Alexander v. State

Decision Date28 January 1976
Docket NumberNo. 1--675A106,1--675A106
PartiesWilbert ALEXANDER, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Stephen C. Haas, Evansville, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Arthur Thaddeus Perry, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

LOWDERMILK, Judge.

Appellant Wilbert Alexander was tried before a jury and convicted of the crime of theft of property valued at less than one hundred ($100) dollars. Alexander now appeals his conviction, presenting the following issues for review:

I) Whether it was error for the trial court to overrule Alexander's motion for a directed verdict which was made at the close of the State's case.

II) Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence testimony of other similar offenses.

III) Whether the trial court improperly denied Alexander's motion to strike all testimony of other similar offenses and admonish the jury to disregard such testimony.

FACTS:

Robert Cox, manager of the Four Seasons Motel in Posey County, stated that Alexander registered at the motel on January 31, 1974. Alexander signed the registration card as 'C. W. Williams,' gave a Gary, Indiana, address, and stated the make of his car to be a 1971 Chevrolet, license number '82D8116.' The following day, the television set from the room assigned to Alexander was found to be missing.

A passing motorist also testified that on the evening of January 31, 1974, she observed two people carrying a television out of one of the rooms at the Four Seasons Motel.

In addition, there was testimony from managers of three other motels that Alexander had registered at each of the motels under an assumed name; had given a Gary address; stated the make of car driven to be a 1971 Chevrolet; and, on at least two occasions, had given the same incorrect Indiana license plate number as was given on the Four Seasons Motel registration card. Each manager testified that the room occupied by Alexander contained a television set when Alexander checked in, but that it was missing the following day.

I.

Alexander first argues that it was error for the trial court to overrule his motion for a directed verdict because there existed at the time of the motion a fatal variance between pleading and proof.

It is Alexander's contention that while the charging information states the owner of the property to be the 'Four Seasons Motel,' the proof is that the television was owned by the Four Seasons Motel, Inc. Alexander argues that the above discrepancy is a fatal variance, and that the variance prejudiced him by misleading him as to the nature of the charges.

We do not find Alexander's argument persuasive. Throughout the trial, there was reference to only one 'Four Seasons Motel.' Further, there was never any suggestion that there were or are other motels with similar names, and there was never any dispute as to the location of the motel named in the charging information.

Although Alexander refers us to one case in support of his argument, he does not inform us as to precisely how the above variance misled him in the preparation of his defense. Absent such articulation, and given the nature of the variance we find no error in the overruling of Alexander's motion. See, Beard v. State (1975), Ind.App., 327 N.E.2d 629, 631; Holloway v. State (1973), Ind.App., 300 N.E.2d 910.

II.--III.

Alexander next claims the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence concerning offenses other than the one with which he is charged. Alexander contends that the testimony of the three motel operators, who related that televisions were missing from motel rooms occupied by Alexander, was irrelevant and highly prejudicial.

The long-standing rule in this State is that evidence of separate and distinct offenses is generally not admissible. Equally as old as the rule, however, are the exceptions that such evidence may be admissible to show intent, motive, purpose, identification or common scheme or plan. In allowing such evidence in certain instances, the court seeks to permit the full disclosure of all relevant facts which have some probative value, not for the purpose of showing the defendant to be a 'criminal-type,' but to present to the trier of fact all evidence which tends to prove that the defendant committed the crime charged. See, Schnee v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 661, 662, 262 N.E.2d 186, 187; ...

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12 cases
  • O'Conner v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • November 29, 1978
    ...The well-established rule in Indiana is that evidence of separate and distinct offenses is generally not admissible. Alexander v. State, (1976) Ind.App., 340 N.E.2d 366, 368. An equally well-established exception to this general rule is that such evidence is admissible to show intent, motiv......
  • DeMichaeli and Associates v. Sanders
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • January 28, 1976
    ... ... '(a) The state highway commission with reference to state highways, and state highway routes through cities, and local authorities with reference to other highways ... ...
  • O'Conner v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • January 24, 1980
    ...not admissible, such evidence is admissible to show intent, motive, purpose, identification or common scheme or plan. Alexander v. State (1976) Ind.App., 340 N.E.2d 366. In Martin v. State (1978) Ind., 372 N.E.2d 181, this Court held that the admission of evidence of alleged acts of child a......
  • Maldonado v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • October 20, 1976
    ...v. State, (1975) Ind., 335 N.E.2d 215. The Court of Appeals has stated the essence of this rule succinctly in Alexander v. State, (1976) Ind.App., 340 N.E.2d 366, 368: 'In allowing such evidence in certain instances, the court seeks to permit the full disclosure of all relevant facts which ......
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