Alexander v. Frank

• Decision Date: 07 August 1991
• Docket Number: No. CA3-90-1337-H.,CA3-90-1337-H.
• Parties: Charlene ALEXANDER, Plaintiff, v. Anthony M. FRANK, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

777 F. Supp. 516

Charlene ALEXANDER, Plaintiff, v. Anthony M. FRANK, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, et al., Defendants.

No. CA3-90-1337-H.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

August 7, 1991.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charlene Alexander, pro se.

Stafford Hutchinson, Asst. U.S. Atty., Dallas, Tex., William H. Brown, Jr., Office of Field Legal Service, U.S. Postal Service, Memphis, Tenn., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SANDERS, Chief Judge.

Before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 17, 1991; Defendants' Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss, filed July 9, 1991; and Plaintiff's Response, filed July 30, 1991. In addition, the Court has received a letter from Plaintiff dated and filed July 22, 1991.

I. BACKGROUND.

This is a discrimination lawsuit before the Court pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because it concerns alleged violations of Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Rehabilitation Act.

Plaintiff pro se Charlene Alexander was hired by the United States Postal Service in Fort Worth on December 12, 1984. Alexander applied for transfer to a Dallas office of the Postal Service in March 1985, and her application was accepted effective May 11, 1985. In April, 1986 Alexander suffered a back injury as the result of repeated heavy lifting. From that time until April, 1990 Plaintiff worked only intermittently at the Postal Service. Alexander last worked at the Postal Service on April 14, 1990.

Plaintiff filed a claim for compensation for her injury with the Office of Workers' Compensation ("OWCP") of the United States Department of Labor. That claim was accepted in January of 1987, and as a result Alexander received compensation benefits for the time she missed from work because of her injury. Plaintiff filed subsequent OWCP claims for compensation arising out of recurrences of her initial back injury, and has received compensation benefits for those periods she was absent from work because of her injured back.¹ By order entered October 4, 1990 the OWCP found that Alexander was totally disabled and awarded her compensation in the amount of 75% of her regular salary, retroactive to May 3, 1990. Alexander continues to receive these benefits, as she remains totally disabled and unable to return to her position at the Postal Service.

Plaintiff Alexander filed the present lawsuit on July 3, 1990 because of her dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Postal Service responded, or failed to respond, to her need for work assignments adapted to her reduced limitations while she was still actively employed by the Postal Service.² Alexander alleges handicap, sex, age, and reprisal discrimination in connection with her employment, and also charges that the Postal Service has violated the Federal Employees' Compensation Act.

Specifically, this civil lawsuit arises from Defendants' actions in denying Plaintiff's bid jobs and access to the bidding process; refusal to recognize Plaintiff's accumulated seniority; and demotion of Plaintiff from assigned regular clerk to unassigned regular clerk on the basis of her physical limitations and the premise of a phantom seventy-pound lifting requirement — a condition which was not even presented to Plaintiff when she was hired by Defendant.

Plaintiff's Response at 2. Alexander seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, and also seeks "restitution of all rights, privileges, job placement, and income that would have been received but for the unlawful and discriminatory practices of the U.S. Postal Service. Remedies sought are to be made whole in every aspect, injunctive relief, backpay, damages in the amount of $10,000,000.00, costs and attorney fees."³ Plaintiff's Complaint, filed July 3, 1990, at 2.

Defendant now moves to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment. The Court deems the present motion to be, and treats it as, a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on file show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 1990), "before a court may grant summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no actual dispute as to an essential element of the plaintiff's case." A movant for summary judgment need not support the motion with evidence negating the opponent's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

"Summary judgment reinforces the purpose of the Rules, to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions, and, when appropriate, affords a merciful end to litigation that would otherwise be lengthy and expensive." Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1197 (5th Cir.1986) (reinterpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 to enhance judicial economy). The Fifth Circuit has held that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing of proof, see id. at 1195-98, although all evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the motion's opponent. See Gremillion v. Gulf Coast Catering Co., 904 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir.1990). Summary judgment may be entered against a party if after adequate time for discovery the party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his or her case and as to which he or she will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324-26, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54.

III. THE RACE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM.

Alexander's allegation of racial discrimination must fail as a matter of law on the basis of the facts as alleged by Alexander. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the claim of racial discrimination and that claim must be dismissed.

First, the Court notes that Title VII actions may be brought under two theories of discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact. The first theory focuses on the discriminatory motive of the employer, the second on the discriminatory effect of the employer's acts. See Hill v. Mississippi State Employment Service, 918 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir.1990). From Alexander's pleadings it is clear that she is not complaining about a pattern or practice of discrimination against employees of the Postal Service on the basis of race, but rather only that she was discriminated against because of her race. In short, this is a disparate treatment case.

A Title VII plaintiff has the burden of making a prima facie showing that:

1. she belongs to a protected class;

2. she was qualified to do her job;

3. despite her qualifications, her employment situation was adversely affected;

4. her position was filled by someone outside that protected class.

Young v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 177, 180 (5th Cir.1990); see Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-94, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Hill v. Mississippi State Employment Service, 918 F.2d at 1238-39; Arenson v. Southern University Law Center, 911 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1417, 113 L.Ed.2d 470 (1991).

In the present case, Alexander has not made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination, in that she states that she was replaced by a person of the same race. See Plaintiff's Response at 3 (stating that her race is "Caucasian"); id. at 5 (stating that Alexander's "bid job was vacated, posted and awarded to a male, non-handicapped Caucasian"). Accordingly, because Alexander's racial discrimination claim must fail as a matter of law, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on this claim must be, and it hereby is, GRANTED.

IV. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM.

Alexander also alleges age discrimination, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. (1985). The Fifth Circuit has held that a plaintiff in a case brought pursuant to the ADEA may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by:

(1) satisfying the "standing requirements under the statute," i.e., showing that she is within the protected age group and that she has been adversely affected — discharged or demoted — by defendant's employment decision; (2) showing that she was qualified to assume another position at the time of discharge or demotion; and (3) producing evidence, circumstantial or direct, from which a factfinder might reasonably conclude that the employer intended to discriminate in reaching the decision at issue.

Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1439, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982) (citation omitted) (citing McCorstin v. United States Steel Corporation, 621 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir.1980); Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir.1977); and the legislative history of the ADEA in establishing requirements for ADEA case).

In discussing the third element of the prima facie case, the Fifth Circuit stated that "the ADEA mandates that an employer reach employment decisions without regard to age.... The age of a `protected' job applicant or incumbent, then, is accorded neutral status under the ADEA, neither facilitating nor hindering his ... exposure to demotion or discharge." Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d at 129 (footnote omitted). Pursuant to this intent requirement, Alexander must produce

some evidence that an employer has not treated age neutrally, but has instead discriminated based upon it. Specifically, the

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