Alexander v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 24 September 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-6672,83-6672
• Citation: 742 F.2d 117
• Parties: Dorothy M. ALEXANDER, Appellant, v. Walter T. JOHNSON; Jane G. Greenlee; Joy J. Johnson; Wymene Valand; Henry W. Oxedine; James Woodward, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 117

742 F.2d 117

Dorothy M. ALEXANDER, Appellant, v.Walter T. JOHNSON; Jane G. Greenlee; Joy J. JohnsonWymene Valand; Henry W. Oxedine; James WoodwardAppellees.

No. 83-6672.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued April 6, 1984.

Decided Aug. 17, 1984.

Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied Sept. 24, 1984.

Marvin Sparrow, Durham, N.C. (Charles T.L. Anderson, Prisoner Legal Services, Inc., Apex, N.C., on brief), for appellant.

Jacob L. Safron, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., Raleigh, N.C. (Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. of N.C., Raleigh, N.C., on brief), for appellees.

Before WIDENER, SPROUSE and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges.

SPROUSE, Circuit Judge:

Dorothy M. Alexander appeals from the district court's dismissal of her civil rights action against members of the North Carolina Parole Commission and the Secretary of the Department of Corrections.Alexander sued these state officers in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983¹, contending that their practice of requiring selected indigent inmates to make restitution for the costs of court-appointed counsel as a condition of parole violated the constitutional standards established in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642(1974), andJames v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct. 2027, 32 L.Ed.2d 600(1972).Although she challenged the facial validity of some aspects of the state's restitution program, her principal claim was that the repayment requirement was unconstitutionally applied to her and other similarly-situated indigent inmates.In dismissing Alexander's suit, the district court upheld the facial constitutionality of the State of North Carolina's restitution program under the applicable standards of Fuller and James, and concluded that Alexander had produced no evidence demonstrating that the statutes had been misapplied in her case.We affirm both the district court's decision upholding the constitutionality of the North Carolina restitution program ² and its order dismissing Alexander's claim that the program had been unconstitutionally applied to her.We do not agree with all of the district court's reasoning concerning the validity of North Carolina's restitution scheme as it was applied in this case, but affirm the court's dismissal of Alexander's action because she has not exhausted state remedies available to her.She essentially challenges the lawfulness of the restraints placed on her freedom and thus her claim seeks relief more appropriately pursued through specific remedies available under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254.SeeTodd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70(4th Cir.1983).

I

Alexander was indicted by a Franklin County grand jury on first-degree murder charges in December 1978.After the return of the indictment, she immediately requested and received court-appointed counsel under the provisions of North Carolina law guaranteeing an indigent person legal assistance when he or she is a defendant in a criminal proceeding.³N.C.GEN.STAT. Sec. 7A-451(a)(1).She was tried before a jury on the murder charge in August 1979, found guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, and sentenced to not less than ten nor more than twenty years in prison and fined $4,000.The sentencing court, in its commitment order, recommended to correction officials that Alexander be required to make restitution as a condition of her participation in any work-release or parole program administered through the department of corrections.The restitution recommended by the sentencing court involved paying the victim's family for the costs of his burial and reimbursing the state for the expenses it incurred in providing Alexander court-appointed counsel.⁴Approximately one month after Alexander was committed to the custody of state prison officials, her liability to repay the state for attorney's fees was reduced to judgment in the Franklin County Superior Court.⁵

Alexander's conviction and sentence were subsequently affirmed on appeal with one modification; she was freed of the obligation to pay the $4,000 fine because it was not authorized by North Carolina law.State v. Alexander, 47 N.C.App. 502, 267 S.E.2d 396(1980).She apparently has never challenged the civil judgment against her for the costs of court-appointed counsel in any proceeding in state court.

In December 1981, barely sixteen months after her conviction, Alexander was removed from the general prison population and placed in a work-release program.Her participation in the program was conditioned, among other things, upon her payment of $100 a month in restitution.The first $1,103 paid by Alexander under this program was to go to the family of the victim for funeral expenses.The next $2,026 was to be paid to the State of North Carolina for the costs of providing court-appointed counsel.

Alexander was enrolled in the work-release program until the spring of 1982, at which time she became eligible for parole.She was informed during this period that the parole commission intended to follow the sentencing court's original recommendations by conditioning her parole upon the continuation of her restitution payments to the victim's family and the state.She also was notified of her right to challenge these conditions of parole through an administrative hearing process within the department of corrections if she so chose.⁶Rather than pursue this option, Alexander executed a waiver of her right to an administrative hearing and accepted parole under the specified conditions.Soon after her release as a parolee, she filed this Sec. 1983 action in federal district court against officials of the department of corrections and the parole commission on behalf of herself and all indigent North Carolina inmates who had repaid, or will be forced to repay, the costs of court-appointed counsel as a condition of work-release or parole.⁷She alleged that the North Carolina practice of requiring an indigent defendant to repay attorney's fees as a condition of parole violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, as well as North Carolina state law.In her prayer for relief, Alexander sought the return of all funds previously withheld from indigents under the allegedly unlawful work-release and parole procedures, a declaratory judgment invalidating the state's restitution scheme as applied by the Department of Corrections, and an injunction releasing her and all others from the attorney's fees repayment condition of parole.

The State of North Carolina answered Alexander's Sec. 1983 suit by moving to dismiss the action.It based its motion on the qualified immunity of the named defendants, the facial constitutional validity of the state's statutes and practices relating to repaying attorneys fees, and the purported failure of Alexander to demonstrate a cognizable constitutional injury or to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.The district court referred this dismissal motion, together with Alexander's counter-motions for summary judgment and class certification, to a federal magistrate for review and a proposed disposition.See28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b)(1)(B).After completing an examination of the applicable case law, statutory provisions, and the parties' evidentiary submissions, the magistrate recommended dismissing all of Alexander's claims except her contention that the North Carolina procedures violated the equal protection clause.He noted that language in the North Carolina Administrative Code indicated correction officials may not have considered Alexander's financial status in determining whether restitution was a viable condition of parole.He believed that the exclusion of such a consideration when determining whether an inmate must repay the state for appointed counsel fees violated the Supreme Court's decision in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642.Accordingly, he recommended that Alexander be allowed to develop the factual basis of her equal protection claim.

Both parties filed timely objections to the magistrate's report.After completing the required review, the district court adopted all parts of the magistrate's report except his recommendation concerning the viability of Alexander's equal protection claim.The district court ruled that, contrary to the magistrate's conclusion, department of corrections procedures do not prohibit any consideration of the prisoner's financial status in parole decisions, and ordered Alexander's entire suit dismissed.On appeal, Alexander's principal contention is that the North Carolina parole provisions relating to repayment of attorney's fees violate well-established constitutional standards both facially and as applied.

II

Alexander suggests that the issues in this appeal can be resolved on a non-constitutional basis.Cf.Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 56 S.Ct. 466, 480, 80 L.Ed. 688(1936)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).She contends that the statutes and procedures governing North Carolina's restitution program simply do not authorize correction officials to condition an inmate's parole upon the repayment of expenses incurred in providing her court-appointed counsel.She argues that correction officials have usurped power they do not lawfully possess under the North Carolina restitution program.We disagree and first treat that contention.

The sentencing court and correction officials ordered Alexander to repay the costs of her court-appointed counsel under the provisions of North Carolina General Statutes sections 148-33.2and148-57.1.These provisions expressly authorize correction officials to impose restitution as a condition of participation in work release or parole programs.They leave the ultimate decision concerning restitution to the discretion of correction officials, but that discretion is far from unbridled.Direct procedural and substantive guidance is provided concerning how and under what circumstances the...