Alexander v. Saul
| Citation | 5 F.4th 139 |
| Decision Date | 08 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | August Term 2020,No. 19-3370-cv,19-3370-cv |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) |
| Parties | Marion ALEXANDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Andrew SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. |
Mark Schneider, Law Offices of Mark Schneider, Plattsburgh, New York, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Daniella M. Calenzo, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney (Ellen E. Sovern, Regional Chief Counsel—Region II, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Social Security Administration, on the brief), for Grant C. Jacquith, U.S. Attorney, Northern District of New York, Syracuse, New York, for Defendant-Appellee.
Katherine Burghardt Kramer, Middlebury, Vermont, for Amicus Curiae National Alliance on Mental Illness of Champlain Valley, in support of Plaintiff-Appellant.
Victoria M. Esposito, Albany, New York, for Amicus Curiae Legal Aid Society of Northeastern New York, Inc., in support of Plaintiff-Appellant.
Before: Park and Menashi, Circuit Judges.*
Plaintiff-Appellant Marion Alexander appeals from the district court's denial of her motion for an extension of time to file an appeal. Alexander filed suit in federal court against the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of the Commissioner's denial of her claim for Supplemental Security Income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. While the district court's decision was pending, Alexander moved out of her mother's house and failed to provide her counsel with updated contact information. As a result, she did not receive notice of the district court's decision denying her benefits claim until two days after the deadline to notice an appeal had passed. Alexander filed a motion with the district court under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) for leave to file an untimely appeal. The Commissioner opposed the motion.
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5), a district court "may extend the time to file a notice of appeal if ... th[e] party [seeking an extension] shows excusable neglect or good cause." The "good cause" standard applies when the need for an extension arises from factors outside the control of the movant; the "excusable neglect" standard applies when the need for an extension results from factors within the movant's control. The district court denied Alexander's motion, holding that she established neither "good cause" nor "excusable neglect" for her failure to file a timely appeal. We review that decision for abuse of discretion and will reverse only if we are left with "a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment" in reaching its decision. Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc. , 333 F.3d 355, 362 (2d Cir. 2003).
Because Alexander's failure to appeal in a timely fashion was at least partially due to her own inadvertence, "excusable neglect," rather than "good cause," is the appropriate standard for assessing her claim. To determine whether a litigant has established "excusable neglect" under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5), courts consider the four factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Investment Services Company v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership , 507 U.S. 380, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). Those factors are: "[1] the danger of prejudice to the [non-movant], [2] the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, [3] the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and [4] whether the movant acted in good faith." Id. at 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489. Because "[t]he requirement of filing a timely notice of appeal is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional,’ " Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 207, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007), we have "taken a hard line in applying the Pioneer test," Midland Cogeneration Venture Ltd. P'ship v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.) , 419 F.3d 115, 122 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), explaining that "where the rule is entirely clear, we continue to expect that a party claiming excusable neglect will, in the ordinary course, lose," id. at 123.
While we are sympathetic to Alexander's case, we cannot conclude that the district court committed an abuse of discretion in holding that Alexander failed to meet this demanding standard. The district court reasonably applied the Pioneer factors and held that because Alexander's untimely appeal was caused by her failure to maintain contact with her attorney—a factor within her reasonable control—she failed to establish excusable neglect under the Pioneer test. While Alexander attributes her delay to her mental illness, which she argues is beyond her control, the record does not compel the conclusion that Alexander's impairments as opposed to her neglect caused her failure timely to appeal. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.
Plaintiff-Appellant Marion Alexander began receiving Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits from the Social Security Administration in 2005 but lost her benefits when she was incarcerated for grand larceny in 2011. Upon her release from prison, Alexander reapplied for SSI benefits, alleging disability due to attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder
, bipolar disorder, chronic hip and back pain, degenerative disc disease, and hepatitis C. Her application was denied.
If the applicant has an impairment or combination of impairments persisting for at least twelve months "that meets or equals one of [the] listings in appendix 1 to subpart P of part 404 of this chapter," the applicant will be found to be disabled. Id. If the applicant's impairments do not meet or equal a listing, the ALJ will assess the applicant's "residual functional capacity" ("RFC") and the applicant's "past relevant work." Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the applicant can perform past relevant work, the applicant will not be found to be disabled. Id. If the applicant cannot perform past relevant work, the ALJ will consider whether, in light of the applicant's RFC, age, education, and work experience, the applicant can "make an adjustment to other work." Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the applicant is not able to make an adjustment to other work, the applicant will be found to be disabled. Id.
Applying this process to Alexander, the ALJ found that Alexander had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since submitting her application for benefits and that she suffered from significant impairments, including hepatitis C
, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and opioid dependence. The ALJ further found, however, that these impairments were not so severe as to meet or medically equal any "listing." Finding that Alexander had sufficient RFC to perform unskilled, light work and that there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Alexander could perform, the ALJ concluded that Alexander would be able to make a successful adjustment to other work and concluded that she was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The ALJ accordingly denied Alexander's claim for SSI benefits.
Alexander retained counsel and filed an appeal with the Social Security Appeals Council, which denied her request for review. Alexander then filed a civil suit against the Commissioner of Social Security in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, seeking review of the Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court held that the ALJ violated his duty to develop the record in Alexander's case by failing to include in the record Alexander's SSI file from the period before her benefits were terminated. Noting that " ‘the existence of a prior established disability is highly relevant when the nature of that disability appears to be the very same cause of the alleged disability then under examination,’ " the district court concluded that there were too many "outstanding questions" about Alexander's case to render a decision on her benefits claim. R. 540 (quoting Mimms v. Heckler , 750 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1984) ) (alteration omitted).1 The district court thought those questions—whether Alexander had received benefits, why those benefits had been terminated, and why Alexander's prior file was not included in the record—needed "further review and explanation." Id. at 541. The district court reversed the Commissioner's decision and remanded the case to the Social Security Administration "for further development of the record." Id.
On remand, the ALJ conducted two further hearings and considered additional evidence regarding Alexander's alleged impairments. The ALJ again concluded...
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