Alexander v. Parker

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MAGRUDER
• Citation: Alexander v. Parker, 144 Ill. 355, 33 N.E. 183 (Ill. 1893)
• Decision Date: 18 January 1893
• Parties: ALEXANDER et al. v. PARKER.

144 Ill. 355

33 N.E. 183

ALEXANDER et al.

v.PARKER.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 18, 1893.

Appeal from appellate court, third district.

Bill by Laura A. Parker against Susan T. Alexander, Edwin, H. Turner, Jr., Elizabeth T. Pease, Jewell T. Wood, Thomas H. Turner, and William L. Turner, to determine the ownership of $3,000 due from the supreme council of the Royal Arcanum, a Massachusetts corporation, upon a benefit certificate issued to Edwin H. Turner. The suit was brought in pursuance of a decree rendered upon a bill of interpleader filed by the council, the money having been paid by the council into court. Complainant obtained a decree awarding the money to her, which decree was affirmed by the appellate court. 42 Ill. App. 455. Defendants appeal. Reversed.

Carter, Govert & Pape, for appellants.

George W. Fogg, for appellee.

MAGRUDER, J.

The question to be determined is whether the fund in the custody of the circuit court belongs to appellee, as the beneficiary named in the benefit certificate issued to Edwin H. Turner by the supreme council of the Royal Arcanum, or to appellants, as the children of said Edwin H. Turner, now deceased. Where the statute under which a benevolent corporation is organized, and its charter adopted in pursuance of such statute, designate certain classes of persons as those for whom a benefit fund is to be accumulated, a person not belonging to either or any of such classes is not entitled to take the fund. The corporation has no authority to create a fund for other persons than the classes specified in the law, nor can a member direct the fund to be paid to a person outside of such classes. Neither the act of a member in naming a person who is now within the classes to be benefited, nor the act of the corporation in making the certificate which it issues payable to such person, can deprive the beneficiaries designated by the law of their right to, or interest in, the fund. Palmer v. Welch, 132 Ill. 141, 23 N. E. Rep. 412; Legion of Honor v. Perry, 140 Mass. 580, 5 N. E. Rep. 634; Britton v. Supreme Council, 46 N. J. Eq. 102, 18 Atl. Rep. 675; Bac. Ben. Soc. §§ 245, 252. Bacon, in his work on Benefit Societies and Life Insurance, at section 245, states the general rule to be that ‘if, by statute or charter, the beneficiaries of members are confined to certain classes, the designation of any one not of such class is void.’ The contract between a benefit society and its members is contained in the certificate, if one be issued, taken in connection with the constitution and by-laws of the organization, and the statute of the state under which it is formed. Id. § 236. If appellee belongs to either of the classes named in the statute and constitution and by-laws of the association, she can only belong to the class designated as ‘persons dependent upon deceased members.’ Being only an ‘affianced wife,’ or, in other words, being bound to the deceased by no other tie than that of an engagement of marriage, she was not a relative within the meaning of the statute. She does not belong to the class first described in the same paragraph of section 2 of law 3. Nor can it be said that appellee was legally dependent upon Turner, the deceased member to whom the certificate was issued. The fact that a woman is the affianced wife of a deceased member of a benefit society does not, as matter of law, make her dependent upon him. Palmer v. Welch, supra; McCarthy v. Supreme Lodge, 153 Mass. 314, 26 N. E. Rep. 866. In Legion of Honor v. Perry, supra, the supreme court of Massachusetts says upon this subject: ‘At the time of the decease of said Perry a valid engagement of marriage subsisted between him and the defendant, Augusta, and by reason of this she claims to be dependent upon him. Until they became man and wife by marriage, there was no obligation upon the said Samuel to support or provide for her. She does not come within the class of persons whom, if able, he was bound by law to support. The mere engagement to marry imposed no obligation upon him, except to carry out his contract with her. Their mutual promise to marry did not in any sense, by itself, make her dependent upon him.’

Counsel for appellants contend that the words ‘affianced wife’ were intended to indicate the relationship between the beneficiary and the deceased member, and that inasmuch as, under paragraphs 1 and 6 of section 2 of law 3, appellee's name and supposed relationship were entered in the certificate, and the designation of such relationship has failed for illegality, the benefit thereby became payable to the appellants as children of the deceased. This contention would have much force if the designation of appellee as an affianced wife should be construed to be exclusively a designation of relationship, and nothing more. But paragraph 1 of section 2 provides for the entry upon the application, and in the certificate, of the name and dependence, as well as the name and relationship, of the person to whom the applicant may desire his benefit to be paid. The statute and laws evidently contemplate that the fund may be paid to a person who is dependent upon a member, even though such person may not be in any way related to him. The dependency required is not necessarily a legal dependency. McCarthy v. Supreme Lodge, supra. While it is not altogether clear how and to what extent the character of the dependency is required by the by-law to be entered in the certificate, yet at the same time it is possible that the use of the expression ‘affianced wife’ may have been intended to designate the nature of the beneficiary's dependence upon the member applying for the certificate. We are not inclined to hold that the designation of the person named in the certificate as an ‘affianced wife’ is sufficient to preclude an examination into the evidence for the purpose of determining whether, as matter of fact, the person so named was really dependent upon the deceased member or not. It has been said ‘that whether or not a person is included among the dependents of a member of a benefit society is a question of fact, and that each case must be decided upon its own merits.’ Bac. Ben. Soc. § 261. The requirements in section 2 of law 3, that written evidence of the dependency must be furnished before the certificate is issued; that the dependency must exist at the time of the member's death; and that if at the time of his death the dependency shall have ceased, or shall be found not to have existed, the benefit shall be payable to the persons named in said ‘class first,’-all indicate that proof as to the dependency may be sought outside of the terms of the certificate itself. In McCarthy v. Supreme Lodge, supra, the certificate, issued to one McCarthy, was payable to ‘Sarah J. Judge, fiancee;’ and the evidence was examined for the purpose of determining the fact of said Sarah's dependence upon McCarthy in his lifetime.

The question then arises, whether the appellee was ever in fact dependent upon Edwin H. Turner, deceased, and, if so, whether such dependence had ceased at the time of his death. Where the statute and charter of an association provide for the payment of benefit funds to...