Alexander v. State

• Citation: 333 So.3d 19
• Decision Date: 10 February 2022
• Docket Number: 2019-CT-01612-SCT
• Parties: Norris ALEXANDER a/k/a Norris Crawford Alexander a/k/a Bugger v. STATE of Mississippi
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

333 So.3d 19

Norris ALEXANDER a/k/a Norris Crawford Alexander a/k/a Bugger

v.STATE of Mississippi

NO. 2019-CT-01612-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

February 10, 2022

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES, Jackson, ZAKIA BUTLER, ERIN BRIGGS

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE

EN BANC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

BEAM, JUSTICE FOR THE COURT:

¶1. The Mississippi Court of Appeals vacated Norris Alexander's life-without-parole sentence as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2020). Alexander v. State , No. 2019-KA-01612-COA, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2021 WL 671340, at *1 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2021). The Court of Appeals held that the Panola County Circuit Court erred by denying Alexander's motions for funds to hire a mitigation investigator and an adolescent-development psychologist for his Miller v. Alabama¹ hearing. The State petitioned this Court for certiorari, which we granted.

¶2. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motions for expert funding, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision, and we reinstate and affirm the trial court's sentencing order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3. In 1998, a Panola County jury found Alexander guilty of capital murder for stabbing his mother-in-law to death in 1993. Alexander was seventeen years old at the time of the killing. He and his wife, along with their young child had previously lived with his wife's mother, Catherine Blevin. Blevin kicked them out of her home a few months before the killing after she discovered marijuana plants growing in their bedroom. Alexander v. State , 759 So. 2d 411, 414 (Miss. 2000).

¶4. Prior to his capital-murder trial, Alexander was twice convicted in 1997 of selling marijuana. At sentencing following the capital-murder conviction, the trial court found that Alexander was a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-81 (Rev. 1994) based on the two prior felony convictions and sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole. Alexander , 759 So. 2d at 414. This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Id. at 422.

¶5. In 2014, this Court granted Alexander's application for leave to proceed in the trial court with his post-conviction relief (PCR) request based on Miller , 567 U.S. at 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Order, Alexander v. State , No. 2008-M-00765 (Miss. Dec. 4, 2014).

¶6. The trial court entered an order in July 2015 vacating Alexander's sentence and appointed a public defender to represent Alexander for a Miller hearing, which was set for August 31, 2015. A number of continuances were granted in the matter. Alexander later retained private counsel, who filed two separate motions in the trial court requesting $10,000 to hire a mitigation investigator and $30,000 to hire an adolescent-developmental-psychology expert.

¶7. A hearing was held on March 31, 2016. The State and defense counsel had stipulated that the trial court should resentence Alexander to life with the possibility of parole on his capital-murder conviction because the sentencing statute for capital murder in 1993 allowed only for either the death penalty or a life sentence.² The State submitted, however, that it intended to prove that Alexander was a habitual offender for purposes Section 99-19-81 and would seek life without parole.

¶8. Alexander asserted that his habitual-offender status was irrelevant because Miller nullified the mandatory sentence of life without parole as a habitual offender—as applied to juveniles. Alternatively, Alexander asserted that he was entitled to an individualized hearing before a jury on the habitual-offender sentence, with consideration of the Miller factors.

¶9. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order in June 2016 denying the motion to resentencing Alexander to life with the possibility of parole and denying the motion for resentencing by a jury. The trial court ruled that the matter should be set for a Miller hearing to determine whether Alexander should be sentenced to life without parole under Section 99-19-81 or life with parole despite his habitual-offender status.

¶10. The trial court noted in the June 2016 order that the parties had made no arguments on the motions for expert funds. The trial court instructed the State to file a written response to the motions within ten days of the order and instructed both parties to notify the trial court if they desired oral argument on the motions. If no oral argument was required, the trial court said it would enter an order on the motions after the ten-day period.

¶11. In July 2016, the trial court entered an order denying a motion for reconsideration of the June 2016 order, filed by Alexander. The trial court instructed the parties to contact the court administrator to obtain possible dates for the Miller hearing.

¶12. No further action was taken in the case until April 2018 when the court administrator contacted Alexander's attorney with dates for a hearing on the motions for expert funding. According to a sua sponte order issued by the trial court on March 27, 2019, Alexander's "attorney indicated he was working on an appeal and would contact the court administrator after the appeal was filed." But, at the time, the attorney had yet to contact the court. The trial court then ordered the parties to confer and to contact the court administrator within fourteen days of the March 27 order to schedule a hearing on resentencing.

¶13. The trial court entered an order on April 30, 2019, noting that Alexander's attorney had contacted the court administrator and "asked for hearing dates for the motions and assert[ed] that setting the re-sentencing would be premature." The trial court found that any request for oral arguments on the motions for expert funding had been waived. And the trial court denied Alexander's motions for expert funding. Relying on Mississippi law, the trial court found that Alexander had not established a substantial need for funds to hire the requested mitigation investigator or the adolescent-developmental psychologist.

¶14. The Miller hearing was held on September 24, 2019. The State called two witnesses: William Travis, the attorney who represented Alexander at his capital-murder trial, and Mark Whitten, a former Panola County Sheriff's deputy, who investigated the crime in 1993. Alexander presented no witnesses.

¶15. Alexander's attorney argued at the hearing that the trial court's denial of his motion for an adolescent-development psychologist left him unprepared to address the Miller factors. So he asked the trial court to strike all of the Miller testimony, stating as follows:

For the record, the [c]ourt entered an order earlier stating that I had waived the right to put on evidence of sort that we're talking about here today, and there was no known waiver by me. I actually had given the court administrator several dates that I was available for a hearing, and I never got a response. And I have found out since then that ... was because the court administrator was ill, and so they didn't get set. But I would like to make the record that I did not come prepared to deal with the Miller factors, because I didn't have any evidence, because the [c]ourt denied my motion to have a psychologist, which might not have occurred had I known when to have her in court. She was prepared to do so. But I just would ask the [c]ourt to strike all of this Miller testimony.

¶16. The trial court denied the request to strike. It ruled on the Miller factors from the bench and subsequently in a written order that same day. The trial court sentenced Alexander to life as a habitual offender under Section 99-19-81, without parole eligibility.

¶17. The trial court considered factors identified by the Miller Court, as interpreted and adopted by this Court in Parker v. State , 119 So. 3d 987, 995 (Miss. 2013)³ : (1) chronological age and the hallmark features among that age; (2) family and home environment; (3) circumstances of the offense; (4) ability to deal with the legal system; (5) and possibility of rehabilitation.

1. Alexander's chronological age: The trial court found that unlike the fourteen-year-old defendants in Miller ,⁴ Alexander was seventeen, married, and had a child. Testimony showed that Alexander was a "typical 17-18 year old and not immature with law enforcement and the criminal process." Nor was he unable to appreciate risks and consequences. Because Alexander put on no proof, no "psychological or educational test scores" were available.

2. Alexander's Family and home environment: "By all accounts," the trial court said, "Alexander came from a good family." Testimony showed that he was "living with his mother-in-law, the victim, and his wife, when the victim found marijuana growing in the home and kicked [him] and his wife out of the home."

3. Circumstances of the offense (participation and pressure): The trial court found that the evidence showed that Alexander acted alone, cutting the victim's phone lines and stabbing her in the throat. By the time Alexander was indicted, he was twenty-one. No evidence was presented that Alexander had succumbed to any type of peer pressure.

4. Alexander's abilities to deal with the legal system and assist counsel: Evidence was presented by Alexander's defense counsel from the murder trial that Alexander had no problems assisting in his defense and had the ability to deal with the police officers involved in the case. Evidence was presented that Alexander was not unfamiliar with law enforcement and the criminal process.

5. Rehabilitation: According to the trial court, Alexander showed no signs of rehabilitation. Documentation presented showed that he had been indicted for multiple felonies while in jail, and he is still committing criminal activity.

6. Additional considerations: The trial court further found that in contrast to the defendants in Miller , Alexander was seventeen (not...