) together which certain companion legislation entitled: 'An Act to amend Sections 3 and 6 of 'An Act to regulate the civil service of cities,' approved March 20, 1895, as amended, and to add Section 3.1 thereto,' approved July 5, 1957 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 24 1/2, pars. 39-77a incl.,); and 'An Act to amend Sections 3 and 6 of 'An Act relating to the civil service in park systems,' approved June 10, 1911, as amended, and to add Section 3b thereto.' Approved July 5, 1957. Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 24 1/2, pars. 78-113.1, incl.

Plaintiff, a taxpayer, brought suit to enjoin the city of Chicago, the Chicago Park District, and certain of their officers from disbursing funds appropriated to implement and effectuate the above enactments, and for judgment declaring such acts to be void. The defendants filed motions to strike and to dismiss which were granted by the trial court, judgment was entered for defendants, and plaintiff appealed.

The act in question provides that on January 1, 1959, its effective date, the title, control and jurisdiction of all park district boulevards, boulevard appurtenances, and park district street maintenance equipment, shall be vested in the city and the title to, control and jurisdiction of all parks, bathing beaches, bathing bath houses and playgrounds under the jurisdiction of the city shall be vested in the park district; and that the employees in charge of such facilities shall be transferred to the recipient municipality and that their respective civil service and pension rights shall be retained and preserved. The purport and intent of the legislature is to place the jurisdiction of all streets and highways in the city in which they lie, and the jurisdiction of all parks, bathing beaches and facilities in the park district. By definition, a city within the meaning of the act is one having a population in excess of 500,000; and a park district is one having a population in excess of 500,000 and a geographic area coextensive with such city. Therefore, the act will be presently effective only in relation to the city of Chicago and the Chicago Park District.

Plaintiff urges that the act is a local or special law changing or amending the charter of the city of Chicago, and therefore violative of section 22 of article IV of the constitution of Illinois, S.H.A.; that it is legislation affecting the municipal government ment of the city of Chicago within the meaning of section 34 of article IV, without providing for a prior referendum; and that the act is invalid because it amends other acts without specific reference thereto, the meaning of that constitutional provision; of the constitution.

Defendants maintain that the act is not a special or local law, but rather is a general law based upon a reasonable classification by population; that it is constitutional without the requirement of a referendum since it is neither based upon section 34 of article IV, nor is it an act affecting the municipal government of the city of Chicago within the meaning of that constitutioanl provision; and that it is not within the proscription of section 13 of article IV, since it does not amend or repeal other acts as urged by plaintiff.

Section 22 of article IV, insofar as it is applicable here, prohibits the General Assembly from passing local or special laws where a general law can be made applicable, for the purpose of 'Incorporating cities, towns or villages, or changing or amending the charter of any town, city or village.' In 1904 the constitution of Illinois was amended by adding section 34 of article IV, which provides, inter alia, that: 'The General Assembly shall have power, subject to the conditions and limitations hereinafter contained to pass any law (local, special or general) providing a scheme or charter of local municipal government for the territory now or hereafter embraced within the limits of the city of Chicago.' The section thereafter specifies the type of legislation which may be passed with respect to the city of Chicago and provides in conclusion that: 'No law based upon this amendment to the Constitution, affecting the municipal government of the city of Chicago, shall take effect until such law shall be consented to by a majority of the legal voters of said city voting on the question * * *.' (Italics ours.) The purpose and effect of this amendment was to permit the legislature to pass any law, local, special or general, providing a scheme or charter of local municipal government for the city of Chicago without regard for the inhibitions of section 22 of article IV. Swigart v. City of Chicago, 223 Ill. 371, 374, 79 N.E. 48.

Thus the legislation under consideration could have been enacted pursuant to section 34 of article IV by the addition of a provision which would make it subject to referendum. But, as we stated in People ex rel. Toman v. William Davies Co., 375 Ill. 397, 400-401, 31 N.E.2d 602, 605: 'Conversely, the mere fact that an act not based upon the amendment may effect the local government of Chicago does not render submission to a referendum necessary. A law may be general and yet operate in a single place where the condition necessary to its operation exists. Mathews v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. 120, 174 N.E. 35. The acts assailed by the appellant are general laws, and do not purport to be based upon section 34 of article IV nor to affect only the municipal government of Chicago. Manifestly, the General Assembly may enact legislation affecting the city of Chicago other than by statutes based upon section 34 of article 4.' We believe that both the language and history of section 34 of article IV evince a clear purpose to permit legislation which theretofore had been prohibited, rather than to prohibit enactments which until than had been permitted. People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626; People ex rel. Toman v William Davies Co., 375 Ill. 397, 31 N.E.2d 602. It is likewise obvious that the legislature did not intend that section 34 of article IV should serve as the constitutional basis for the validity of the act since no referendum procedure was provided for therein. While the act before us cannot be sustained by reason of the legistive power granted by section 34 of article IV, neither is it thereby invalidated.

We therefore turn to the proscriptions of section 22 of article IV against 'local or special laws.' It is patent that the act presently is applicable only to the city of Chicago and the Chicago Park District, since they are the only municipal corporations having a population in excess of 500,000. However, it is well settled that the act is not special or local merely because of a legislative classification based on population. Littell v. City of Peoria, 374 Ill. 344, 29 N.E.2d 533; People ex rel. Moshier v. City of Springfield, 370 Ill. 541, 19 N.E.2d 593, even though such classification may render the enactment applicable in only a single place, (Du Bois v. Gibbons, 2 Ill.2d 392, 118 N.E.2d 295; Gaca v. City of Chicago, 411 Ill. 146, 103 N.E.2d 617; People v. City of Chicago, 349 Ill. 304, 182 N.E. 419; Mathews v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. 120, 174 N.E. 35; People v. Kastings, 307 Ill. 92, 138 N.E. 269,) and that if unreasonable or arbitrary, a legislative classification by population is violative of section 22 of article IV. Hunt v. Cook County, 398 Ill. 412, 76 N.E.2d 48; People ex rel. Stuckart v. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410, 56 N.E. 155.

The judicial function in reviewing the reasonableness of a legislative classification based on population is articulately defined in Du Bois v. Gibbons, 2 Ill.2d 392, 399, 118 NE.2d 295, 300: '* * * a legislative classification based upon population will be sustained where founded on a rational difference of situation of condition existing in the persons or objects upon which it rests and there is a reasonable basis for the classification in view of the objects and purposes to be accomplished. (Citations.) Legislation is not special or local merely because it may operate only in a single place where the condition necessary to its operation exists or because, at the time of its enactment, it can be applied only to one city in the State. (Citations.) There is always a presumption that the General Assembly and its committees acted conscientiously and did their duty in making a survey of the conditions prevailing in the municipalities of the State before enacting the classification legislation and the result will never be nullified by this court on the ground that its judgment might differ from that of the General Assembly. Only if it can be said that the classification is clearly unreasonable and palpably arbitrary will the courts act to hold the classifying enactment invalid. (Citation.) It must appear that there is no fair reason for the law which would not require with equal force its extension to other cities of smaller population which are not affected before we should...