Alexander v Sandoval, 991908

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtThomas
Citation149 L.Ed.2d 517,121 S.Ct. 1511,532 U.S. 275
PartiesJAMES ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al., PETITIONERS v. MARTHA SANDOVAL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situatedSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Decision Date24 April 2001
Docket Number991908

532 U.S. 275

121 S. Ct. 1511

149 L. Ed. 2d 517

JAMES ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.MARTHA SANDOVAL, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

No. 99-1908

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

January 16, 2001, Argued

April 24, 2001, Decided

SYLLABUS.

As a recipient of federal financial assistance, the Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department), of which petitioner Alexander is the Director, is subject to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of that Title prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in covered programs and activities. Section 602 authorizes federal agencies to effectuate § 601 by issuing regulations, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in an exercise of this authority promulgated a regulation forbidding funding recipients to utilize criteria or administrative methods having the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on the prohibited grounds. Respondent Sandoval brought this class action to enjoin the Department's decision to administer state driver's license examinations only in English, arguing that it violated the DOJ regulation because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin. Agreeing, the District Court enjoined the policy and ordered the Department to accommodate non-English speakers. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Both courts rejected petitioners' argument that Title VI did not provide respondents a cause of action to enforce the regulation.

Held: There is no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI. Pp. 3-17.

(a) Three aspects of Title VI must be taken as given. First, private individuals may sue to enforce § 601. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694, 696, 699, 703, 710-711, 60 L. Ed. 2d 560, 99 S. Ct. 1946. Second, § 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293, 83 L. Ed. 2d 661, 105 S. Ct. 712. Third, it must be assumed for purposes of deciding this case that regulations promulgated under § 602 may validly proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups, even though such activities are permissible under § 601. Pp. 3-5.

(b) This Court has not, however, held that Title VI disparate-impact regulations may be enforced through a private right of action. Cannon was decided on the assumption that the respondent there had intentionally discriminated against the petitioner, see 441 U.S. at 680. In Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 77 L. Ed. 2d 866, 103 S. Ct. 3221, the Court held that private individuals could not recover compensatory damages under Title VI except for intentional discrimination. Of the five Justices who also voted to uphold disparate-impact regulations, three expressly reserved the question of a direct private right of action to enforce them, 463 U.S. at 645, n. 18. Pp. 5-7.

(c) Nor does it follow from the three points taken as given that Congress must have intended such a private right of action. There is no doubt that regulations applying § 601's ban on intentional discrimination are covered by the cause of action to enforce that section. But the disparate-impact regulations do not simply apply § 601 -- since they forbid conduct that § 601 permits -- and thus the private right of action to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to enforce these regulations. See Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 173, 128 L. Ed. 2d 119, 114 S. Ct. 1439. That right must come, if at all, from the independent force of § 602. Pp. 7-10.

(d) Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578, 61 L. Ed. 2d 82, 99 S. Ct. 2479. This Court will not revert to the understanding of private causes of action, represented by J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433, 12 L. Ed. 2d 423, 84 S. Ct. 1555, that held sway when Title VI was enacted. That understanding was abandoned in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 45 L. Ed. 2d 26, 95 S. Ct. 2080. Nor does the Court agree with the Government's contention that cases interpreting statutes enacted prior to Cort v. Ash have given dispositive weight to the expectations that the enacting Congress had formed in light of the contemporary legal context. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378-379, 72 L. Ed. 2d 182, 102 S. Ct. 1825; Cannon, supra, at 698-699; and Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 98 L. Ed. 2d 512, 108 S. Ct. 513, distinguished. Pp. 10-12.

(e) The search for Congress's intent in this case begins and ends with Title VI's text and structure. The "rights-creating" language so critical to Cannon's § 601 analysis, 441 U.S. at 690, n. 13, is completely absent from § 602. Whereas § 601 decrees that "no person . . . shall . . . be subjected to discrimination," § 602 limits federal agencies to "effectuating" rights created by § 601. And § 602 focuses neither on the individuals protected nor even on the funding recipients being regulated, but on the regulating agencies. Hence, there is far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons, Cannon, supra, at 690-691. The methods § 602 expressly provides for enforcing its regulations, which place elaborate restrictions on agency enforcement, also suggest a congressional intent not to create a private remedy through § 602. See, e.g.,Karahalios v. Federal Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 533, 103 L. Ed. 2d 539, 109 S. Ct. 1282. Pp. 12-15, 489 U.S. 527, 103 L. Ed. 2d 539, 109 S. Ct. 1282.

(f) The Court rejects arguments that the regulations at issue contain rights-creating language and so must be privately enforceable; that amendments to Title VI in § 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986 and § 6 of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 "ratified" decisions finding an implied private right of action to enforce the regulations; and that the congressional intent to create a right of action must be inferred under Curran, supra, at 353, 381-382. Pp. 15-17.

197 F.3d 484, reversed.

Jeffrey S. Sutton argued the cause for petitioners.

Eric Schapper argued the cause for private respondents.

Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined.

[149 L. Ed. 2d 523] [121 S. Ct. 1515] [532 U.S. 278]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether private individuals may sue to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

I

The Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department), of which petitioner James Alexander is the Director, accepted grants of financial assistance from the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Transportation (DOT) and so subjected itself to the restrictions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. Section 601 of that Title provides that no person shall, "on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity" covered by Title VI. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Section 602 authorizes federal agencies "to effectuate the provisions of [§ 601] . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability," 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, and the DOJ in an exercise of this authority promulgated a regulation forbidding funding recipients to "utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin . . . ." 28 CFR § 42.104(b)(2) (1999). See also 49 CFR § 21.5(b)(2) (2000) (similar DOT regulation).

The State of Alabama amended its Constitution in 1990 to declare English "the official language of the state of [532 U.S. 279] Alabama." Amdt. 509. Pursuant to this provision and, petitioners have argued, to advance public safety, the Department decided to administer state driver's license examinations only in English. Respondent Sandoval, as representative of a class, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama to enjoin the English-only policy, arguing that it violated the DOJ regulation because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin. The District Court agreed. It enjoined the policy and ordered the Department to accommodate non-English speakers. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (1998). Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (1999). Both courts rejected petitioners' argument that Title VI did not provide respondents a cause of action to enforce the regulation.

We do not inquire here whether the DOJ regulation was authorized by § 602, or whether the courts below were correct to hold that the English-only policy had the effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin. The petition for writ of certiorari raised, and we agreed to review, only the question posed in the first paragraph of this opinion: whether there is a private cause of action to enforce the regulation. 530 U.S. 1305 (2000).

II

Although Title VI has often come to this Court, it is fair to say [149 L. Ed. 2d 524] (indeed, perhaps an understatement) that our opinions have not eliminated all uncertainty regarding its commands. For purposes of the present case, however, it is clear from [121 S. Ct. 1516] our decisions, from...

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    ...believed an amendment would be untimely due to a case then-pending before the United States Supreme Court (Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)). Sandoval did not, however, address the focus of this rulemaking--revising the regulations to conform them to the added definition of ``prog......
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    ...who claims not to be disabled but only that she was considered disabled is not entitled to an accommodation. Cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (stating "this Court is bound by holdings, not language"); see also Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, I......
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    ...may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute." Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). "The question whether a statute creates a cause of action, either expressly or by implicati......
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    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
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    ...Alexander v. Sandoval preclude plaintiffs from challenging the agency interpretations they seek to vacate here. See Alexander v. Sandoval 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). Page 126 Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary are contradictory to say the least. While, on the on......
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    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of Kansas
    • June 5, 2002
    ...who claims not to be disabled but only that she was considered disabled is not entitled to an accommodation. Cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (stating "this Court is bound by holdings, not language"); see also Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, I......
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    ...Alexander v. Sandoval preclude plaintiffs from challenging the agency interpretations they seek to vacate here. See Alexander v. Sandoval 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). Page 126 Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary are contradictory to say the least. While, on the on......
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    ...could act as a backstop to the use of market mechanisms. 135 129. Id. at i (foreword). 130. See id. at ii. 131. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that private individual did not have right to sue under §602 to enjoin state public safety department from administering driver......
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