Alexander v. Florida
| Decision Date | 03 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4:21cv301-AW/MAF |
| Parties | DAVID ALEXANDER, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On July 14, 2021, Petitioner David Alexander, a state inmate proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. On January 7 2022, Respondent filed an answer, with exhibits. ECF No. 8. Petitioner has not filed a reply, although he was given the opportunity to do so. See ECF Nos. 5, 7; see also ECF No. 10. Petitioner has filed a notice of inquiry regarding the status of the case. ECF No. 11.
The matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Northern District of Florida Local Rule 72.2(B). After careful consideration, the undersigned has determined no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter. See Rule 8(a), R. Gov § 2254 Cases. For the reasons stated herein, the pleadings and attachments before the Court show Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief, and this § 2254 petition should be denied.
By information filed September 2, 2015, in Leon County Circuit Court Case 15-CF-246, the State of Florida charged Petitioner David Alexander with eight counts, in connection with events that occurred between June 15, 2015, and August 8, 2015 three counts of sale of a controlled substance (cocaine), a second degree felony, in violation of section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Counts 1-3); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a second degree felony, in violation of section 790.23(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Count 4); possession of a controlled substance (cannabis), a first degree misdemeanor, in violation of section 893.13(6)(b), Florida Statutes (Count 5); trafficking a controlled substance (cocaine), a first degree felony, in violation of section 893.135, Florida Statutes (Count 6); maintaining a place where controlled substances are used, a first degree misdemeanor, in violation of section 893.13(7)(a)5., Florida Statutes (Count 7); and possession of paraphernalia, a first degree misdemeanor, in violation of section 893.147(1), Florida Statutes. Ex. B1 at 13-14.[1] Alexander proceeded to a jury trial on May 18, 2016, before Judge Angela C. Dempsey. Exs. B2-B3 (trial transcript). Alexander did not testify. Ex. B3 at 232. The jury found him guilty as charged on Counts 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Id. at 328-29, 357-58; Ex. B1 at 55-60. That same day, the trial judge adjudicated Alexander guilty and sentenced him to fifteen (15) years in prison on Counts 4 and 6, and 286 days on Counts 5, 7, and 8, to run concurrently, with credit for 286 days' time served. Ex. B3 at 364-65; Ex. B1 at 64-73. The State announced a nolle prosequi as to Counts 1 through 3. Ex. B3 at 366.
Alexander appealed his judgment and sentence to the First District Court of Appeal (First DCA), assigned case number 1D16-2338. Ex. B1 at 75. Alexander, through counsel, filed an Initial Brief raising three points. Ex. B7. The State filed an answer brief. Ex. B8. Alexander filed a reply brief. Ex. B9. On February 17, 2017, a three-judge panel of First DCA, consisting of Judges Ray, Bilbrey, and Kelsey, affirmed the convictions and sentences without a written opinion. Ex. B10; Alexander v. State, 236 So.3d 338 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). The mandate issued November 7, 2017. Ex. B10.
On December 18, 2018, Alexander filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief in the state trial court, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Ex. C1 at 3-29. He subsequently filed an amended Rule 3.850 motion, raising nine claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). Ex. C1 at 36-70. By order on January 30, 2020, the state post-conviction trial court, Judge J. Lee Marsh, summarily denied all but one of Alexander's claims and set the remaining claim, Ground 1, for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 73-77. Following the evidentiary hearing held May 14, 2021, Judge Marsh denied postconviction relief in an order rendered May 17, 2021. Id. at 78. Alexander appealed to the First DCA. Id. at 79-80. By order on October 5, 2021, the First DCA dismissed the case, assigned number 1D21-2011, after Alexander did not comply with court orders directing him to file an initial brief. Exs. C3, C4.
In the meantime, as indicated above, on July 14, 2021, Alexander filed his § 2254 petition in this Court. ECF No. 1. He raises four grounds, three of which allege ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC):
On January 7, 2022, Respondent filed an answer, with exhibits. ECF No. 8. Alexander has not filed a reply, although he was given the opportunity to do so. See ECF Nos. 5, 7; see also ECF No. 10.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts may grant habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody. Section 2254(d) provides:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-83 (2011); Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2011). “This is a ‘difficult to meet' and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181 (). This Court's review “is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Id.
For ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims, the United States Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To demonstrate ineffectiveness, a “defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. For this Court's purposes, importantly, “[t]he question ‘is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination' under the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold.'” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). “And, because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.” Id. It is a “doubly deferential judicial review that applies to a Strickland claim evaluated under the § 2254(d)(1) standard.” Id.
In his first ground, Petitioner Alexander asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress as no exigent circumstances existed to excuse law enforcement's failure to comply with Florida's “knock and announce” statute. ECF No. 1 at 9, 22. He explains that the lead detective testified “he called breach of the residence because he felt it was compromised because people were standing outside,” and asserts this is not a reason “to not follow procedure” as “it is not illegal to stand outside” and it “[d]efinitely does not meet exigent circumstances.” Id. at 9; see id. at 22.
Respondent asserts that, assuming Alexander has presented a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief in this ground, it is unexhausted because Alexander did not alert the trial court that he was asserting a federal...
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