Alexander v. Williams

• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 21-cv-1353-WJM
• Decision Date: 17 November 2022
• Citation: 641 F.Supp.3d 1082
• Parties: James Henry ALEXANDER, Petitioner, v. Dean WILLIAMS, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections, Virgil Ensley, Warden of the Bent County Correctional Facility, and Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General for the State of Colorado, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

641 F.Supp.3d 1082

James Henry ALEXANDER, Petitioner, v.Dean WILLIAMS, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections, Virgil Ensley, Warden of the Bent County Correctional Facility, and Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General for the State of Colorado, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 21-cv-1353-WJM

United States District Court, D. Colorado

Signed November 17, 2022

James Henry Alexander, Las Animas, CO, Pro Se.

Patrick Aloysius Withers, Colorado Department of Law, Denver, CO, Ryan Alan Crane, Colorado Attorney General's Office, Denver, CO, for RespondentsDean Williams, Philip J. Weiser.

ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

William J. Martinez, United States District Judge

A state court jury found PetitionerJames Henry Alexander("Alexander") guilty of first degree assault, possession of a weapon by a previous offender, ownership of a dangerous dog, and four habitual criminal counts.The state case was the product of a dispute that arose after a woman tried to drive through an alley behind Alexander's tattoo parlor—and escalated to the point where Alexander's girlfriend released Alexander's dog to attack the woman.The trial court adjudicated Alexander a habitual criminal and imposed a 64-year sentence on the assault conviction.Alexander brings this habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to collaterally challenge the conviction and sentence.His habeas application presents five claims for relief.The parties have briefed the merits of each claim.For the reasons described below, Alexander's Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus is granted in part and denied in part, and Alexander shall be released from custody in 120 days unless he is retried on the charges brought against him in Case No. 08CR1660 in the Adams County District Court of the State of Colorado.¹

I.STANDARDS OF REVIEW

For the purposes of habeas review, federal courts are limited to determining if a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.Estelle v. McGuire,502 U.S. 62, 68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385(1991).Federal courts do "not review the judgment, but the lawfulness of [Alexander's] custody simpliciter."Coleman v. Thompson,501 U.S. 722, 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640(1991).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), relief is further limited to instances where the state court adjudication of a habeas petitioner's claims on the merits (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under the § 2254(d)(1), a federal court will not grant the writ unless "the state court arrived at a conclusion 'opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'"Boykin v. Webb,541 F.3d 638, 642(6th Cir.2008)(quotingWilliams v. Taylor,529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389(2000)).Under the "unreasonable applications" clause, a habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identified the correct legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but unreasonably applied that principle to the petitioner's case.Id.

Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court"will not conclude a state court's factual findings are unreasonable 'merely because [it] would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.'"Smith v. Duckworth,824 F.3d 1233, 1241(10th Cir.2016)(quotingBrumfield v. Cain,576 U.S. 305, 313-14, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 192 L.Ed.2d 356(2015)).Instead, we"defer to the state court's factual determinations so long as 'reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question.'"Id.(quotingBrumfield,576 U.S. at 314, 135 S.Ct. 2269).In line with this deference, the federal court is to presume that a state court's factual findings are correct, "and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by 'clear and convincing evidence.'"Id.(quoting28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).However, "deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review,' and 'does not by definition preclude relief."Brumfield,576 U.S. at 314, 135 S.Ct. 2269(quotingMiller-El v. Cockrell,537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931(2003)("Miller-El I")).

Because Alexander is pro se,the Court liberally construes his filings, but will not act as an advocate.James v. Wadas,724 F.3d 1312, 1315(10th Cir.2013).

II.BACKGROUND

In addressing Alexander's direct appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals("CCA") summarized the evidence presented at trial as follows:

The victim, LF, was driving through an alley behind a tattoo shop owned by Alexander.LF's husband and children were in the car with her.LF was forced to stop her car because a parked car was blocking the alley.At that time, Alexander, his girlfriend, Theresa Apodaca-Zambori,² and two other men were standing in the alley.LF's husband, Christopher Chavez, rolled down his window and asked Alexander and the others to move their car.Alexander responded that the alley was private property and told Chavez, "Tell your bitch to back up the way she came."

Alexander approached the front of LF's car.The two other men stood on either side of the car.Alexander told the two other men to get in front of the car and not let LF's family leave.He then went into the tattoo shop with Apodaca-Zambori.As the two entered the shop, Apodaca-Zambori yelled something at Alexander.

A few moments later, the two returned—Alexander exiting the building first and Apodaca-Zambori shortly thereafter.Alexander approached the car with some papers, stating that they proved that LF's family was on his private property.As Apodaca-Zambori exited the building, she was holding Alexander's pit bull dog, Nala, by its collar a short distance from LF's car.LF then heard Apodaca-Zambori say, "Get her, Nala," at which point Nala attacked LF, biting her leg.

Eventually, LF and Apodaca-Zambori removed Nala from LF's leg.As the dog was pulled away from LF's leg, Alexander told LF, "Bitch, you were lucky it was my dog and not my strap."³Alexander and Apodaca-Zambori then got into separate cars and drove away.Police arrested them shortly thereafter.Subsequent to Alexander's arrest, the police found a handgun in his car.

(ECFNo. 22-1at 2-4.)

In June 2008, the People of the State of Colorado("State") charged Alexander with first degree assault and unlawful ownership of a dangerous dog.(Id. at 2.)Shortly thereafter, the prosecution added one count of possession of a weapon by a previous offender (POWPO).(Id.)In February 2009, the State added four habitual criminal counts.⁴(Id.;ECF No. 1-1at 8.)A July 2009 trial on the severed POWPO charge resulted in a hung jury, but a November 2009 retrial led to a conviction.(ECFNo. 22-2at 2.)Then in December 2009, Alexander was tried and found guilty of first degree assault and unlawful ownership of a dog.(Id.)The trial court adjudicated Alexander a habitual criminal and sentenced him to sixty four years in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections.(Id. 2-3.)The CCA affirmed Alexander's convictions and sentences.(Id. at 33.)

Alexander returned to the trial court seeking postconviction relief under Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c).As relevant here, Alexander based his postconviction motion on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding advice received during plea negotiations and a claim that his 64-year sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.(Id. at 23.)The Adams County District Court denied the Rule 35(c) motion after holding an evidentiary hearing ("Hearing") on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.(Id. at 15-16.)The CCA affirmed the denial of postconviction relief.(Id. at 29.)

After the state proceedings concluded, Alexander brought the instant habeas corpus action on May 17, 2021.(ECF No. 1.)The parties were ordered to address the procedural defenses of timeliness and exhaustion of state remedies.(ECF No. 8.)Respondents filed a Pre-Answer Response, conceding that Alexander's claims were timely and exhausted.(ECF No. 14.)Accordingly, Respondents were ordered to file an answer addressing the merits of Claims 1-5, and Alexander was ordered to file a reply.(ECF No. 15.)The claims are now fully briefed (ECF Nos. 22, 42), and the Court will review the merits of the following five claims:

1.There was insufficient evidence to support Alexander's conviction for first degree assault ("Claim One")(ECF No. 1at 8-12);

2.Alexander's due process rights were violated because the trial court did not dismiss the assault charge as a sanction for the government's destruction of Nala before trial ("Claim Two")(id. at 12-15);

3.Trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective during plea negotiations by failing to adequately advise Alexander of the mandatory 64-year sentence he faced if convicted of the assault charge and adjudicated a habitual criminal ("Claim Three")(id. at 16-19);

4.Alexander's 64-year sentence is so disproportionate to the crimes he was convicted of committing that it violates the Eighth Amendment("Claim Four")(id. at 19-22); and

5.Alexander's right to a fair trial was violated because the prosecution's dog training expert was allowed to testify that Nala (Alexander's dog) had some type of training and took commands ("Claim Five")(id. at 22-24).

As relief, Alexander asks the Court to grant either a conditional or unconditional writ of habeas corpus.(Id. at 28.)

III.ANALYSIS

Respondents contend the CCA's resolution of each claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, which bars habeas...