Alexander v. Trump
| Decision Date | 12 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-1081 |
| Parties | BRUCE ALEXANDER v. PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Before the undersigned magistrate judge, on reference from the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), is a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) [doc. #21], filed by defendant, Henry Cotton in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Bastrop ("Mayor Cotton ") as well as a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) & (6), filed by defendants, President Donald Trump ("President Trump ") and F.B.I. Director Christopher Wray ("Director Wray").1 For reasons stated below, it is recommended that the motions be GRANTED, and that plaintiff's claims against defendant Cotton be DISMISSED with prejudice, and his claims against defendants Trump and Wray be DISMISSED without prejudice.
On August 28, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant pro se complaint against President Trump, Director Wray, Louisiana Governor John B. Edwards, and Mayor Cotton in their respective official capacities. See Complaint, doc. #1, p. 2, ¶ 8. Plaintiff asserts violations of his Fourthand Fourteenth Amendment.
On January 22, 2018, Mayor Cotton filed his motion to dismiss [doc. #21] arguing that Plaintiff has failed to allege essential elements to his § 1983 claim against Mayor Cotton. Mayor Cotton requests that the Court grant him attorney fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Plaintiff filed his opposition [doc. #23], Mayor Cotton filed a reply [doc. #26], and Plaintiff filed a sur-reply [doc. #29]. On February 26, 2018, President Trump and Director Wray filed their motion to dismiss [doc. #30] arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that Plaintiff has failed to allege a claim against them. Plaintiff filed his opposition [doc. #40]. These matters are now ripe.
In November 2006, Plaintiff was summoned to testify as a witness in a murder trial in Farmerville, Union Parish, Louisiana. The criminal defendant's father hired the Sheriff of Morehouse Parish, the Chief of Police for the City of Bastrop, and the local division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Monroe, Louisiana (collectively, "the Conspirators") to murder Plaintiff. The Conspirators then worked with various local businesses to poison Plaintiff. The Conspirators conducted constant surveillance of Plaintiff by monitoring and recording his telephone, placing tracking devices on his automobiles, and placing audio/video recording devices in his home. The Conspirators blocked Plaintiff's attempts to communicate with theoutside world, including the Department of Justice, by intercepting telephone calls and mail.
As a result of the poisoning, Plaintiff has suffered heart attacks, blood loss, and other ailments. Plaintiff informed Joe Mickel, assistant U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Louisiana, about the plot to kill him by poisoning. Mr. Mickel directed Plaintiff to obtain a blood test. While Plaintiff was on his way to obtain a blood test, the Conspirators abducted him and held him for 12 days. The Conspirators attempted to have Plaintiff committed to a state mental institution and to remove Plaintiff's "voice box."
Plaintiff no specific claims against Director Wray. He claims that President Donald Trump "[f]ailed to properly maintain control of his appointed F.B.I. Director" and "[f]ailed to establish and assure the function of a bona fide and meaningful departmental system for dealing with complaint[s] of law enforcement misconduct." Plaintiff asserts that Mayor Henry Cotton "failed to take action after this matter was brought to him on more than one occasion."
Plaintiff requests that the Court grant him declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiff demands that the Court declare the acts set forth in his complaint to be unconstitutional and direct the defendants to restore his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff further requests that the Court "[f]airly and completely investigate" the matters of which he complains.
It is axiomatic that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party invoking the federal forum. Id. Moreover, litigants cannot confer federal subject matter by waiver or consent. Elam v. The Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require dismissal when the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A district court may assess subject matter jurisdiction based on "(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebellius, 635 F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
In this case, neither party has submitted evidence or stipulations of fact. Accordingly, the undersigned must assess the presence of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Complaint alone. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief for alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment by the defendants in their official capacities.
The suit against President Trump and Director Wray in their official capacities is treated as a suit against the United States. Hagen v. Coggins, 208 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir. 2000). "Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit." F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1000 (1994). This includes suits for injunctive and declaratory relief. Huffstutler v. Bergland, 607 F.2d 1090, 1092 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133, 1137 (5th Cir. 1972)); Kight v. U.S. Dist. Court, N. Dist.of Georgia, 681 F. App'x 882, 884 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 582, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934)). But see Navajo Nation v. Dep't of the Interior, 876 F.3d 1144, 1171 (9th Cir. 2017) ().
Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional defense. Without a waiver of sovereign immunity, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a suit against the United States. Ecker v. United States, 358 F. App'x 551, 552-53 (5th Cir. 2009) (). Plaintiff must sufficiently allege a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction in the Complaint. Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff did not allege a waiver of sovereign immunity in his Complaint, and the undersigned is not aware of any applicable waiver under statutory or federal common law. Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims against President Trump and Director Wray and should dismiss those claims without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanction dismissal where the plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A pleading states a claim for relief, inter alia, when it contains a "short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Circumstances constituting fraud or mistake, however, must be alleged with particularity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
To withstand a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is "plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies somewhere in between. See Iqbal, supra. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. Although the court must accept as true all factual allegations set forth in the complaint, the same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" does not satisfy Rule 8. Id. "[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to make out a valid claim." City of Clinton, Ark, supra.
Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. (citation omitted). A well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of the asserted facts is improbable, and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, supra. Nevertheless, a court is compelled to dismiss an otherwise well-pleaded claim if it is premised upon an invalid legal theory. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (1989).
When considering a motion to dismiss, courts generally are limited to the complaint and its proper attachments. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)(citation...
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