Alexander v. Todman
| Citation | 361 F.2d 744 |
| Decision Date | 17 June 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 15762.,15762. |
| Parties | Joseph ALEXANDER and Daniel W. Ambrose, Respectively, President and Secretary of the Democratic Party of the Virgin Islands, Acting on Behalf of the Democratic Party of the Virgin Islands v. Henrita TODMAN, Supervisor of Elections, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
James A. Bough, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, V. I., for appellants.
Edith L. Bornn, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, V. I., for appellees.
Before STALEY, Chief Judge, and MARIS and McENTEE, Circuit Judges.
Argued at Charlotte Amalie April 26, 1966.
The question presented by this appeal is whether the District Court of the Virgin Islands erred in its taxation of costs and attorneys' fees. The question arose following our remand to the District Court of this action and another companion suit. No useful purpose would be served in recounting the background facts since they are set out in our opinion on the prior appeal, 1964, 337 F.2d 962, 5 V.I. 137, cert. den. 380 U.S. 915, 85 S.Ct. 893, 13 L.Ed.2d 800. Suffice it to say that in the first action, No. 158-1963, Joseph Alexander and Daniel W. Ambrose, the president and secretary, respectively, of the Democratic Party of the Virgin Islands, acting on behalf of the Democratic Party of the Virgin Islands, appealed to the District Court from a ruling by defendant Henrita Todman, the Territorial Supervisor of Elections. The plaintiffs sought to have set aside a petition registering the Democratic Party under the newly enacted Election Code, 18 V.I.C. §§ 301 et seq., the petition having been filed by the defendants Ottley, et al., referred to as the Mortar and Pestle Group. In the second action, No. 260-1963, which is the case involved in the present appeal, the plaintiffs sought, inter alia, to have the defendants Ottley, et al., enjoined from acting as, or representing themselves to be, members of the Territorial Committee of the Democratic Party of the Virgin Islands and from engaging in political activities as representatives of that Party. The defendants filed what they entitled a "Counterclaim or Third Party Complaint" in the caption of which they listed the names of seventeen individuals, including Alexander and Ambrose, referring to them as "plaintiffs or third-party defendants" and designating them as the "Donkey Group Plaintiffs". The defendants prayed the Court to direct these persons to appear as plaintiffs or as third-party defendants and that they be enjoined from representing themselves as officers or representatives of the Democratic Party or as members of its Territorial Committee. The cases were consolidated in the District Court. Following a trial, judgment was entered for the plaintiffs in each case, 1964, 231 F. Supp. 365, 368, 4 V.I. 580, 589. Appeals from these judgments were taken by defendants, at our docket Nos. 15000 and 15001, and, following argument, the judgments of the District Court in favor of the plaintiffs were reversed and the orders and injunctions contained therein were vacated. The cases were remanded to the District Court with instructions to issue the injunctions requested by the defendants and for any other action consistent with our opinion, 1964, 337 F.2d 962, 5 V.I. 137. Our mandate, which issued on March 9, 1965, directed the allowance to the defendants of their costs incurred on the appeals.
Upon remand, the defendants filed a motion in the District Court for a judgment pursuant to our mandate and for the taxation of costs and attorneys' fees. The District Court entered a judgment on April 7, 1965, on the defendants' counterclaim or third-party complaint enjoining Joseph Alexander, Daniel W. Ambrose, Ronald DeLugo, Fritz Lawaetz, Herbert Sugden, Thomas W. Gibbs, Anthony Cerge, Alfred Lockhart, Lucinda A. Millin, Augustin Doward, Fabian Martinez, Delta Dorsch, Theovald E. Moorhead, Leslie Moorhead, Clely Berry, Charles S. Sebastian, and Waldron J. Shackelton, their agents and associates, from, inter alia, acting as, or representing themselves to be, members of the Territorial Committee of the Democratic Party of the Virgin Islands unless they shall be duly elected to said Committee in a primary election held pursuant to title 18, V.I.C.; the complaints in Nos. 158-1963 and 260-1963 were dismissed with prejudice, and the costs incurred on appeal to this court were assessed "against the plaintiffs". The District Court, after hearing argument on the motions for taxation of costs and attorneys' fees entered, on May 7, 1965, an order taxing attorneys' fees against the plaintiffs and amended its order of April 7th to reflect the correct amount of court costs. The plaintiffs then moved for an order for the modification and clarification of the prior orders, requesting the District Court to specify the exact persons, clubs or organizations liable for the payment of costs and counsel fees. After hearing argument, the District Court, on December 7, 1965 entered an order amending its order of May 7th to read that costs and attorneys' fees were taxed against the Democratic Party of the Virgin Islands as it existed at the time the actions were commenced. The present appeal by the defendants is from that order.
The defendants' first contention is that the District Court erred in not holding plaintiffs Alexander and Ambrose personally liable for the costs and attorneys' fees.1 The defendants urge that the District Court wrongly applied 5 V.I.C. § 545, the statute which provides for the assessment of costs in actions brought by parties acting in a representative capacity. § 545 provides as follows:
"In an action prosecuted or defended by an executor, administrator, trustee of an express trust, or a person expressly authorized by a statute to prosecute or defend therein, costs shall be recovered as in ordinary cases, but such costs shall only be chargeable upon or collected from the estate, fund, or party represented, unless the court orders the same to be recovered from the plaintiff or defendant personally for mismanagement or bad faith in such action or the defense thereto."
The defendants say that plaintiffs Alexander and Ambrose, in bringing the action for an injunction, were actually suing to gain control of the Democratic Party and, therefore, were really...
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