Alexander v. United States

Decision Date21 August 1967
Docket NumberNo. 18553,18554.,18553
Citation380 F.2d 33
PartiesLarry Edward ALEXANDER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Simon Galter, Lincoln, Neb., for appellant.

Duane L. Nelson, Asst. U. S. Atty., Omaha, Neb., for appellee; Theodore L. Richling, U. S. Atty., Omaha, Neb., on the brief.

Before MEHAFFY and GIBSON, Circuit Judges, and STEPHENSON, District Judge.

MEHAFFY, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Alexander seeks review from his convictions on two counts of an indictment charging the forging and counterfeiting of material signatures on United States money orders in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 500 and on an indictment charging that he knowingly transported a stolen automobile from Lawton, Oklahoma to Verdon, Nebraska in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 2312. The cases, based on the two separate indictments, were consolidated for trial in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska. We affirm the convictions.

The essential facts are not in dispute and briefly summarized disclose that appellant was in the Army, stationed at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, when on August 26, 1965 he and one Dennis Burk left the Army camp without leave and proceeded to Lawton, Oklahoma where they stole a Buick convertible automobile. They drove the stolen car to Frederick, Oklahoma where appellant had formerly lived for several weeks in the home of Reverend James Royce Thomason. After an anonymous telephone call insuring the vacancy of the Thomason home, appellant entered the house, ransacking a desk drawer and stealing therefrom certain articles including the money orders involved, which were made payable to Reverend Thomason. Following this, appellant and Burk, ed in the stolen automobile to Verdon, having switched the license plate, proceed-Nebraska, Burk's home. After reaching Verdon, they drove to Lincoln, Nebraska where appellant obtained a social security card in the name of Reverend Thomason and used the card as identification to cash the stolen money orders, forging thereon Reverend Thomason's signature as endorser.

Appellant and Burk returned to Verdon after cashing the money orders in Lincoln, Nebraska. Their actions at Verdon were suspicious, causing the local law enforcement officers to check on the license plate on the Buick, finding it had been issued for another car. The sheriff, his deputy and the town marshal drove to the Burk residence to make an investigation and seeing the Buick in front of the home noticed appellant was asleep in the front seat of the car. He was awakened by the officers' tapping on the window and the sheriff conversed with him while the deputy went to the house to ascertain if anyone were there. Finding no one at the house, the deputy returned to the car and discovered that appellant was holding a pistol on the sheriff. Appellant threatened the sheriff's life if he did not have the deputy hand over his gun, whereupon the deputy, in order to prevent assassination of the sheriff, handed his gun to appellant, who then attempted to take the sheriff as a hostage. The sheriff, an elderly man who had suffered a stroke, had been sitting in the front seat of the car with his right leg outside, since because of the stroke it was difficult for him to use his leg normally. He refused to accompany appellant and proceeded to get out of the car, telling appellant that he would have to shoot him in the back if he wanted to stop him. The sheriff then walked to the deputy's car and appellant drove off in the Buick at a high rate of speed which at times approximated one hundred miles per hour, with the sheriff and the deputy in hot pursuit. During the chase, the officers alerted other law enforcement people by radio. Eventually, appellant lost control of the Buick and it overturned in a ditch, but appellant was uninjured and continued his flight on foot. A search party had formed and a helicopter located appellant in a bean field a few miles distant from the wrecked automobile where he was apprehended by two youths, escorted to the road, and turned over to the sheriff and his deputy. Appellant was promptly taken to the sheriff's office and interrogated by the county attorney after being fully advised of his constitutional rights and during which custodial investigation he admitted the commission of the crimes.

Upon his arraignment, appellant, with apparent clear knowledge of his rights, pleaded guilty in open court. The court subsequently, however, allowed him to change his plea to one of not guilty, but when this change of plea was indicated appellant's court-appointed attorney was allowed to withdraw based on grounds that appellant failed to heed his advice. The court thereupon appointed another attorney for appellant who has ably represented him throughout the trial of several days and on this appeal.

The Confessions.

Appellant made three confessions, each of which was introduced in evidence, and he challenges the court's refusal to suppress this evidence. The first confession was made to the county attorney on August 31, 1965 immediately upon appellant's arrival at the courthouse. The second was made to FBI agents the following morning, and the third to a general investigator for the United States Army on that same day — September 1, 1965. None of the interrogations was for an inordinate length of time nor were they accompanied by any semblance of coercion.

Appellant did not take the stand and there is no dispute as to his guilt. The only issue before us on this evidentiary matter is whether the guidelines set forth in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), were scrupulously adhered to by the law enforcement officers, the interrogations having been conducted prior to appointment of an attorney for appellant.

We note that the interrogations here were conducted ten months before the date on which the decision in Miranda was handed down which was on June 13, 1966. Nonetheless, the protection of appellant's constitutional rights was fully observed by each of the investigative agencies so as to scrupulously comply with the guidelines subsequently enunciated in Miranda. Immediately upon appellant's apprehension at approximately 2:00 p. m. on August 31, 1965, he was delivered into the custody of the sheriff who promptly took him to the courthouse, assuring him enroute that he had nothing to fear as he would not be mistreated. Photographers had assembled at the courthouse entrance at the time of the arrival of the sheriff and appellant, but at appellant's request they were forbidden to take pictures. Appellant was then taken into the sheriff's office where he was interrogated for the first time, said interrogation being conducted by the county attorney, Mr. Henry F. Schepman. Mr. Schepman, who had had thirteen years' experience in office, introduced himself to the appellant and a conversation followed after Mr. Schepman fully advised appellant of his constitutional rights. Mr. Schepman clearly informed appellant of his right to remain silent; that anything he said could be used against him; that he had a right to have a lawyer of his own choice, but if unable to employ one, a lawyer would be provided.1 Mr. Schepman asked appellant if he would mind relating what had happened and appellant responded in detail and later made a statement in his own handwriting.

On the following day, appellant was interrogated by an FBI agent and an Army investigator. Both of these individuals also advised appellant of his right to remain silent, that any statement he might make could be used against him, and of his right to counsel.

Appellant cites and relies on Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), but Escobedo is not applicable to the facts here as appellant did not request counsel and counsel was not denied him. Von Schmitt v. United States, 366 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1966). In the case at hand, as in United States v. Ardner, 364 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1966), there is no suggestion that appellant could not have contacted anyone he desired.

In Miranda, the Court in discussing Escobedo reiterated that "the police did not effectively advise him Escobedo of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney." The record here reveals a complete absence of the finding in Miranda of "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights." Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Here, the record is replete with advice to appellant of his constitutional rights.2

It is argued that appellant when interrogated was tired and unable to make an intelligent waiver. He was, of course, tired from the ordeal of his flight on foot through rough country, but his mental acuteness was not affected, and he was not tired on the following day when he was interrogated by the FBI agent and the Army representative.

Entwined in appellant's argument are references to the background life of appellant which is sad indeed. Appellant was next to the youngest of seven children. His father was a construction worker and was away from home frequently except for weekends, and finally abandoned his family when appellant was eight years of age. When he ultimately quit sending money to appellant's mother, this necessitated her moving the family to her father's farm in Iowa. From his early youth, appellant engaged in petty thefts such as stealing watermelons and a bicycle, and he and two of his older brothers were eventually committed to the Iowa State Correctional School for Boys. At this institution, however, he finished the tenth grade and did well in the subjects he liked, and excellent in some of them. His intelligence was above average with a quotient of 115. He continued to engage in petty thefts at the...

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